Mohamed Azzim Gulamhussen

(Re)Testing the 'follow the customer' hypothesis in multinational bank expansion

Abstract Theory suggests that multinational banks follow their corporate and non-corporate customers. Previous empirical studies have tested the hypothesis that multinational banks follow their corporate customers. This study bridges a gap between the theory and previous empirical studies by testing the hypothesis that multinational banks also follow their non-corporate customers. We accomplish the purpose by empirically testing a model of the effect of home country factors on multinational bank expansion. Our results support the hypothesis that multinational banks also follow their non-corporate customers.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HOME-COUNTRY POLITICAL RISK The Case of Brazil

This article looks into the factors that explain foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil by country of origin. We collected a sample of 180 countries with and without FDI in Brazil. We use multiple estimation techniques and controls to isolate the effect of country political risk on outward foreign direct investment and show that countries with lower levels of political risk undertake more FDI in Brazil, and that features of the policy environment of home countries drive the negative relationship between risk and FDI. Furthermore, we show that the aspect of the political and institutional environment that is most likely to drive this negative relation between risk and investment into Brazil is related to the effectiveness of national governments. Our findings broaden the understanding of the puzzling influence of political risk on FDI observed in previous studies, correct for sampling and selection biases, and have substantive implications for policy design to attract FDI.

The Exit Decision in the European Venture Capital Market

This article analyses the exit decision in the European venture capital market, studying when to exit and how it interacts with the exit form. Using a competing risks model we study the impact on the exit decision of the characteristics of venture capital investors, of their investments and of contracting variables. Our results reveals that the hazard functions are non-monotonic for all exit forms and suggest that, in Europe, Initial Public Offering candidates take longer to be selected than trade sales. Moreover our results show that, in Europe, venture capitalists associated with financial institutions have quicker exits (stronger for trade sales), and highlight the importance of contracting variables on the exit decision. An unexpected result is that the presence on the board of directors leads to longer investment durations.

The Role of Financial, Macroeconomic, and Non-financial Information in Bank Loan Default Timing Prediction

We assess the use of bank loan information in predicting the timing to default. We use unique data on defaults in small and medium enterprises maintained by the Central Bank of Portugal which includes financial accounting and macroeconomic indicators, as well as non-financial information. The findings are indicative of the incremental predictive ability of non-financial information over and above macroeconomic and financial accounting information in the baseline, industry, and in- and out-of-sample models. Specifically, total credit secured by firms is, as expected, negatively and significantly related to default. Gross domestic product is negatively and significantly related to default, and benchmark market rate is positively and significantly associated with default. The findings also reveal that firms which are operated by partners, which have stronger financial support from partners, and which possess operational assets exhibit lower hazards of default. The study indicates that non-financial information and macroeconomic indicators assessed alongside financial accounting data can significantly improve the forecasting performance of default models.

The Effectiveness of Regulatory Capital Requirements Prior to the Onset of the Financial Crisis

We extend the literature on the role of capital requirements as a regulatory tool by developing a continuous measure of the degree of regulatory pressure and by examining data on US commercial banks during the economic upturn that preceded the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Our findings indicate the inability of regulatory pressure to force banks to build capital buffers during the economic upturn that preceded the crisis. These findings are consistent with the view that banks entered the crisis with inadequate levels of capital. Our findings support the endeavors of regulators in explicitly demanding capital buffers in their new regulatory framework.

Do multinational banks create or destroy shareholder value? A cross‐country analysis

We question whether the international diversification of multinational banks creates or destroys shareholder value. Based on a sample of 384 listed banks from 56 countries we provide new and robust evidence that bank cross‐border activities create shareholder value, as shown by an economically and statistically significant premium for international diversification. Our results are confirmed controlling for bank fixed effects, time‐varying bank characteristics, reverse causality, functional diversification, and instrumenting for the choice to expand abroad. The increase in shareholder value is slightly larger for banks in the middle range of international diversification and in the case of expansion towards less developed countries.

The Influence of Managerial Ownership on Bank Market Value, Performance, and Risk: Evidence from Banks Listed on the STOXX Global Index

We follow agency theory to assess the influence of managerial ownership on the market value, performance, and risk of 123 listed banks in 23 countries included in the STOXX Global Index in 2007 and 2010. After controlling for bank characteristics, regulatory restrictions, and macroeconomic conditions, our findings show a positive relation between managerial ownership and both market value (Tobins Q) and performance (ROA and ROE). Moreover, we find a negative relation between managerial ownership and risk (EDF, NPL/L, and Z‐SCORE). Bank market value and performance is a non‐linear, inverse U‐shaped function of managerial ownership. The negative relation between managerial ownership and bank risk is also non‐linear and U‐shaped. Our results remain robust to reverse causality. In their effort to immunize the global financial system from systemic risks, central banks and practitioners should find our results relevant for regulation purposes.

A note on foreign bank investment in the USA

This study investigates the presence of panel effects in the foreign bank investment decision in the USA. To accomplish this purpose, it tests a model of the effect of home country factors on foreign bank investment in the USA. The relationship between home country factors and foreign bank investment in the USA is empirically tested through regression analysis of panel data (53 countries; 8 years). The empirical results confirm the presence of panel effects, previously ignored in the literature, and dependence of foreign bank investment in the USA on home country factors.