Miguel A. Malo

Labor Market Institutions and Individual Absenteeism in the European Union: The Relative Importance of Sickness Benefit Systems and Employment Protection Legislation

In this article, we analyze the determinants of individual absenteeism focusing on the strictness of employment protection and the generosity of sickness benefits. The data come from the European Survey on Working Conditions launched in 2000. Due to its coverage (the EU-14), the data enable us to identify the relative importance of the institutional framework for explaining differences in absence behavior across nations. Our results reveal that, first, employment protection does not influence the number of absence days while sickness benefits increase absenteeism. And, second, the impact of the institutional framework is smaller than that of some individual worker characteristics.

A Simple Model of Severance Pay Determination: The Case of Individual Dismissals in Spain

In this article we model the determinants of severance pay for individual dismissals in Spain, following an idea proposed by Jimeno and Toharia (Economistas 55: 243-255, 1993). We point out the importance of severance pay settled before judgment, since the legal framework creates a bargaining space to determine the amount paid by firms in cases of individual dismissal. The model is a simple pre-trial bargaining game between the firm and the worker. It predicts a higher settled severance pay for dismissals on economic grounds than on disciplinary ones, which could explain the perceptions held about the wide use of disciplinary dismissals in Spain. In addition, this approach could be useful in designing labour market reforms aimed at changing dismissal costs, because it allows us to determine the key variables affecting settled severance pay. Our simple model predicts that the key variables for Spain are the severance pay for unfair dismissal and the probability of unfair dismissal. Copyright Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000.

Worker Turnover, Job Turnover and Collective Bargaining in Spain

This paper analyses the relationship between the presence of organized labour in firms (approximated by the scope of collective bargaining) and the extent of gross worker and job flows. According to the voice theory of Freeman, those firms having a union presence will have lower worker mobility. However, there is no analysis of the effects of the presence of organized labour on gross job flows. Using a Spanish data base, we find evidence of the existence of a voice effect on gross worker flows but not clear support for a voice effect on gross job flows.

European Labour Law and Severance Pay Determination in Collective Redundancies

In this article, we analyse the effects of institutional procedures for redundancies on the earning losses of redundant workers in Europe. Our approach consists of modelling an ideal case embedding the main characteristics of European Labour Law, in particular, the bargaining between firms and workers on the severance pay after a negative shock. The most striking result is that an exact compensation of the earning losses is only obtained by chance. In particular, we show (including a numerical example) that overcompensation of dismissed workers is a real possibility. On the contrary, the ex-ante bargaining models of severance pay predict a full-insurance result. Therefore, we propose a policy recommendation which consists of changing the ex-post bargaining of severance pay in collective dismissals for an ex-ante bargaining.

Temporary Workers and Direct Voting Systems for Workers’ Representation

In this article, the author analyses whether in direct voting systems of workers’ representation the voting probability is affected by the contract type, using the Spanish union elections as a ‘natural’ experiment. Although temporary workers are formally covered by this electoral system, the author finds that it strongly discourages the participation of temporary workers in elections. The main consequence is that unions have fewer incentives to include temporary workers’ preferences in collective bargaining, and temporary workers lose an institutional channel to pressure for improvements in their inferior working conditions. The importance of other channels to include interests of temporary workers in unions’ strategies (such as membership) is discussed as well.

La evolución institucional del despido en España: una interpretación en términos de un accidente histórico

En este articulo se realiza un analisis de la evolucion institucional del despido en Espana. Se explica como determinados accidentes historicos que han generado dependencia del pasado dieron lugar a un sistema de despido libre costoso y los incentivos de empresas, trabajadores y gobiernos para sostener dicho sistema. Se analizan las ineficiencias de este sistema: incremento sustancial del coste del despido, uso distorsionado de las causas de despido y dificultades para hacer frente a grandes shocks economicos generalizados. Por ultimo, se explica como la reforma de las prestaciones por desempleo de 2002 es la culminacion de dicho sistema de despido libre costoso.

Hiring Workers with Disabilities when a Quota Requirement Exists: The relevance of firm’s size

We evaluate the impact of a mandatory quota of workers with disabilities using a sharp regression discontinuity design. We use data from a panel of Spanish firms where there is a mandatory quota of 2 % for firms with 50 or more workers. Non-parametric estimations show that strictly beyond the cut-off of 50 workers there is an increase of 1.4 points in the percentage of workers with disabilities in the firm, just fulfilling the quota of 2 %. However, this effect has some lack of precision. In addition, for larger firm’s sizes the variation in the percentage of workers with disabilities is likely related with differences in firms’ characteristics. dependence and endogenous initial conditions.

How are fixed-term contracts used by firms? An analysis using gross job and worker flows

Using Spanish establishment-level data on temporary and permanent job and worker flows, we examine firms’ relative usage of fixed-term contracts in response to changes in their prior net employment expectations for the short-run and the long-run – viewed as proxies of how a wide variety of future shocks are ultimately perceived by establishments. The employment response of establishments to changing net employment expectations for the short-run is, primarily, suggestive of their reliance on fixed-term contracts as a buffer to cushion short-run changes in demand as well as to shield permanent workers from downward workforce adjustments. In contrast, their response to changes in net employment expectations for the long-run mostly hints on the use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device. Therefore, policies providing financial incentives to convert fixed-term into permanent contracts – thus targeting firms’ using fixed-term contracts as a screening device, are likely to only have limited effectiveness.

Diferencias salariales por discapacidad y Centros Especiales de Empleo

En este articulo se estiman las diferencias salariales por discapacidad, atendiendo especialmente a las diferencias salariales existentes en los Centros Especiales de Empleo (CEE). Se encuentra que los trabajadores con discapacidad en un CEE ganan en torno a un 93% de lo que ganan en una empresa ordinaria. El 58% de esta diferencia salarial no es atribuible a diferencias en caracteristicas. Conforme crece la severidad de la discapacidad la parte no atribuible a caracteristicas disminuye, lo cual sugiere la existencia de discriminacion estadistica, tanto en CEE como en empresas ordinarias. El analisis esta basado en datos administrativos de la Seguridad Social.

Do Partial Disability Pensions Close the Earnings Gap

In this article, we estimate the total earnings losses of male workers with a partial disability, i.e., they are able to work at a different occupation after the disability’s onset. We use a Spanish administrative dataset (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales) from a specific partial disability pension scheme (Incapacidad Permanente Total). Using propensity score estimators combined with difference-in-differences, the estimation of the causal effect of the disability onset shows earnings losses to be approximately €400 per month for the first two years. For male workers over 54, total earnings losses are greater although they receive greater benefits.