Mitchell Rabinowitz

Representation in Teaching: Inferences From Research of Expert and Novice Teachers

Research examining differences between expert and novice teachers is reviewed through the lens of cognition to outline and establish how features of the classroom are mentally represented. Studies are reviewed under Shulmans (1986b) framework characterizing knowledge bases necessary for teacher effectiveness, including content knowledge, pedagogical content knowledge, and general pedagogical knowledge. Inferences are made as to how teachers, varying in experience level, represent classroom events including curriculum planning, instruction, management, and communication. Implications for teacher education and professional development programs are discussed.

Age-related differences in the organization of children's knowledge of Illness

This article compares the structures of illness schemata of healthy children demonstrating varying degrees of knowledge about illness. Three age groups participated (6-7-year-olds, 9-10-year-olds, and 13-14-year-olds). The younger children were more likely to use non-illness-related concepts when sorting illness-related stimuli. Performance on recognition of illness and cause of illness tasks further suggestd that younger children used concepts related to human behavior, rather than to illness, in completing these tasks. They believed changes in behavior, rather than symptoms, signaled illness and that most illnesses were contagious. With increased knowledge, however, illness-related concepts gained primacy. Older children believed symptoms signaled disease and had a broader understanding about the many factors that might cause illness

Teacher expertise and the development of a problem representation

This study examined ways in which expert and novice teachers mentally represent classroom problems in matters of instruction, assessment, and curriculum planning. A triad judgement task was administered to expert teachers (n=20) and novice teachers (n=98) to determine whether deep, structural features (i.e. the theoretical underpinnings associated with the problem) and/or surface features (narrative characteristics of the problem including grade level and subject) were used to interpret and represent a problem situation presented in a classroom context. Findings were consistent with results from previous studies examining problem representation among experts and novices in other domains. That is, the experts in this study primarily relied on the deep features to form a mental representation of a problem situation whereas the novices tended to rely on surface structures to do so. However, findings also revealed that novice teachers relied on the deep, structural features of the problem under certain conditions.

Diagnostic Reasoning of High - and Low - domain-knowledge Clinicians A Reanalysis

Thinking-aloud protocols provided by Joseph and Patel were reanalyzed to determine the extent to which their conclusions could be replicated by independently developed coding schemes. The data set consisted of protocols from four cardiologists (low domain knowledge = LDK) and four endocrinologists (high domain knowledge = HDK), individually working on a diagnostic problem in endocrinology. The two analyses agree that the HDK physicians related data to potential diagnoses more than did the LDK group and were more focused on the correct diagnostic components. However, the reanalysis found no meaningful differ ence between the groups in diagnostic accuracy, speed of diagnosis, or the breadth of the search space used to seek a solution. In the reanalysis, the HDK physicians employed more single-cue inference and less multiple-cue inference. The generalizability of results of pro tocol-analysis studies can be assessed by using several complementary coding schemes. Key words: domain knowledge; protocol analysis; cognition; reasoning; diagnostic process. (Med Decis Making 1993;13:21-29)

Conceptual Knowledge Processing: An Oxymoron?

Attempts to account for developmental differences in memory performance have emphasized the importance of two components of cognitive skill—the strategic processes the learner uses and the role of available conceptual knowledge. The task of trying to understand the independent and/or interactive contributions of these two factors on memory performance has been primary (Bjorklund, 1985; 1987; Chi, 1981; 1985; Chi & Ceci, 1987; Ornstein & Naus, 1985; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1987; Rabinowitz & Chi, 1987). However, even with this emphasis there is still little agreement in regard to the manner in which these two factors affect memory performance.

Semantic and strategic processing : independent roles in determining memory performance

In this experiment, the roles played by semantic and strategic processing in enabling memory performance were investigated. Sixty-four college students were asked to learn and recall one of two categorizable lists (one consisting of highly typical exemplars; the other of medium typical exemplars) and given one of two types of memory strategy instructions (standard free recall; repetition). With the medium typical exemplars, recall performance (proportion of items recalled) was dependent on the specific strategy used; when a poor strategy was used (repetition), performance significantly decreased. However, with the highly typical exemplars, performance level was less affected by the specific strategy used. These results are discussed in relation to the active automatic processing going on within semantic memory.

