Morteza Hashemi

A post-secular reading of public sociology

There are two theses originally put forward by Michael Burawoy but which still need to be highlighted; the first is the necessity of challenging the assumed neutrality of the social sciences and the second is the necessity of public engagement in the form of encouraging co-practice in society. Burawoy suggests public sociology should play a role in the struggle to protect humanity against the tyranny of the market. I tend to challenge this by arguing that a post-secular and post-neutrality public sociology could only work as a frame of dialogue about the priority of each struggle. Otherwise, it can be easily turned into a target for the criticism of those who do not share the interest in Burawoy’s preferred struggle. The article would also suggest that Ali Shariati’s political rereading of religious ideas not only to adapt to the modern world but also to transform it makes this Iranian intellectual a classic figure of the traditional post-secular public sociology.

What Does It Mean To Be a Progressive Intellectual after the Refugee Crisis in Europe? A Dialogue with Tariq Ramadan

This chapter examines the idea of progressivism in the context of the current refugee crisis in Europe. By investigating a variety of the progressive frameworks for the inclusion and the integration of Muslim minorities into European society, Morteza Hashemi highlights the significance of an empirical examination of what Tariq Ramadan calls the European Muslims’ “silent revolution.” Hashemi argues that one of the most progressive missions of public intellectuals today is to challenge the “dialogical monologue” with European Muslims through the empirical study of Muslims’ everyday engagement, including the co-practice of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. Progressive intellectuals who are seeking authentic dialogue need to see and study these social practices.

A Theory of Evolution of Religious Knowledge in a Post-Revolutionary Iran: And a New Frontier for Sociology of Knowledge

Abdolkarim Soroush is a prominent figure in the religious intellectualism movement in post-revolutionary Iran. In 1991, he published a controversial book, The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sacred Law, on the social evolution of religious and non-religious types of knowledge, as well as their co-dependence. His main argument, which was ground-breaking at the time, could be summarized in three theses: first, there is a constant dialogue between those two types of knowledge and they are not mutually exclusive. Second, theoretical contraction and expansion of non-religious knowledge will influence (if not shape) our understanding of religious knowledge. Third, like other types of knowledge (such as science and philosophy), religious knowledge evolves. Nevertheless, as a religious intellectual and a believer, he tried to distinguish between religion on the one hand and religious knowledge on the other. He hoped that the division could be a basis for future reformist movements. The history of dialogue between Soroush and his opponents on truth and relativism has shaped the intellectual life of Iranians since the 1990s. This chapter will critically examine those exchanges and ask what sociology of knowledge, in a post-truth era, could learn from them.

Tourist Atheists as Players

Tourist atheists see the world as a large buffet, from each item of which they take some pleasure. That is to say, the aim is no longer considered to be something external (in the temple of the universe) but it is the internal pleasure. In this chapter the author explores the idea of ‘tourist atheists as players’, mainly through the idea’s first public appearance in the works of Alain de Botton. Today, de Botton is the face of tourist atheism because he has successfully publicised its core idea which is the atheistic deconstruction of religion. The term ‘atheism 2.0ʹ represents his description of tourist atheism. The point is that we need to interpret his perspective on religion against the backdrop of his version of touristic individualism which is most evident in his other books.

Pilgrim Atheists and the Myth of Warfare

This chapter is about the theological foundations of the scientific approach of those contemporary pilgrim atheists that call themselves New Atheists. The core argument is that although Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, among others, do not like to be called ‘reductionist’ because of its semantic implication (i.e. being simplistic), they are nonetheless tempted to choose simple, coherent, straightforward and easy-going theories. I intend to search for the cause of this temptation in the theological ideals of modern science, the most important of which is what Amos Funkenstein called the ideal of economy and coherence. That ideal was based on seeking a univocal and representational language, on the one hand, and presupposing a homogenous nature on the other hand. So a scientist of the dawn of the modern age could discover the natural laws, which are represented in epistemologically simple but ontologically pervasive formulas, and in this way he (in this case dominantly male) could gain god-like powers. The main insight of this chapter is that we can find the radicalised and ideologised version of the ideal of ‘economy and coherence’ in the New Atheists’ naturalistic arguments against the existence of God.

