Mitchell G. Ash

Academic Politics in the History of Science: Experimental Psychology in Germany, 1879–1941

The rise of large-scale laboratory research in nineteenth-century Germany has often been portrayed as a continuous success story. Taken as indicative are the two sciences on the leading edge of the trend, chemistry and physiology; developments in biology, physics, and the technical fields are then depicted either as imitations of or as the results of knowledge or personnel transfer from the leading disciplines. At first glance, the founding in 1879 of the worlds first continuously operating psychological laboratory in Leipzig by Wilhelm Wundt, a physiologist turned philosopher, seems to fit this model very well. In one study, Joseph Ben-David and Randall Collins assert that this instance of “role hybridization,” as they call it, marked experimental psychologys “take-off into sustained growth” as a scientific discipline.

Wissenschaftswandel in Zeiten politischer Umwälzungen: Entwicklungen, Verwicklungen, Abwicklungen

Until recently, the development of the modern sciences has usually been described as a continuous unfolding of constantly expanding and differentiating research institutions on the one hand, and the accumulation of more and better knowledge on the other. The changes that have occurred both in scientific institutions and in the direction and content of research in the course of revolutions or comparable political changes pose significant challenges to such accounts.I would like to propose an interactive approach to this issue. Instead of accepting a linear, deterministic model of scientific change as a result of political upheaval, I suggest that such political changes present an array of challenges to and possibilities for the interruption, redirection, reconstruction or effortful continuation of research.The central claim is that scientific development in times of political upheaval has proceeded in Germany primarily by means of increasing cooperation of scientists with the state, involving a process that I call the technologization of basic research. But this is not always a one-sided affair involving the subordination of science to practical politics or to ideology. Rather, I argue, what occurs is themobilization or reconstruction of physical, institutional, financial, cognitive and/or rhetorical resources. Such mobilizations can proceed in various directions: the state or agencies within it can mobilize scientists as resources in the interest of achieving certain political aims; scientists can convert themselves into such resources (or claim that they are doing so); or both things can happen at once.The approach is exemplified by examining continuities and changes in the situations of the sciences following the major turning points of 20th-century German history, symbolized by the dates 1918, 1933, 1945 and 1990. Considered in particular are: scientific changes in Germany following the Nazi takeover and creative innovations by émigré scientists working in different cultural settings; the massive transfer of scientific resources after Nazi Germanys defeat and attempts to carry on and reconstruct science in the two postwar German states; and the massive reorganization of scientific institutions in eastern Germany after unification. The examples come primarily from biology and experimental psychology, but physical sciences and particular branches of technology are considered as well.

Rhetoric, Society, and the Historiography of psychology

The historiography of psychology has undergone a renaissance during the past ten years. In the process various research programs have emerged, all of which have in common the conversion of formerly unqueried textbook generalities into questions for research. Two of them might be called the critical contextualizing and reflexivity approaches. The first, pursued by historians and sociologists of science together with interested psychologists, emphasizes the historical rootedness of psychological concepts, research priorities, and institutions in specific societal and cultural settings. The second, pursued almost entirely by psychologists but also relying on sophisticated archival research and other historians’ methods, regards contextualizing not as an end, but as a means of encouraging psychologists to reconsider present disciplinary structures and practices. Clearly, there is no inherent contradiction between these programs. Kurt Danziger has contributed effectively to each, and his paper can be seen as an attempt to synthesize them. It will be obvious from what follows that I am in sympathy with Danziger’s approach and basic claims. Nonetheless, I shall offer a number of critical points and modifications, from a historian of science’s point of view.

Gestalt psychology in Weimar culture

Twenty years ago, in a ground-breaking article, Paul Forman proposed the thesis that quantum acausality was a response by physicists and mathematicians to what he called the hostile intellectual environment of Weimar culture.2 At the time, the suggestion was scandalous in circles unused to considering scientific ideas in relation to society, and scepticism about aspects of the thesis or the thesis itself was widespread. None the less, his paper attained iconic status as proof of the formative impact of culture and ideology on science. Ten years ago, however, John Hendry argued that quantum theorists were more isolated from than influenced by what he called ’the milieu’, and that the impact of Weimar culture

Max Wertheimer's university career in Germany

SummaryThis paper presents archival and related material bearing on the German university career of Max Wertheimer. It is shown that many factors interacted to shape that career. What drew Wertheimer to psychological science was its potential philosophical relevance, as expounded by his mentors Christian von Ehrenfels and Carl Stumpf. Once his career had begun, however, he faced the challenge of maintaining intellectual independence in a system where patronage counted, and also the problem of producing systematic philosophical work as well as empirical research in psychology at appropriate points in his career. These difficulties, compounded by Wertheimers highly personal style of thinking and writing, appear to have been at least as inhibiting to Wertheimers career as was Anti-Semitism. Thanks to unusual circumstances created in part by Kurt Riezler at the University of Frankfurt, Wertheimer became full professor there in 1929 — only to be forced into exile in 1933, on obviously anti-Semitic grounds.