Moritz Schularick

The Empire Effect: The Determinants of Country Risk in the First Age of Globalization, 1880-1913

This paper reassesses the importance of colonial status to investors before 1914 by means of multivariable regression analysis of the data available to contemporaries. We show that British colonies were able to borrow in London at significantly lower rates of interest than non-colonies precisely because of their colonial status, which mattered more than either gold convertibility or a balanced budget. Allowing for differences not only in monetary and fiscal policy but also in economic development and location, the â¬SEmpire effectâ¬? was a discount of around 100 basis points. We conclude that investors saw colonial status as a no-default guarantee.

Betting the House

Is there a link between loose monetary conditions, credit growth, house price booms, and financial instability? This paper analyzes the role of interest rates and credit in driving house price booms and busts with data spanning 140 years of modern economic history in the advanced economies. We exploit the implications of the macroeconomic policy trilemma to identify exogenous variation in monetary conditions: countries with fixed exchange regimes often see fluctuations in short-term interest rates unrelated to home economic conditions. We use novel instrumental variable local projection methods to demonstrate that loose monetary conditions lead to booms in real estate lending and house prices bubbles; these, in turn, materially heighten the risk of financial crises. Both effects have become stronger in the postwar era.

Financial Integration, Investment, and Economic Growth: Evidence from Two Eras of Financial Globalization

Does international financial integration boost economic growth? The empirical literature has not yet established a robust link between openness to the international capital market and economic growth. In this paper, we turn to the economic history of the first era of financial globalization (18801914) for new insights. Using identical empirical models and techniques as contemporary studies, we find a significant growth effect in the historical period. A key difference between now and then is that opening up to the international market led to net capital movements and higher investment in the historical period, but it no longer does so today.

The End of Chimerica

For the better part of the past decade, the world economy has been dominated by a world economic order that combined Chinese export-led development with US over-consumption. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 likely marks the beginning of the end of the Chimerican relationship. In this paper we look at this era as economic historians, trying to set events in a longer-term perspective. In some ways Chinas economic model in the decade 1998-2007 was similar to the one adopted by West Germany and Japan after World War II. Trade surpluses with the U.S. played a major role in propelling growth. But there were two key differences. First, the scale of Chinese currency intervention was without precedent, as were the resulting distortions of the world economy. Second, the Chinese have so far resisted the kind of currency appreciation to which West Germany and Japan consented. We conclude that Chimerica cannot persist for much longer in its present form. As in the 1970s, sizeable changes in exchange rates are needed to rebalance the world economy. A continuation of Chimerica at a time of dollar devaluation would give rise to new and dangerous distortions in the global economy.

Sovereigns Versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and Consequences

Two separate narratives have emerged in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. One interpretation speaks of private financial excess and the key role of the banking system in leveraging and deleveraging the economy. The other emphasizes the public sector balance sheet over the private and worries about the risks of lax fiscal policies. However, the two may interact in important and understudied ways. This paper examines the co-evolution of public and private sector debt in advanced countries since 1870. We find that in advanced economies significant financial stability risks have mostly come from private sector credit booms rather than from the expansion of public debt. However, we find evidence that high levels of public debt have tended to exacerbate the effects of private sector deleveraging after crises, leading to more prolonged periods of economic depression. We uncover three key facts based on our analysis of around 150 recessions and recoveries since 1870: (i) in a normal recession and recovery real GDP per capita falls by 1.5 percent and takes only 2 years to regain its previous peak, but in a financial crisis recession the drop is typically 5 percent and it takes over 5 years to regain the previous peak; (ii) the output drop is even worse and recovery even slower when the crisis is preceded by a credit boom; and (iii) the path of recovery is worse still when a credit-fueled crisis coincides with elevated public debt levels. Recent experience in the advanced economies provides a useful out- of-sample comparison, and meshes closely with these historical patterns. Fiscal space appears to be a constraint in the aftermath of a crisis, then and now.

Macrofinancial History and the New Business Cycle Facts

In advanced economies, a century-long, near-stable ratio of credit to GDP gave way to rapid financialization and surging leverage in the last forty years. This “financial hockey stick” coincides with shifts in foundational macroeconomic relationships beyond the widely noted return of macroeconomic fragility and crisis risk. Leverage is correlated with central business cycle moments, which we can document thanks to a decade-long international and historical data collection effort. More financialized economies exhibit somewhat less real volatility, but also lower growth, more tail risk, as well as tighter real-real and real-financial correlations. International real and financial cycles also cohere more strongly. The new stylized facts that we discover should prove fertile ground for the development of a new generation of macroeconomic models with a prominent role for financial factors.

No Price Like Home: Global House Prices, 1870-2012

How have house prices evolved in the long-run? This paper presents annual house price indices for 14 advanced economies since 1870. Based on extensive data collection, we are able to show for the first time that house prices in most industrial economies stayed constant in real terms from the 19th to the mid-20th century, but rose sharply in recent decades. Land prices, not construction costs, hold the key to understanding the trajectory of house prices in the long-run. Residential land prices have surged in the second half of the 20th century, but did not increase meaningfully before. We argue that before World War II dramatic reductions in transport costs expanded the supply of land and suppressed land prices. Since the mid-20th century, comparably large land-augmenting reductions in transport costs no longer occurred. Increased regulations on land use further inhibited the utilization of additional land, while rising expenditure shares for housing services increased demand.

The macroeconomic effects of large exchange rate appreciations

In this paper we study the macroeconomic aftermath of large exchange rate appreciations. Using a sample of 128 countries over the period 1960–2008, we identify 25 episodes of large nominal and real appreciations shocks. We use narrative identification of exogenous appreciation episodes and study the macroeconomic effects in a dummy-augmented panel autoregressive model.

Public and Private Debt: The Historical Record (1870–2010)

Abstract Economists routinely emphasize the risks of excessive public borrowing, but tend to have a more benign view of private sector debt. In this study, I draw on recent comparative studies of the macroeconomic history of advanced economies since 1870. I synthesize four historical facts and argue that a more balanced view of public and private borrowing is warranted. First, while both public and private debts have increased markedly, private, not public debts have climbed to historically unprecedented levels. Second, outside war times, financial crises have typically originated in the private sector, yet the costs have increasingly been socialized. Third, the historical record shows that modern democracies have been relatively successful in managing their financial affairs, evidenced by a systematically positive response of primary balances to high debt ratios. Fourth, I demonstrate that private and public debt cycles have been tightly linked since the 1970s.

Touching the Brakes after the Crash: A Historical View of Reserve Accumulation and Financial Integration

Over the past decade emerging markets accumulated foreign currency reserves to insure against the risks of global financial integration. They were wise to do so. Countries with large reserves have fared better in the crisis of 2008/09. Yet collectively reserve accumulation had unintended consequences. It has contributed to the build-up of global imbalances and financial distortions that helped create the macroeconomic backdrop for the crisis. This article looks at recent patterns of global capital flows from the perspective of economic history, trying to set events in a longer term perspective. It argues that the crisis could mark the end of the latest attempt to manage the financial stability risks of capital market integration. Emerging markets will not consent to facing global financial flows without large foreign currency reserves, but a return to currency interventions and reserve accumulation would be equally problematic. Historically, the ups and downs of global capital market integration have been driven by varying assessments of the benefits of capital mobility. With the recent crisis the time for such a reassessment might have come.