Milja Kurki

Causes of a divided discipline: rethinking the concept of cause in International Relations theory

Kurki, M. (2006). Causes of a Divided Discipline: Rethinking the Concept of Cause in International Relations theory. Review of International Studies, 32 (2), 189-216. RAE2008

Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations

Kurki, M. (2007). Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35 (2), 361-378. RAE2008

The conceptual politics of democracy promotion

European Research Council, Political Economies of Democratisation, ERC grant number 202 596.

Democracy through Technocracy? Reflections on Technocratic Assumptions in EU Democracy Promotion Discourse

Abstract For some time the notion ‘technocracy’ has been, for better or for worse, associated with the functioning of the European Union. But what role do technocratic assumptions play in the EUs new ‘symbolic’ policy agenda of democracy promotion, if any? Some authors have suggested that ‘depoliticising’ technocratic biases exist in the EU democracy promotion framework, despite its ‘normative’ rhetoric and seemingly far-reaching ‘political’ consequences for target countries. This article investigates the ways in which technocratic assumptions characterise the EUs democracy promotion discourse. Further, it reflects on the potential consequences of technocratic assumptions for EU democracy promotion: both the pragmatic benefits involved in ‘fudging’ the question of politics and ideology in democracy promotion, and the problems and paradoxes that technocratic biases give rise to by removing clear normative and political justifications from the EU democracy promotion agenda.

Democratic Futures : Re-Visioning Democracy Promotion

RONO: ERC 202 596 Sponsor: European Research Council, Political Economies of Democratisation

The Politics of the Philosophy of Science

Monteiro and Ruby ( 2009 ) argue that International Relations (IR) scholars should look to adopt a more ‘tentative attitude’ towards the philosophy of science (PoS) frameworks in IR. This is an attractive and timely call for more open-minded PoS argumentation in the field. Yet, the logic of Monteiro and Ruby’s argument is not (rather characteristically of PoS debates) infallible. As other commentaries in this forum show, it is not self-evident that Monteiro and Ruby’s account is ‘post-foundational’, or that it is premised on an accurate reading of existing PoS positions in IR. However, I do not here wish to elaborate further on the critiques that could be made of the internal coherence of Monteiro and Ruby’s argumentation or their reading of core philosophical schools. Instead, I want to discuss a different kind of an issue raised by Monteiro and Ruby’s intervention: their treatment of the interaction of political forms of argumentation and PoS debates.

The Limitations of the ‘Critical Edge’: Reflections on Critical and Philosophical IR Scholarship Today

The crisis of 2009 has not proved to be a great impetus for new critical redirection of political and economic thinking in the West: both politico-economic structures in the West and the models of development and democratisation at the heart of Western foreign policy agendas remain much the same. This is despite the continued efforts of critical and philosophical IR theorists to push ‘critical thinking’ and ‘alternative agendas’ in world politics. Why the dismal ‘real-world’ failure of critical and philosophical IR research? This piece reflects on the trends towards depoliticisation, fragmentation and de-concretisation of critical and philosophical IR research and suggests some potential ways forward in reorienting critical and philosophical research in the field.

Stretching Situated Knowledge: From Standpoint Epistemology to Cosmology and Back Again

This article is driven by the belief that there is great potential benefit in carefully considering the implications of ‘situated knowledge’ in IR scholarship. This can be helpful not just for scholars thinking through meta-theoretical puzzles in International Relations (IR), but also for shaping concrete knowledge practices in international political practice today. Yet, there seems to be something of an unresolved puzzle at the heart of the situated knowledge paradigm: a puzzle relating to what the situatedness of knowledge entails and how we should ‘deal with it’. This piece suggests that philosophical and social theoretical, and by extension also IR theoretical, engagements with situated knowledge can benefit from being considered anew: from the point of view of theoretical physicists and cosmologists. While not always reflexive concerning ‘social’ situatedness, the physicists and cosmologists considered here have reflected on aspects of situatedness that have been under-emphasised in standpoint philosophy. Crucially, physics and cosmology framings of situated knowledge can help to show why dealing with situated knowledge should mean more than attentiveness to various knowers and their positionality, and more than reflexive ‘dialogue’ between knowers; it also seems to require ‘stretching beyond’ the horizons of ‘situated knowers’. It is suggested that science is, and perhaps even ‘scientifically aspirant’ IR then should be, about imaginative conceptual ‘stretching’ rather than merely ‘situating’. This stretching should go hand in hand with opportunistic but critical methodological probing, seeking to push us ‘beyond’ how we understand the world from our situated perspectives. The provocations developed here have three main audiences in IR: scholars engaged in meta-theoretical debates in IR, those studying international politics through the situated knowledge approach, and also critical theorists seeking to understand conditions of critique.

Towards the politics of causal explanation: a reply to the critics of causal inquiries

Causal inquiry has been a controversial matter in International Relations (IR) scholarship in recent years. While many new „non-positivist‟ stances on causal analysis have been developed in recent years, many post-positivist and critical theorists in the discipline have remained unconvinced of the virtues of causal inquiry. Crucially, the political consequences of causal analysis seem to be a sticking point for many such critics. Yet, the politics of causal analysis are, we argue, complex and relatively poorly engaged with at present. Indeed, the arguments against causal analysis which rely on warnings concerning the political nature of causal analysis are inadequate and incomplete. We contend here that causal analysis is, indeed, political but that this does not mean that we should not engage in causal inquiry. On the contrary, we argue that this is what makes causal inquiry interesting and important in social science. A more nuanced and reflective approach to dealings with the politics of causal analysis is needed, and it is such a response that we provoke critics of causal analysis to consider.

Introduction: The conceptual politics of democracy promotion

European Research Council, Political Economies of Democratisation, ERC grant number 202 596.