Ming D. Leung

Dilettante or Renaissance Person? How the Order of Job Experiences Affects Hiring in an External Labor Market

Social actors who move across categories are typically disadvantaged relative to their more focused peers. Yet candidates who compile experiences across disparate areas can either be appreciated as renaissance individuals or penalized as dilettantes. Extant literature has focused on the comparison between single versus multiple category members and on skill assessment, hindering its applicability. To discriminate between more versus less successful category spanners, I suggest that the order of accumulated experiences matters, because it serves as an indicator of commitment. I propose the concept of erraticism and predict that employers will prefer candidates who demonstrate some erraticism, by moving incrementally between similar jobs, over candidates who do not move and also over those with highly erratic job histories. Furthermore, I suggest this relationship holds for more complex jobs, less experienced freelancers, and is attenuated through working together. These issues are particularly salient given the rise of external labor markets where careers are increasingly marked by moves across traditional boundaries. I test and find support for these hypotheses with data from an online crowd-sourced labor market for freelancing services, Elance.com. I discuss how virtual mediated labor markets may alter hiring processes.

“Actual” and Perceptual Effects of Category Spanning

Literature to date has demonstrated that producers and products spanning multiple categories have inferior market performance. However, two related but distinct explanations exist as to the source of such a discount. One explanation suggests that “actual” skills are degraded when producers attempt to engage across diverse categories. Another explanation involves perceptual fit to category representations held by an audience as the cause. These two explanations tend to be confounded in archival studies because external observers, responsible for the evaluation of market performance, are often aware of both the identity of producers and the underlying characteristics of their products. This leaves researchers unable to empirically separate effects. We present an analysis conducted in a setting in which it was possible to distinguish the two mechanisms: critics’ ratings of the same wines through “blind” and “nonblind” tastings. The findings indicate that after controlling for the value of ratings assigned blindly, the wines made by wineries spanning styles continue to receive lower ratings in the nonblind situation.

Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Evidence of Perceptual Factors in the Multiple-Category Discount

Extant work shows that market actors who span multiple social categories tend to be devalued relative to their more specialized peers. Scholars typically explain this pattern of results with one of two arguments. Some contend that perceptual factors—namely, the difficulties that buyers have in making sense of category spanners—contribute to the observed pattern of devaluation. Others argue that the penalty for category-spanning stems from the fact that those who do not focus their efforts narrowly tend to offer products that are of lower quality. Because these two mechanisms often co-occur, it has been difficult to provide definitive evidence of the perceptually driven component of the multiple-category penalty. We employ a natural experiment on a peer-to-peer crowd-funding website to address this gap. Difference-in-difference analyses on matched samples show that category spanning is perceived negatively and can result in devaluation, even in the absence of underlying quality differences. This result supports the argument that perceptual issues contribute to the penalty for category spanning.

The Dilemma of Mobility: The Differential Effects of Women and Men's Erratic Career Paths

It is well recognized that organizations play a central role in generating inequality in employment outcomes between women and men. Women are often disadvantaged relative to men when they enter firms either because they are more likely to enter into lower paying positions or into roles that offer less advancement opportunities. What is less well-understood are the mechanisms though which women may be able to overcome these disadvantages. One theoretical solution to this problem is for women to undertake less typical career paths within the firm and move to more fecund jobs and job ladders that offer more opportunity for advancement. However, there is a risk to moving atypically, as erratic careers are often viewed negatively. We investigate this question with monthly observations of 53,311 exempt U.S. employees at a West Coast Fortune 500 tech company over an eight year period, from 2008 to 2015. We first demonstrate that jobs disproportionately staffed by women are, on average, of lower pay and lower advancement opportunities within the firm. We find, erratic career mobility, defined as a sequence of atypical job moves, results in differential outcomes for women and men. Specifically, women who move erratically are promoted faster than similarly erratic men. However, this effect is the opposite for performance appraisals. More erratic mobility by women results in lower performance appraisals than similarly erratic men. Mobility is therefore a double-edged sword for women - we refer to this as the dilemma of mobility.

Failed Searches: Hiring as a Cognitive Decision Making Process and How Applicant Variety Affects an Employer's Likelihood of Making an Offer

Extant hiring research has generally focused on understanding outcomes for employees and not on outcomes for employers. I theorize on how employer cognitive hiring decision processes affect their likelihood of extending an offer of employment. I argue that greater variety in the job experiences of candidates in the applicant pool complicates employer comparison processes. Hiring is a two-stage process and I predict that comparison difficulties materialize among a winnowed down consideration set of candidates in this second stage. More experienced employers have less difficulty with variety because they have better constructed preferences. Regression analyses from an online market for contract labor on over 640,000 job postings by over 170,000 employers support my contentions. Greater variety in job experiences among job candidates in the applicant pool leads to a lower likelihood a job offer will be extended to any of them. This relationship is completely mediated by the variety in job candidates in the second stage consideration set. The more experience an employer has in hiring in a domain, the less of an issue variety becomes. Results utilizing an instrumental variable and several supporting analyses are also reported. Contributions to the study of evaluation in markets, hiring, and cognitive processes of categorization are discussed.

Learning to Hire? Hiring as a Dynamic Experiential Process in an Online Market for Contract Labor

Can employers learn to hire? This article conceptualizes hiring as a dynamic experiential learning process. Instead of examining hiring as a point in time decision, I investigate whether and how employers’ past hiring experiences affect their future decisions. Drawing on evidence from a global online market for contract labor, I argue that employers revise their beliefs regarding job applicants from a particular social category following a negative hiring experience from that social category. I analyze over 16 Million applications from freelancers worldwide for over 2.2 Million jobs from 557,416 employers. I find that employers who have a negative hiring experience with a freelancer from a particular country are subsequently less likely to hire other freelancers from that country. This effect is stronger on hiring for identical subsequent jobs and weaker for other jobs. Most strikingly, evidence from the actual hiring switches following a negative experience and a simulation using data from the observed distribution of freelancers on the platform demonstrate that employers unnecessarily oversteer away from countries given the narrow distribution of observable ability among freelancers. Switches do not result in hiring from a “better�? country.