Ever-changing Images of God–Man Relationship: From Jesus to Feuerbach

This chapter describes a theologically rooted image of the world which was constituted during the late Middle Ages. My focus will be on the changing images of the relationship between man and God in the history of Christianity from the age of Jesus to our time. Since the intention of this research is not a wide historical survey, the chapter focuses on three main turning points in that process; Duns Scotus, Rene Descartes and Ludwig Feuerbach are the main figures of these three phases respectively. The fundamental argument of this chapter is that some characteristics of the Christian God during the late Middle Ages were attributed to man. This transmission of God’s properties to man found its substantial inception in the nominalist narrative with figures such as Duns Scotus (1265–1308) and William of Ockham (1287–1347). That narrative in fact has sowed the very seeds of the modern atheism.

A Post-Secular Reading of Public Sociology: A Way to Co-Practice

This chapter argues that there are two theses originally put forward by Michael Burawoy but which still need to be highlighted; those are the necessity of challenging the assumed neutrality of the social sciences and also the necessity of public engagement in the form of encouraging co-practice in society. The suggestion is that an idea of a much needed post-secular public sociology is the result of a critical reading of those two theses. The chapter argues that the most effective argument for post-secularism in this sense has been put forward by revealing the historicity of the secular. In other words, post-secularism as suggested in this book refers to consciousness about the historical formation of the secular as the neutral and also hesitation about its possibility. The second part of the chapter shows how the conception of post-secular as a challenge to the idea of neutrality could couple with co-practice and co-training.

The Revival of the Comtean Dream

There are some similarities between ‘atheism 2.0ʹ and tourist atheism in our time, on the one hand, and Auguste Comte’s (1798–1857) project of establishing the secular Religion of Humanity, on the other. In the nineteenth century, the atheist Comte had been attracted to the institution and hierarchy of the Catholic Church while the idea of God for him was absurd. He wanted to reject the content of the religious tenets and keep some aspects of its form. This chapter examines the contemporary relevance of the Comtean project and his shift of the major strategy from the rejection of religious ideas to their expropriation. The central question here is: is there any revival of the Comtean dream in recent atheism?

The Primacy of Training over Truth: From Rorty to Sloterdijk

Richard Rorty was a radical pragmatist philosopher in many aspects; particularly in his anti-metaphysical point of views. However, when it comes to religion he, for several decades, used to adopt an orthodox, metaphysical atheist standpoint. This chapter explains his 2003 transition from that intellectual idea to abandoning atheism as an untenable metaphysical position and replacing it with anti-clericalism which is a political standpoint and more defensible for an anti-essentialist and neo-pragmatist philosopher. I will also suggest that the mentioned transition implies that the Jeffersonian compromise defined and defended by him is also problematic. The Jeffersonian compromise, for Rorty of pre-2003, was an American version of a democratic compromise between believers of different faiths and also non-believers i.e. one trades dropping ‘reference to religious beliefs in the public square’ to ‘religious liberty’. The chapter argues that this trade does not seem to be coherent with his transition to a more pragmatic anti-clerical standpoint. Moreover it shows the necessity of a new compromise. At this juncture, Peter Sloterdijk’s neo-Nietzscheian approach to ‘religions as anthropotechnic systems’ becomes relevant. The author puts forward a synthesis of Rorty and Sloterdijk’s approaches and calls it ‘the primacy of training over truth’.

Tourist Atheists’ Religion as Act

In this chapter, the author shows how the idea of God who acts or God the player of nominalists of the fourteenth century is implicit within the idea of tourist atheism. The focus of this chapter is on the theological shift from ‘wisdom’ to ‘will’ and its counterpart in modern philosophy from ‘truth’ (Plato) to ‘act’ (Nietzsche). Arguably, tourist atheism is more influenced by the latter, seeing an act at the centre of both myth and religion. One might say that a tourist atheist is a player who sets the rules of the game arbitrarily. The author argues that for tourist atheists the human being is created in the image and likeness of God, not because like Him we can gain ‘objective knowledge’ but because we are, like Him, individuals who set the rules of the game. Therefore, while there is no criterion beyond this inner goal of fulfilment of the individual-sovereign’s will, the religious claim of truth cannot be deemed to rival another truth (e.g. scientific truth). In this way, religion is not considered to be the enemy but a different mode of approaching the world which our ancestors devised. Therefore, man the player (homo ludens) also can change the rules of the religious games or make his own versions of the games.