Monika Ambrus

The role of experts in international and european decision-making processes: Setting the scene

Analyses of the significance of knowledge in present-day society, also referred to as knowledge society, fuelled our curiosity about the role that experts play in international and European decision-making processes. This interest prompted us to ask the question reflected in the title of this book: are experts in these decision-making processes advisors, decision makers or irrelevant actors? A literature survey illustrated that, while analysis of knowledge utilization is and has been ’ readily available in the social sciences, there is only scant analysis of how experts relate to decision-making processes at the international and European levels. This realization in turn prompted us to bring together a group of, yes, ’experts’ to discuss the above-mentioned question at a two-day seminar held in June 2011, which is at the origin of this book.

Between pragmatism and predictability: temporariness in international law

One of the key functions or purposes of international law (and law in general for that matter) is to provide long-term stability and legal certainty. Yet, international legal rules may also function as tools to deal with non-permanent or constantly changing issues, and rather than stable, international law may have to be flexible or adaptive. Prima facie, one could think of two main types of temporary aspects relevant from the perspective of international law. First, the nature of the object addressed by international law or the ‘problem’ that international law aims to address may be inherently temporary (temporary objects). Second, a subject of international law may be created for a specific period of time, after the elapse of which this entity ceases to exist (temporary subjects). These types of temporariness raise several questions from the perspective of international law, which are hardly addressed from a more conceptual perspective. This volume of the Netherlands Yearbook of International Law aims to do exactly that by asking the question of how international law reacts to various types of temporary issues. Put differently, where does international law stand on the continuum of predictability and pragmatism when it comes to temporary issues or institutions?

Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2014: Between pragmatism and predictability: temporariness in international law

One of the key functions or purposes of international law (and law in general for that matter) is to provide long-term stability and legal certainty. Yet, international legal rules may also function as tools to deal with non-permanent or constantly changing issues, and rather than stable, international law may have to be flexible or adaptive. Prima facie, one could think of two main types of temporary aspects relevant from the perspective of international law. First, the nature of the object addressed by international law or the ‘problem’ that international law aims to address may be inherently temporary (temporary objects). Second, a subject of international law may be created for a specific period of time, after the elapse of which this entity ceases to exist (temporary subjects). These types of temporariness raise several questions from the perspective of international law, which are hardly addressed from a more conceptual perspective. This volume of the Netherlands Yearbook of International Law aims to do exactly that by asking the question of how international law reacts to various types of temporary issues. Put differently, where does international law stand on the continuum of predictability and pragmatism when it comes to temporary issues or institutions?

Water Rights: Fragmented Rights?

Historically, global water law has developed in fragments. The fragmented nature of water law mainly originates from the fact that water can be seen as an economic, ecological and social unit (horizontal fragmentation). Within the clusters that these units constitute, water law is also seen as fragmented, given that a particular cluster is composed of different levels (vertical fragmentation). This article will scrutinise the social justice cluster, or the right to water, and examine whether and to what extent vertical fragmentation in water law leads to divergent approaches among the different levels, while placing the discussion within the general context of fragmentation in international law. For that purpose the elaboration of the human right to water by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, functioning at the international level, will be compared with the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), a regional court.

Legitimacy Narratives in Polycentric Water Law and Governance: The Strategies of the Danube Commission

Global water law and governance is horizontally and vertically fragmented, very complex, involves both state and non-state parties, and established under and/or mandated by national, supranational (EU) or international law. Accordingly, it can be qualified as polycentric governance. Any governance system, but polycentric governance in particular, raises questions of legitimacy. The paper aims to look at one specific segment of this legitimacy discourse, namely how an international organisation, that is a ‘centrepiece’ in polycentric governance, attempts to legitimize itself, i.e. justify its activities in order to gain social acceptance. For this purpose, the legitimacy narratives of a rather successful river basin organisation, the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, will be analysed as a case study for better understanding the specific nature of polycentric governance and its legitimacy narratives.

The European Court of Human Rights and Standards of Proof in Religion Cases

In terms of evidence law, it can be argued that the degree of discretion allocated to the state party by the European Court of Human Rights also assigns the extent to which the allegations have to be proven by the state in order to be accepted, which can be translated as the applicable standard of proof. With the help of this procedural approach the paper aims to explore the standards of proof narrated and actually applied in the case law in religion cases, that is cases under Article 9 ECHR, Article 14 in combination with Article 9 ECHR and Article 2 of Protocol I when interpreted in the light of Article 9 ECHR.