Mikael Elinder

Gender, social norms, and survival in maritime disasters

Since the sinking of the Titanic, there has been a widespread belief that the social norm of “women and children first” (WCF) gives women a survival advantage over men in maritime disasters, and that captains and crew members give priority to passengers. We analyze a database of 18 maritime disasters spanning three centuries, covering the fate of over 15,000 individuals of more than 30 nationalities. Our results provide a unique picture of maritime disasters. Women have a distinct survival disadvantage compared with men. Captains and crew survive at a significantly higher rate than passengers. We also find that: the captain has the power to enforce normative behavior; there seems to be no association between duration of a disaster and the impact of social norms; women fare no better when they constitute a small share of the ship’s complement; the length of the voyage before the disaster appears to have no impact on women’s relative survival rate; the sex gap in survival rates has declined since World War I; and women have a larger disadvantage in British shipwrecks. Taken together, our findings show that human behavior in life-and-death situations is best captured by the expression “every man for himself.”

The Impact of Inheritances on Heirs' Labor and Capital Income

Abstract The objective of this paper is to study when and how much labor and capital income of heirs respond to inheritances. We estimate fixed effects models following direct heirs, inheriting in 2004, during the years 2000--2008 using Swedish panel data. Our first main result is that the more the heir inherits, the lower her labor income becomes. This labor income effect appears in the years after the heir had inherited and is stronger for old heirs than for young heirs. We also find evidence of anticipation effects that occur before the actual transfer. Our second main result is that the more the heir inherits, the higher her capital income becomes. This effect only appears in the years after receiving the inheritance. It seems to be dissipating after a couple of years.

Consequences of a price incentive on free riding and electric energy consumption

Significance We show that a simple and common price incentive is highly effective in reducing electric energy consumption (EEC). When EEC is billed and metered at the apartment level compared with when tenants have unlimited EEC included in the rent, annual EEC falls by about 25%. Moreover, the reduction in EEC comes almost exclusively from households with very high EEC before the policy change. The results suggest that most tenants benefit, whereas only a small group of free riders stand to lose from this policy change. The policy is cost-effective, with a cost per reduced kilowatt hour of US

Trust and Growth: A Shaky Relationship

0.01, and for each invested dollar, the social value of reductions in air pollution, including CO2, is

Is Tolerance Good or Bad for Growth

2. This article shows that a simple monetary incentive can dramatically reduce electric energy consumption (EEC) in the residential sector and simultaneously achieve a more desirable allocation of EEC costs. The analyses are based on data from a policy experiment conducted in 2011 and 2012 by a private housing company in about 1,800 apartments. Roughly 800 of the tenants (treatment group) were subject to a change from having unlimited EEC included in their rent to having to pay the market price for their own EEC. This change was achieved by installing EEC meters in each apartment. Tenants in the other 1,000 apartments (control group) experienced no policy change and were subject to apartment-level billing and metering during the entire study period. Using a quasiexperimental research design and daily data on EEC from 2007 to 2015, we estimate that apartment-level billing and metering permanently reduce EEC by about 25%. Moreover, we show that households reduce EEC immediately after being informed that they will be billed for EEC, the reduction is larger when the production cost is higher, and the reduction in EEC comes almost exclusively from households with very high EEC before the policy change. Finally, we show that apartment-level billing and metering are cost-effective, with a cost per reduced kilowatt hour of US

Correcting Mistakes : Cognitive Dissonance and Political Attitudes in Sweden and the United States

0.01, and for each invested dollar, the social value of reductions in air pollution, including CO2 emissions, is

Promises, policies and pocketbook voting

2.