Muneo Ohta

The Chemical Disaster Response System in Japan

During the last decade, Japan has experienced the largest burden of chemical terrorism-related events in the world, including the: (1) 1994 Matsumoto sarin attack; (2) 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack; (3) 1998 Wakayama arsenic incident; (4) 1998 Niigata sodium-azide incident; and (5) 1998 Nagano cyanide incident. Two other intentional cyanide releases in Tokyo subway and railway station restrooms were thwarted in 1995. These events spurred Japan to improve the following components of its chemical disaster-response system: (1) scene demarcation; (2) emergency medical care; (3) mass decontamination; (4) personal protective equipment; (5) chemical detection; (6) information-sharing and coordination; and (7) education and training. Further advances occurred as result of potential chemical terrorist threats to the 2000 Kyushu-Okinawa G8 Summit, which Japan hosted. Today, Japan has an integrated system of chemical disaster response that involves local fire and police services, local emergency medical services (EMS), local hospitals, Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and the Japanese Poison Information Center.

Hospital disaster preparedness in Osaka, Japan

PURPOSE To investigate the adequacy of hospital disaster preparedness in the Osaka, Japan area. METHODS Questionnaires were constructed to elicit information from hospital administrators, pharmacists, and safety personnel about self-sufficiency in electrical, gas, water, food, and medical supplies in the event of a disaster. Questionnaires were mailed to 553 hospitals. RESULTS A total of 265 were completed and returned (Recovery rate; 48%). Of the respondents, 16% of hospitals that returned the completed surveys had an external disaster plan, 93% did not have back-up plans to accept casualties during a disaster if all beds were occupied, 8% had drugs and 6% had medical supplies stockpiled for disasters. In 78% of hospitals, independent electric power generating plants had been installed. However, despite a high proportion of power-plant equipment available, 57% of hospitals responding estimated that emergency power generation would not exceed six hours due to a shortage of reserve fuel. Of the hospitals responding, 71% had reserve water supply, 15% of hospitals responding had stockpiles of food for emergency use, and 83% reported that it would be impossible to provide meals for patients and staff with no main gas supply. CONCLUSIONS No hospitals fulfilled the criteria for adequate disaster preparedness based on the categories queried. Areas of greatest concern requiring improvement were: 1) lack of an external disaster plan; and 2) self-sufficiency in back-up energy, water, and food supply. It is recommended that hospitals in Japan be required to develop plans for emergency operations in case of an external disaster. This should be linked with hospital accreditation as is done for internal disaster plans.

Analysis of medical needs on day 7 after the tsunami disaster in Papua New Guinea.

INTRODUCTION Because of great intervening distances, international medical relief activities in catastrophic, sudden-onset disasters often do not begin until days 5-7 after the precipitating event. The medical needs of those affected and what public health problems exist in the community in the week after the tsunami disaster in Papua New Guinea(PNG) were investigated. METHODS The Japan Medical Team for Disaster Relief (JMTDR) conducted investigative hearings at the District Office responsible for the management of the disaster, the Care Center, and the Hospitals in Aitape, Vanimo, and Wewak in PNG. RESULTS The numbers of in-patients in the Aitape, Vanimo, and Wewak Hospitals, and in the Care Center in Aitape were 291, > 300, 68, and 104, respectively. The exact number of people affected was unknown at the Aitape District Office. There was no lack of medical supplies and drugs in the hospital, but the Care Center in Aitape did not have sufficient quantities of antibiotics. No outbreak of communicable disease occurred, despite the presence of risk factors such as the dense concentration of affected people and the constant prevalence of malaria and diarrhea. The water at Wewak General Hospital contained chlorine and was suitable for drinking, but that elsewhere contained bacteria. CONCLUSIONS On about the 7th day after the event, the available information still was incomplete, and it was a time to shift from initial emergency activities to specialized medical care. Although no outbreak of communicable disease actually occurred, there was much anxiety about it because of the risk factors present. For effective medical care at this stage, it is essential to conduct a survey of actual medical needs that also include epidemiological factors.

Fire disasters in Osaka

Fire disasters in urban areas are theoretically preventable and avoidable, most of them being man-made. Unfortunately, accidents of the same sort occur repeatedly, without any advantage being taken of the lessons learned before. Even though no two disasters are exactly alike, they often show common features and give much useful information for future preparedness and prevention of similar disasters.