Monika Bauhr

Resisting Transparency: Corruption, Legitimacy, and the Quality of Global Environmental Policies

The domestic endorsement and institutionalization of transparency is of central importance to the implementation of global environmental policies. Studies often contend that interaction with international organizations (IOs) promotes domestic support for transparency. This article qualifies this conclusion and suggests that the positive effects of interaction with international organizations depend on the quality of IO decision-making processes, defined as their fairness, predictability, and effectiveness. Unfair, ineffective, and unpredictable decision-making processes in IOs can increase corruption, reduce legitimacy, and make officials blame transparency for unsatisfactory decision-making. The results build on a study of government officials in developing countries responsible for managing funds from the Clean Development Mechanism and the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol. Our findings suggest that government officials who perceive IO systems as unfair, ineffective, and unpredictable cultivate an adversarial relationship with media and NGOs and become more critical of the benefits of transparency.

Insider or Outsider? Grand Corruption and Electoral Accountability:

While democratic accountability is widely expected to reduce corruption, citizens to a surprisingly large extent opt to forgo their right to protest and voice complaints, and refrain from using their electoral right to punish corrupt politicians. This article examines how grand corruption and elite collusion influence electoral accountability, in particular citizens’ willingness to punish corrupt incumbents. Using new regional-level data across 21 European countries, we provide clear empirical evidence that the level of societal grand corruption in which a voter finds herself systematically affects how she responds to a political corruption scandal. Grand corruption increases loyalty to corrupt politicians, demobilizes the citizenry, and crafts a deep divide between insiders, or potential beneficiaries of the system, and outsiders, left on the sidelines of the distribution of benefits. This explains why outsiders fail to channel their discontent into effective electoral punishment, and thereby how corruption undermines democratic accountability.

Exclusion or interests? Why females in elected office reduce petty and grand corruption: EXCLUSION OR INTERESTS

Disappointed by the numerous failures of anticorruption reforms, international organisations, scholars and policy makers increasingly place their hopes on measures aimed at enhancing gender equality and in particular increasing the inclusion of female representatives in elected assemblies. Yet most studies to date focus on aggregate measures of corruption and fail to explain why the correlation between women’s representation and levels of corruption occurs. Using newly collected regional-level, non-perception-based measures of corruption, this study distinguishes between different forms of corruption and shows that the inclusion of women in local councils is strongly negatively associated with the prevalence of both petty and grand forms of corruption. However, the reduction in corruption is primarily experienced among women. This suggests that female representatives seek to further two separate political agendas once they attain public office: the improvement of public service delivery in sectors that tend to primarily benefit women; and the breakup of male-dominated collusive networks.