Mukesh Bajaj

The Costs of Issuing Preferred Stock

U.S. firms commonly use preferred stocks to raise external capital. Yet this hybrid securitys issuance costs and offer yields have not been previously examined in a systematic manner. We analyze a sample of 3,042 U.S. preferred stocks issued between 1980 and 1999. We find that convertible issues, which are riskier than straight issues, entail higher gross spreads and other direct expenses. Scale, credit rating, and industry effects influence gross spreads and issuance costs. We also compare preferred stocks yields with various bellwether bond yields. Our results support the tax-based argument that suggests that yields on preferred stocks should be lower than comparable risky bonds. 2002 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.

Ownership structure, agency costs and dividend policy

We find that, at low levels of insider ownership, the markets reaction to dividend increases becomes less positive, and to dividend decreases becomes less negative, as insider ownership increases. The price reaction is larger when insiders control voting on shares they do not own and lower if a family owns a block. The results are .stronger for firms with low values of Tobins Q. Several tests indicate that these cross-sectional results are not a manifestation of the information content hypothesis. Instead, the findings support the hypothesis that dividend increases reduce the agency costs of free cash flow and vice versa.

Assessing Market Efficiency for Reliance on the Fraud-on-the Market Doctrine After Wal-Mart and Amgen

Following the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Basic, securities class plaintiffs can invoke the “rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market” [the “fraud-on-the market” doctrine] to prove class-wide reliance. Although this requires plaintiffs to prove that the security traded in an informationally efficient market throughout the class period, Basic did not identify what constituted adequate proof of efficiency for reliance purposes. Market efficiency cannot be presumed without proof because even large publicly-traded stocks do not always trade in efficient markets, as documented in the economic literature that has grown significantly since Basic. For instance, during the recent global financial crisis, lack of liquidity limited arbitrage (the mechanism that renders markets efficient) and led to significant price distortions in many asset markets. Yet, lower courts following Basic have frequently granted class certification based on a mechanical review of some factors that are considered intuitive “proxies” of market efficiency (albeit incorrectly, according to recent studies and our own analysis). Such factors have little probative value and their review does not constitute the rigorous analysis demanded by the Supreme Court. Instead, to invoke fraud-on-the market, plaintiffs must first establish that the security traded in a weak-form efficient market (absent which a security cannot, as a logical matter, trade in a “semi-strong form” efficient market, the standard required for reliance purposes) using well-accepted tests. Only then do event study results, which are commonly used to demonstrate “cause and effect” (i.e., prove that the security’s price reacted quickly to news --- a hallmark of a semi-strong form efficient market) have any merit. Even then, to claim class wide reliance, plaintiffs must prove such cause and effect relationship throughout the class period, not simply on selected disclosure dates identified in the complaint as plaintiffs often do. These issues have policy implications because, once a class is certified, defendants frequently settle to avoid the magnified costs and risks associated with a trial, and the merits of the case (including the proper application of legal presumptions) are rarely examined at a trial.