Mikhail I. Gofman
Binghamton University
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Featured researches published by Mikhail I. Gofman.
computer and communications security | 2007
Scott D. Stoller; Ping Yang; C. R. Ramakrishnan; Mikhail I. Gofman
Administrative RBAC (ARBAC) policies specify how Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policies may be changed by each administrator. It is often difficult to fully understand the effect of an ARBAC policy by simple inspection, because sequences of changes by different administrators may interact in unexpected ways. ARBAC policy analysis algorithms can help by answering questions, such a suser-role reachability, which asks whether a given user can be assigned to given roles by given administrators. This problem is intractable in general. This paper identifies classes of policies of practical interest, develops analysis algorithms for them, and analyzes their parameterized complexity, showing that the algorithms may have high complexity with respect to some parameter k characterizing the hardness of the input (such that k is often small in practice) but have polynomial complexity in terms of the overall input size when the value of k is fixed.
tools and algorithms for construction and analysis of systems | 2009
Mikhail I. Gofman; Ruiqi Luo; Ayla C. Solomon; Yingbin Zhang; Ping Yang; Scott D. Stoller
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) has been widely used for expressing access control policies. Administrative Role-Based Access Control (ARBAC) specifies how an RBAC policy may be changed by each administrator. Because sequences of changes by different administrators may interact in unintended ways, it is often difficult to fully understand the effect of an ARBAC policy by simple inspection. This paper presents RBAC-PAT, a tool for analyzing RBAC and ARBAC policies, which supports analysis of various properties including reachability, availability, containment, weakest precondition, dead roles, and information flows.
Computers & Security | 2011
Scott D. Stoller; Ping Yang; Mikhail I. Gofman; C. R. Ramakrishnan
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a widely used access control paradigm. In large organizations, the RBAC policy is managed by multiple administrators. An administrative role-based access control (ARBAC) policy specifies how each administrator may change the RBAC policy. It is often difficult to fully understand the effect of an ARBAC policy by simple inspection, because sequences of changes by different administrators may interact in unexpected ways. ARBAC policy analysis algorithms can help by answering questions, such as user-role reachability, which asks whether a given user can be assigned to given roles by given administrators. Allowing roles and permissions to have parameters significantly enhances the scalability, flexibility, and expressiveness of ARBAC policies. This paper defines PARBAC, which extends the classic ARBAC97 model to support parameters, proves that user-role reachability analysis for PARBAC is undecidable when parameters may range over infinite types, and presents a semi-decision procedure for reachability analysis of PARBAC. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis algorithm specifically for parameterized ARBAC policies. We evaluate its efficiency by analyzing its parameterized complexity and benchmarking it on case studies and synthetic policies. We also experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of several optimizations.
symposium on access control models and technologies | 2009
Scott D. Stoller; Ping Yang; Mikhail I. Gofman; C. R. Ramakrishnan
Role based access control (RBAC) is a widely used access control paradigm. In large organizations, the RBAC policy is managed by multiple administrators. An administrative role based access control (ARBAC) policy specifies how each administrator may change the RBAC policy. It is often difficult to fully understand the effect of an ARBAC policy by simple inspection, because sequences of changes by different administrators may interact in unexpected ways. ARBAC policy analysis algorithms can help by answering questions, such as user-role reachability, which asks whether a given user can be assigned to given roles by given administrators. Allowing roles and permissions to have parameters significantly enhances the scalability, flexibility, and expressiveness of ARBAC policies. This paper defines PARBAC, which extends the classic ARBAC97 model to support parameters, and presents an analysis algorithm for PARBAC. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis algorithm specifically for parameterized ARBAC policies. We evaluate its efficiency by analyzing its parameterized complexity and benchmarking it on case studies and synthetic policies.