Beliefs about Childhood Vaccination in the United States: Political Ideology, False Consensus, and the Illusion of Uniqueness.

Several contagious diseases were nearly eradicated through childhood vaccination, but some parents have decided in recent years not to fully vaccinate their children, raising new public health concerns. The question of whether and how beliefs about vaccination are linked to political ideology has been hotly debated. This study investigates the effects of ideology on perceptions of harms and benefits related to vaccination as well as judgments of others’ attitudes. A total of 367 U.S. adults (131 men, 236 women; Mage = 34.92 years, range = 18–72) completed an online survey through Mechanical Turk. Results revealed that liberals were significantly more likely to endorse pro-vaccination statements and to regard them as “facts” (rather than “beliefs”), in comparison with moderates and conservatives. Whereas conservatives overestimated the proportion of like-minded others who agreed with them, liberals underestimated the proportion of others who agreed with them. That is, conservatives exhibited the “truly false consensus effect,” whereas liberals exhibited an “illusion of uniqueness” with respect to beliefs about vaccination. Conservative and moderate parents in this sample were less likely than liberals to report having fully vaccinated their children prior to the age of two. A clear limitation of this study is that the sample is not representative of the U.S. population. Nevertheless, a recognition of ideological sources of potential variability in health-related beliefs and perceptions is a prerequisite for the design of effective forms of public communication.

Using computer simulations to investigate individual differences: a look at an addition retrieval model

Abstract In this article the use of computer simulations as a research tool to investigate individual differences in performance will be discussed and illustrated. A computer simulation of the retrieval of addition facts is presented. The goal of this presentation is to illustrate the level of specificity of describing assumptions that goes into constructing a simulation model and the implications and understanding of individual differences in performance that can be derived from such simulation attempts.

Distinguishing facts from beliefs: fuzzy categories

Abstract This paper presents results from five studies that investigate how people perceive the distinction between facts and beliefs. The central question being asked is whether the features that distinguish the categories of facts and beliefs are distinct or overlapping. In each of the five studies, participants are presented with content statements and asked the degree to which they agree with a given statement, the degree to which they think others would agree with it, and whether the statement was a fact or a belief. From these ratings, six possible patterns were derived. The results showed that in many content areas the patterns that describe the statements they categorized as facts and those that they categorized as beliefs had considerable overlap. In addition, participant consensus as to which statements were to be considered facts versus beliefs varied from high to low depending on the specific content being evaluated.

Orienting to see what's important: Learn to ignore the irrelevant

The current study used a triad judgment task to assess whether blocking by comparison type in a triad judgment task could lead people to pay less attention to surface-level (irrelevant) features and pay more attention to deep (structural) features of information. A sample of 313 participants recruited through Mechanical Turk participated in this study. On each triad, participants were asked to evaluate which of two source scenarios went best with the target scenario. Three types of triads were constructed with materials related to the ability to perceive ethical issues within the practice of psychology. One type of triad contrasted a scenario that was similar to the target in terms of surface-level features and a scenario that was similar in terms of deep features (similar surface-similar deep, SS/SD). A second triad type contrasted a scenario that was similar in terms of deep features with an unrelated scenario (similar deep-unrelated, SD/U). The third contrasted a scenario that was similar in terms of surface features with an unrelated scenario (similar surface-unrelated, SS/U). There were 10 triads of each type. We found that with all the blocking orders except two, participants reliably chose the SS scenario over the SD scenario for the SS/SD triads. However, participants who started out with the SD/U triads did not. The results provide evidence that people often have the ability to perceive the deep, but they are distracted by the surface-level features. The results also show that people can be oriented away from being distracted by the surface-level features so that they can see the deep.