Mirella Damiani

Temporary Job Protection and Productivity Growth in EU Economies

The present study examines cross-national and sectoral differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in fourteen European countries and ten sectors from 1995 to 2007. The main aim is to ascertain the role of employment protection of temporary contracts on TFP by estimating their effects with a “difference-in-difference” approach. Results show that deregulation of temporary contracts negatively influences the growth rates of TFP in European economies and that, within sectoral analysis, the role of this liberalisation is greater in industries where firms are more used to opening short-term positions. By contrast, in our observation period, restrictions on regular jobs do not cause significant effects on TFP, whereas limited regulation of product markets and higher R&D expenses positively affect efficiency growth.

Stakeholders vs. Shareholders in Corporate Governance

The paper is divided in two coordinate parts. The first considers in general the issue of stockholders vs. stakeholders oriented governance systems and their relative merits and demerits. The second part deals specifically with the issue of the principal-agent problem in a stakeholder context.

Decentralised bargaining and performance-related pay: Evidence from a panel of Italian firms

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which performance-related pay (PRP) has been negotiated through decentralised bargaining in Italy. Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides estimates aimed at identifying the main factors that have favoured agreements on PRP, on the basis of a nationally representative sample of Italian manufacturing and service companies. Findings – The paper shows that collective bargaining on PRP in Italy is positively associated with the presence of unions. The estimates also suggest that in unionised firms, workers have more access to returns from training in the form of PRP schemes. Finally, the paper finds that firm performance is positively associated with the adoption of PRP. Research limitations/implications – Further research based on additional data should enable the authors to identify causal effects. Practical implications – Partial fiscal exemptions for the wage component linked to enterprise results might increase the number of firms a...

Mergers, Acquisitions and Technological Regimes: The European Experience over the Period 2002-2005

Comparisons by countries and by sectors of mergers and acquisitions have usually been performed in separate fields of research. A first group of studies, focusing on international comparisons, has explored the role of corporate governance systems, investor protection laws and other countries’ regulatory institutions as the main determinants of takeovers around the world. A second group of contributions has attributed a central role to variations in industry composition, documenting that, in each country, mergers occur in waves and within each wave clustering by industry is observed. This paper aims to integrate both perspectives and to make comparisons by countries and by sectors, thus exploring the role of various driving forces on takeover activities. It also intends to consider the specific influence that technological regimes and their innovation patterns may exert in reallocating assets and moving capital among sectors. This will be done by examining the European experience of the last few years (2002-2005). We found that even in countries where transfer of control is a frequent phenomenon, mergers are less frequent in those sectors where innovation is a cumulative process and where takeovers may be a threat to the continuity of accumulation of innovative capabilities.

Labour Shares and Employment Protection in European Economies

Liberalisation of temporary contracts has become an important component of recent labour reforms but up to now available research has not paid attention to the impacts of these institutional changes on functional income distribution. The present paper intends to fill this gap by focussing on the reduction in strictness of employment protection of temporary jobs and analysing its effects on factor shares. We have estimated labour share, as well as its components, worker pays and employment, by considering country-sector evidence for 14 EU economies and the sample period 1995-2007. We have found that these legislative changes, that have favoured the extensive use of temporary contracts, have contributed to instability of working conditions and caused negative effects on workers’ pays. These impacts have more than counterbalanced the scanty positive effects on employment (due to greater access to the labour market of additional workers, likely young and women), thus leading to a decrease in income share accruing to workers.

Family Firms and Labor Productivity: The Role of Enterprise‐Level Bargaining in the Italian Economy

We investigate the role of Italian firms in labor productivity performance. We find that family‐owned firms have lower labor productivity than their non‐family counterparts. In a second step, we estimate the role of firm‐level bargaining (FLB) to determine whether family‐controlled firms that adopt this type of bargaining may partially close the gap in terms of labor productivity with their non‐family competitors. Our results, obtained through IV estimation to control for endogeneity bias, suggest that enterprises under family governance achieve significant labor productivity gains—greater than those achieved by their non‐family counterparts—when they adopt firm‐level bargaining.

