Mike Felgenhauer

Preselection and Expert Advice

We study the effects of preselection on an expert’s advice about the execution of a project if its execution yields more precise estimates about the expert’s expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker evaluates the project before asking for advice, alters the expert’s perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.

Bayesian persuasion with private experimentation

This article studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of equilibria that are not Pareto‐dominated. In each of these equilibria under private experimentation, the persuasion probability is lower and the receiver obtains access to higher quality information than under public experimentation. The decision quality improves in the senders stakes.