Michele M. Moody-Adams

The idea of moral progress

This paper shows that moral progress is a substantive and plausible idea. Moral progress in belief involves deepening our grasp of existing moral concepts, while moral progress in practices involves realizing deepened moral understandings in behavior or social institutions. Moral insights could not be assimilated or widely disseminated if they involved devising and applying totally new moral concepts. Thus, it is argued, moral failures of past societies cannot be explained by appeal to ignorance of new moral ideas, but must be understood as resulting from refusals to subject social practices to critical scrutiny. Moral philosophy is not the main vehicle for disseminating morally progressive insights, though it has an important role in processes that lead to moral progress. Yet we have grounds for cautious optimism, since progressive moral insights can be disseminated and can, sometimes, have constructive social effects.

A Commentary on Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race

Moral inquiry is a fundamentally interpretive enterprise. Yet its interpretive tasks assume special importance when we seek to resolve moral conflict about political life.1 Discussions of American political morality must, first of all, interpret constitutive principles of liberal democracy—such as equality before the law, respect for individual liberty, and equality of opportunity. Since these principles define a political ideal, interpretations must weigh present approximations of the ideal against the effort to promote its fuller realization in the future. We must also articulate the moral relevance of past political arrangements which have shaped the contexts to which interpreted principles apply. Finally, moral inquiry must help us articulate our self-understandings, and encourage us to scrutinize them—and possibly to revise them—in accordance with morally compelling principles. The two essays by Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann that constitute Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race ably meet these interpretive demands. Together they provide a richly illuminating account of the moral and political implications of ‘‘race.’’ Color Conscious does not claim to be a comprehensive treatment of the subject; each essay attempts to answer one essentially self-contained question. Appiah’s essay, ‘‘Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections,’’ considers whether demands for political recognition of racial identities are compatible with requirements of American political morality. In ‘‘Responding to Racial Injustice,’’ Gutmann considers whether color-conscious policies—in employment, college admissions, and electoral redistricting—can be consistent with America’s newly evolved ideal of color-blindness. The essays also divide the interpretive labor. Appiah

The Virtue of Nussbaum's Essentialism

This paper shows that Nussbaums Aristotelian essentialism effectively combines resources for constructive social criticism (even in traditional societies) with concern for the concrete particulars of realized ways of life. Many critics of Nussbaums views have failed to appreciate its many virtues in this regard. Yet Nussbaums confidence in the broad possibilities of internal social criticism demands a better account of the moral openness of human cultures than anything Nussbaum has herself provided. Even Nussbaums reading of Aristotle - as well as the ethical antirelativism on which it depends - demands a richer account than Nussbaum has so far offered of the essential openness of human world interpretations.

Diversity and Disagreement in Ethics: Philosophical Implications

The extraordinary variety of ethical beliefs and practices that is possible within and across human societies has been a rich source of philosophical reflection. This article discusses important philosophical accounts, historical as well as contemporary, of what that diversity and disagreement come to. Philosophers ask what diversity and disagreement can tell us about the nature of ethical argument and inquiry, and they consider the implications of diversity and disagreement for ethical practice and social life. It is shown that philosophical contributions to these debates have often shaped and, in turn, been shaped by related work in the social sciences, and that as a result philosophers and social scientists frequently discuss similar methodological concerns. It is also argued that some of those concerns demand a response to debates about the nature of argument and inquiry in science, in order to address skepticism about the possibility of ever resolving serious ethical disagreement. Finally, it is shown that many recent philosophical discussions of diversity and disagreement address the ongoing challenge of adjudicating ethical and political conflict in culturally complex societies.

Diversity and Disagreement

The extraordinary variety of beliefs and practices that is possible within and across human societies has been a rich source of philosophical reflection; this article focuses on philosophical accounts of specifically ethical diversity and disagreement. Philosophers want to know what ethical diversity and disagreement might tell us about the nature of ethical argument and inquiry, as well as consider the implications of diversity and disagreement for ethical practice. This article discusses the most influential philosophical treatments of these issues, drawing on historical as well as contemporary accounts. It will be shown that these accounts have often shaped and, in turn, been shaped by related work in the social sciences, and that as a consequence they have frequently given rise to similar methodological worries. It will also be shown that these accounts will continue to be shaped by concern about how best to understand argument and inquiry in natural science, as well as by increasingly urgent concerns to adjudicate ethical and political conflict in culturally complex societies.