Wages and Labour Productivity: The Role of Performance-Related Pay in Italian Firms

This paper analyses the role of Performance Related Pay (PRP) agreements on labour productivity and wages. Its main contribution is thus to investigate the effects of PRP on both dimensions, i.e. productivity and distribution, whereas most of the studies of related literature are restricted to one of those aspects. All estimates are performed for a large sample of manufacturing and service Italian firms with more than five employees and a restricted sample including only unionised firms. It allows us to focus on a relevant feature of industrial relations represented by worker representation and its role in local wage setting in the Italian economy. The expected positive link between PRP and firm performance has been confirmed in all estimates, also controlling for a rich set of covariates. Furthermore, the comparison of productivity estimates with those for wages allows us to ascertain that payments by results might be not only rent-sharing devices, but schemes that substantially lead to efficiency enhancements. These findings have been validated by a number of robustness checks, also taking into account endogeneity by using instrumental variables and the treatments of 3SLS. The paper argues that well designed policies, that circumvent the limited implementation of PRP practices, would guarantee productivity improvement. The real effectiveness of these measures would not be weakened under union governance.

Performance-Related Pay, Unions, and Productivity in Italy: Evidence from Quantile Regressions

Purpose – This study analyses the effects on productivity of Performance-Related Payments (PRP) and unions, and examines to what extent heterogeneity between firms characterises these influences. Design - For the Italian economy, the study presents firm-level quantile regressions for Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and controls for various observed characteristics of firms, worker composition and labour relations. Findings - The paper shows the significant effect of PRP and unions on the whole economy and on firms operating in the manufacturing industries. In these industries, the uniform incentive effects of PRP but the increasing impact of unions are estimated along the productivity distribution. Conversely, the role of management - significant in all sectors- is more efficacious in prospering large firms operating in services. Research limitations – The adoption of PRP schemes and the presence of unions maybe endogenous to firms’ productivity, and our estimates do not prove causal links but simply suggest correlations. Practical implications - The limited incentive effects of PRP schemes in services contribute towards explaining the slowdown in Italian productivity, whereas the role of unions is quite uniform among sectors. Originality- The paper addresses the hitherto poorly developed issue of firm heterogeneity and TFP, and offers the first Italian study of PRP and unions, which covers all dimensional classes of firms and non-agricultural sectors of the Italian economy.

The market for corporate control: do countries and technological regimes matter?

Using DATASTREAM and LexisNexis databases, we examine the experience from 1995 to 2005 for eight European countries and 21 sectors, and compute the frequency of merger transactions at sectoral level, controlling for the roles of country variables and focusing on distinct technological patterns of innovation. We found that, even in market‐based countries, where transfer of control is a frequent phenomenon, mergers are less frequent in those sectors where innovation follows cumulative processes and where takeovers represent a ‘breach of knowledge.’ This study provides empirical support to the fruitful line of research of varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001) and shows that sectoral differences in M&A (mergers and acquisitions) may be seen in their complementarities with differences by country and their institutional frameworks. Results confirm that acquisitions may occur even in those economies where block‐holders are present, but where the good quality of institutions leaves no space for defence against takeovers. It also highlights the significant role played by takeover regulation, and suggests that the recent reforms in European harmonization should be implemented, so that the obstacles impeding takeovers can be removed. However, policy‐makers should also try to identify for which economies and sectoral fields of specialization, merger activities produce more beneficial effects and which turn out to be detrimental.

Labour protection and productivity in the European economies: 1995-2005

The present study examines cross-national and sectoral differences in multifactor productivity growth in sixteen European countries from 1995 to 2005. The main aim is to ascertain the role of flexible employment contracts and collective labour relationships in explaining the ample differentials recorded in the European economy. Research Findings We use the EU KLEMS database for growth accounting and a broad set of indicators of labour regulations, covering two distinct ‘areas’ of labour regulation: employment laws and collective relations laws. This comprehensive approach allow us to consider arrangements that regulate allocation of labour inputs (fixed-term, part-time contracts, hours worked) and of payoff and decision rights of employees. We find that, since 1995, European countries have not followed similar patterns of growth. A large number of variations between European economies are caused by deep differentials in multifactor productivity and part of this heterogeneity is caused by sectoral diversities. We show that, in labour-intensive sectors such as services, fixed-term contracts, which imply shorter-term jobs and lower employment tenures, may discourage investment in skills and have detrimental effects on multifactor productivity increases. We also find that some forms of labour regulation and arrangements that give a ‘voice’ to employees mitigate these perverse effects on efficiency patterns. Employment protection reforms which slacken the rules of fixed-term contracts cause potential drawbacks in terms of low productivity gains. More stringent regulation of these practices, as well as a climate of collective relations, sustain long-term relationships and mitigate these negative effects.