european symposium on research in computer security | 2010
Mikhail I. Gofman; Ruiqi Luo; Ping Yang
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) has been widely used for restricting resource access to only authorized users. Administrative Role Based Access Control (ARBAC) specifies permissions for administrators to change RBAC policies. Due to complex interactions between changes made by different administrators, it is often difficult to comprehend the full effect of ARBAC policies by manual inspection alone. Policy analysis helps administrators detect potential flaws in the policy specification. Prior work on ARBAC policy analysis considers only static ARBAC policies. In practice, ARBAC policies tend to change over time in order to fix design flaws or to cope with the changing requirements of an organization. Changes to AR-BAC policies may invalidate security properties that were previously satisfied. In this paper, we present incremental algorithms for user-role reachability analysis of ARBAC policies, which asks whether a given user can be assigned to given roles by given administrators. Our incremental algorithms determine if a change may affect the analysis result, and if so, use the information of the previous analysis to incrementally update the analysis result. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first known incremental algorithms in literature for ARBAC analysis. Detailed evaluations show that our incremental algorithms outperform the non-incremental algorithm in terms of execution time.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences | 2010
Ping Yang; Shiyong Lu; Mikhail I. Gofman; Zijiang Yang
Recently, scientific workflows have emerged as a platform for automating and accelerating data processing and data sharing in scientific communities. Many scientific workflows have been developed for collaborative research projects that involve a number of geographically distributed organizations. Sharing of data and computation across organizations in different administrative domains is essential in such a collaborative environment. Because of the competitive nature of scientific research, it is important to ensure that sensitive information in scientific workflows can be accessed by and propagated to only authorized parties. To address this problem, we present techniques for analyzing how information propagates in scientific workflows. We also present algorithms for incrementally analyzing how information propagates upon every change to an existing scientific workflow.
Communications of The ACM | 2016
Mikhail I. Gofman; Sinjini Mitra; Tsu-Hsiang Kevin Cheng; Nicholas Smith
Fusing information from multiple biometric traits enhances authentication in mobile devices.
DBSec 2013 Proceedings of the 27th Annual IFIP WG 11.3 Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXVII - Volume 7964 | 2013
Ping Yang; Mikhail I. Gofman; Zijiang Yang
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a widely used model for expressing access control policies. In large organizations, the RBAC policy may be collectively managed by many administrators. Administrative RBAC (ARBAC) is a model for expressing the authority of administrators, thereby specifying how an organizations RBAC policy may change. Changes by one administrator may interact in unintended ways with changes by other administrators. Consequently, the effect of an ARBAC policy is hard to understand by simple inspection. In this paper, we consider the problem of analyzing ARBAC policies, in particular to determine reachability properties (e.g., whether a user can eventually be assigned to a role by a group of administrators) and availability properties (e.g., whether a user cannot be removed from a role by a group of administrators) implied by a policy. We first establish the connection between security policy analysis and planning in artificial intelligence. Based partly on this connection, we show that reachability analysis for ARBAC is PSPACE-complete. We also give algorithms and complexity results for reachability and related analysis problems for several categories of ARBAC policies, defined by simple restrictions on the policy language
Journal of Computer Security | 2015
Ping Yang; Mikhail I. Gofman; Scott D. Stoller; Zijiang Yang
Role based access control RBAC is a widely used approach to access control with well-known advantages in managing authorization policies. This paper considers user-role reachability analysis of administrative role based access control ARBAC, which defines administrative roles and specifies how members of each administrative role can change the RBAC policy. Most existing works on user-role reachability analysis assume the separate administration restriction in ARBAC policies. While this restriction greatly simplifies the user-role reachability analysis, it also limits the expressiveness and applicability of ARBAC. In this paper, we consider analysis of ARBAC without the separate administration restriction and present new techniques to reduce the number of ARBAC rules and users considered during analysis. We also present parallel algorithms that speed up the analysis on multi-core systems. The experimental results show that our techniques significantly reduce the analysis time, making it practical to analyze ARBAC without separate administration.
ieee international conference on services computing | 2012
Ruiqi Luo; Ping Yang; Shiyong Lu; Mikhail I. Gofman
Provenance has become an important concept for services computing in general, and for scientific workflows in particular. Provenance often contains confidential data and dependencies whose access needs to be protected. Provenance access control policies control who can access which provenance information. Correct specification of provenance access control policies is critical to ensure system security. However, due to the sheer size of provenance, it is often difficult to comprehend the full effects of an access control policy by manual inspection alone due to complex multi-step dependencies and their interactions. In this paper, we present automated analysis algorithms and complexity results for three provenance analysis problems. We have also developed incremental strategies for these algorithms for evolving provenance and access control policies.