Miles Goodwin

Employer Evasion of Workers’ Entitlements 1986-1995: Why, What and Whose?

Employer non-compliance with workers’ entitlements has been largely ignored in Australian industrial relations. The legal and regulatory literature however, identifies arguments relating to employer propensity to evade regulatory requirements, as well as highlighting environmental factors that may influence such behaviour. This article explores these issues in the Australian federal industrial relations jurisdiction, as well as providing a picture of employer evasion of minimum labour standards between 1986 and 1995: who is exploited and in respect of what entitlements. Industry contexts and common characteristics of non-compliance are outlined by exploration of 30 awards ranked by the extent of underpayments recovered by the federal inspectorate during the period. Employer evasion of workers’ entitlements is arguably a calculated business decision, prompted or facilitated by intense competition, precarious employment (particularly female and youth), non-unionized workplaces and under-resourced enforcement agencies.

Does Institutional Location Protect from Political Influence? The Case of a Minimum Labour Standards Enforcement Agency in Australia

Among the many factors that influence enforcement agencies, this article examines the role of the institutional location (and independence) of agencies, and an incumbent governments ideology. It is argued that institutional location affects the level of political influence on the agencys operations, while government ideology affects its willingness to resource enforcement agencies and approve regulatory activities. Evidence from the agency regulating minimum labour standards in the Australian federal industrial relations jurisdiction (currently the Fair Work Ombudsman) highlights two divergences from the regulatory enforcement literature generally. First, notions of independence from political interference offered by institutional location are more illusory than real and, second, political need motivates political action to a greater extent than political ideology.

TRANSFORMING THE INSPECTION BLITZ: TARGETED CAMPAIGNS, ENFORCEMENT AND THE OMBUDSMAN

The inspection blitz is a tool used by enforcement agencies, as a method of checking compliance with regulatory standards by concentrating resources on particular workplaces where significant non-compliance is suspected. This paper explores the transformation of blitzes into ‘targeted campaigns’ in the minimum labour standards’ enforcement agency in the Australian federal industrial relations jurisdiction. An examination of historical and current use by the agency exposes significant changes to both the implementation and potential outcomes of this enforcement tool. Examined within the framework of regulatory enforcement approaches taking accommodative, deterrence or ‘responsive’ stances, two points are made: several aspects of current practice limit the effectiveness of targeted campaigns in the longer term; and the agency displays divided enforcement approaches delivering inconsistent messages to its target audience.