Muriel Egerton

Higher education and civic engagement

This paper focuses on the relationship between social engagement, particularly civic engagement, and education. It is well known that more highly educated people are more likely to engage in voluntary work in formalized settings. It has been difficult to disentangle the effect of higher education from that of family origin and occupational socialization. This paper examines the effects of tertiary education on the social and civic engagement of young people, using the British Household Panel Study. The social and civic activity of young people is observed in their late teens, before entering the labour market or tertiary education, and compared with that of the same young people in their early 20s, after completing tertiary education courses or gaining labour market experience. It was found that the social and civic engagement of young people who would enter higher education was higher in their late teens than that of their peers who did not enter. However, higher education had a small additional effect on civic engagement, for both young and mature students. The children of professionals were the social grouping most likely to be involved in civic activities. The relationship of higher education, professional occupations and family socialization is discussed.

Lifelong Debt: Rates of Return to Mature Study

High rates of return to first degrees have been used to justify increased student financial contributions to higher education. However, no discrete study of rates of return to mature graduates has been carried out although mature graduates now form a significant proportion of the student population. The General Household Survey 1983–1992 was used to examine the earnings of mature graduates compared with those of matriculates. The GHS yielded 616 mature graduate men in full-time work and 296 mature graduate women who were in full-time employment. It was found that the rate of return to mature male graduates was just above one per cent. With recent added costs, new male mature graduates can be forecast to make a sizeable loss on their study. Rates of return to women mature graduates were higher, between five and six per cent, and, based on these figures, the recent increased cost of mature graduate study should be covered by increased earnings. However, these calculations are based on average earnings for the modal age cohort of mature graduates. Those who are older when they complete or earn below the average (a large percentage) will not recoup the costs of study.

Pay Differentials between Early and Mature Graduate Men: The role of state employment

This article examines pay differentials between men who graduate at the conventional age and men who graduated after mature study. This group is interesting given the breakdown of lifetime careers and the current expectation that some of the labour force may have to retrain several times during their careers. The General Household Survey (1983-92) was used to examine factors which may lower mature graduate pay in comparison with early graduate pay. This sample yielded 3733 early graduates and 841 mature graduates who were in employment and had good pay data. Having controlled for shorter lengths of work experience as graduates of mature graduates, the following factors were found to lower mature graduate pay: social origin, with fewer mature graduates coming from middle-class origins: institution of education, with more mature graduates attending new universities: working outside the South-east; and working in the public sector. Public sector employers are less likely to discriminate against mature graduates than private sector employers, and mature graduates are mainly employed in the public sector. This may have affected their choice of educational institution, which may proxy to some extent for academic discipline. Results are discussed in the light of age discrimination and the current costs of higher education.

Political Partisanship, Voting Abstention and Higher Education: Changing Preferences in a British Youth Cohort in the 1990s

This paper focuses on the relationship between education and political partisanship, using the British Household Panel Study (1991–1999). It is known that partisanship has been falling in Britain since the mid–1950s. However, voting abstention rose only gradually until the June 2001 election where the turnout (at 59 per cent) was the lowest since 1918. Partisanship also fell sharply during the 1990s. Although social class and education are associated with turnout in the USA, no relationship has been reported in the UK, and voting seems to have been perceived as a citizen duty. However, in the light of recent changes in voting patterns and educational participation, this paper investigates the role of education, contextualising education effects in social class and gender effects. The preferences of young people are observed in their late teens, before entering the labour market or higher education, and are compared with those of the same young people in their early 20s, after completing higher education courses or gaining labour market experience. The BHPS yielded a sample of about 500 young people with the required data over the time period. It was hypothesised that dissatisfaction with government performance would take different forms for the more and the less educated, with the more educated shifting preferences to minority parties while the less educated shift preferences to voting abstention. The hypothesis was confirmed for young men. Endorsement of abstention was very high for adolescent women who also seemed to be more influenced by their family’s social class. However, by early adulthood a lower proportion of young women endorsed abstention than young men. Strong effects of education were still found with more highly educated young women (as with more highly educated young men) being more likely to have party preferences.