Mihaela Onofrei

Determinant Factors of Firm Leverage: An Empirical Analysis at Iasi County Level☆

Abstract The paper investigates the determinants of capital structure of micro- and small enterprises based in the county of Iasi in Romania. Our study employed debt ratio as the dependent variable and five factors (profitability, tangibility, liquidity, size, and growth opportunity) as determinants of capital structure. We have found that leverage is negatively related to tangibility, profitability and liquidity. The size of the firm and the growth opportunities can also have a negative impact on the leverage, but to a lower extent.

The Effects of Corporate Board and CEO Characteristics on Firm Value: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies on the Bucharest Stock Exchange

ABSTRACT This article investigates the influence of characteristics of the corporate board and chief executive officer (CEO) on firm value, using a sample of companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2011. We consider board independence, committees, size, and diversity as board characteristics, as well as CEO characteristics such as CEO age, tenure, dual roles of CEO and chairman, country of residence, and gender. We employ the Tobin’s Q ratio as a proxy for firm value. We find evidence that board size negatively influences firm value, whereas curvilinear relationships are found among board independence, diversity, and firm value. Also, CEO tenure positively influences firm value, whereas the other governance variables are not statistically significant.

Corruption and Banking Stability: Evidence from Emerging Economies

ABSTRACT This article investigates the effect of corruption on banking stability using data from banks in emerging markets. The analysis first reveals that a lower level of corruption had a positive impact on bank stability and is associated with fewer credit losses and with more moderate credit growth. It then highlights the importance of bank and country characteristics in identifying the asymmetric effects of corruption on bank stability. Our evidence suggests that stability of banks that are acting in a country that has not adopted a corporate governance code or is not a member of the European Union is affected more by the corruption. Also, in countries with higher levels of corruption banks could increase their stability if they implement rigorous corporate governance practices.

Corporate Governance Influence on Banking Performance. An Analysis on Romania and Bulgaria

Abstract The aim of the paper is to find if the corporative governance characteristics have an impact on bank performance. We conducted an OLS regression on panel data (fixed, random effects and first-difference). We used data from Romanian and Bulgarian commercial banks as reported by Bureau van Dijk database and categorical variables manually collected by analyzing the annual reports of the banks from our sample. These latest dummy variables reflect the corporative governance component for our model. The data used in our paper is from 2003 to 2015 period. Our results showed that there are some statistically significant effects of our categorical variables on bank profitability in both countries, so, the good practice of corporate should be applied for obtaining higher bank’s performance.

Parliamentary Imm(p)unity

Abstract The parliamentary immunity as an ensemble of legal provisions, ensures for the deputies and the senators a derogatory juridical system from the common law, in relation to the justice and with the purpose of guaranteeing their independence. The protection that is being offered to the members of the Parliament against potential abuses from the executive power is a relative, not an absolute one. Thus, immunity does not imply impunity. In accordance with the principles of a democratic state, it is necessary that an adequate protection is offered to the deputies and senators, precisely so that a situation would not arise, in which they are prevented from exercising their mandate according to their own convictions, as a consequence of political disputes or personal vendettas.