Myriam García Olalla

Estructura del consejo de administración en la empresa familiar versus no familiar: evidencia empírica en España

RESUMEN El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la influencia de la dimensión cualitativa de la estructura de propiedad, en particular de la identidad familiar del accionista de control mayoritario, sobre la configuración óptima del Consejo de Administración, así como el efecto que dicha configuración tiene en la creación de valor de la organización. La técnica econometrica utilizada, el estimador de sistema del Método Generalizado de los Momentos, aplicada para un panel de empresas españolas familiares y no familiares cotizadas en el período 2001–2007, nos permite solventar el tradicional problema de endogeneidad presente en los estudios de gobierno corporativo. Los resultados obtenidos muestran las diferentes necesidades de supervisión y asesoramiento que tienen las empresas familiares con respecto a las de naturaleza no familiar y el consecuente efecto sobre las características estructurales y funcionales de sus consejos de administración. Entre las principales conclusiones encontramos que, a pesar de la creencia generalizada, los consejos pequeños e independientes no son siempre más eficientes.

Size, Target Performance and European Bank Mergers and Acquisitions

During the 1990s, the banking sector experienced an important consolidation process in most developed countries, where mergers and acquisitions (M&As) between credit institutions reached unprecedented levels. Financial deregulation and technological progress have played an important role in this process (Berger, Demsetz & Strahan 1999). These, among other factors, may have intensified the synergy derived from size and facilitated an improvement in the management of the acquired institutions. In order to evaluate the importance of these two factors, we carry out a multinomial logit analysis of the characteristics of continental European financial institutions prior to their participation in merger and/or acquisition operations between 1995 and 2001. Our results demonstrate that size is an important factor in mergers and acquisitions, but it is not clear that economies of scale are sought with these types of deals. In turn, improving the management of the acquired institutions has played an important role in this process.

Consecuencias de las Fusiones y Adquisiciones Entre las Entidades de Crédito de Europa Continental

RESUMEN Aunque tradicionalmente no se ha demostrado que las fusiones y adquisiciones entre entidades de crédito generen beneficios significativos, los cambios que han tenido lugar en los sistemas financieros han alterado las condiciones en las que se desarrollan estas operaciones, incrementando sus ganancias potenciales. En este sentido, realizamos un análisis del efecto que las fusiones y adquisiciones han tenido recientemente en la rentabilidad, los costes, la eficiencia y la cuota de mercado de las entidades de crédito de la Europa Continental durante el período comprendido entre 1993 y 2001 empleando una metodología de datos de panel dinámicos GMM. Los resultados obtenidos muestran moderados incrementos en la rentabilidad de las entidades adquirentes y las que participan en fusiones y únicamente ciertas reducciones de costes en las entidades adquiridas, en ambos casos más visibles a largo plazo, mientras que la cuota de mercado sólo mejoraría en las adquirentes.

An Empirical Analysis of Monitoring Behaviour and Private Benefits of Investors in the Spanish Market

The objective of our study is to look for anequilibrium among three factors: the privatebenefits that main shareholders can obtain fromthe firm, the social benefits derived from acertain ownership structure (such assupervision and alignment of interests) and thecosts derived from ownership concentration(such as loss of liquidity and riskdiversification). Our empirical analysis allowsus to conclude that the supervisory role ofownership is more intense in firms where thepotential conflict of interest betweenshareholders and managers is greater, andtherefore the value of the firm can beincreased through a specific composition of itsshareholders.The objective of our study is to look for anequilibrium among three factors: the privatebenefits that main shareholders can obtain fromthe firm, the social benefits derived from acertain ownership structure (such assupervision and alignment of interests) and thecosts derived from ownership concentration(such as loss of liquidity and riskdiversification). Our empirical analysis allowsus to conclude that the supervisory role ofownership is more intense in firms where thepotential conflict of interest betweenshareholders and managers is greater, andtherefore the value of the firm can beincreased through a specific composition of itsshareholders. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Banking Performance in Domestic and Cross-Border Acquisitions

During the 1990s, the banking sector experienced an unprecedented process of consolidation in most developed countries, in which mergers and acquisitions between credit institutions reached previously unknown levels. Bank concentration became relevant in the 1980s in the USA, becoming a world-wide phenomenon with increasing intensity during the 1990s. In fact, the number of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) among financial institutions in Europe rose from 330 in 1990 to 1,072 in 2000, and those carried out by banks rose from 97 in 1990 to 269 in 2000 (Thomson Financial, 2001).

Economic Valuation of the Efficiency of Bankruptcy Systems

The market valuation of corporate insolvency problems is conditioned by the attributes of bankruptcy laws, with different codes traditionally being oriented toward protecting the debtor or the creditor. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to address the objective of each concrete measure established in the legislation to try to resolve financial distress. This study carries out an approximation, taking into account the different types of efficiency in bankruptcy regulations, the antagonistic character that, on occasions, exists between them, and the market valuation of each one of these, by way of an international analysis undertaken within the main European Union countries.

Cambios en la propiedad accionarial y el gobierno de la empresa: una revisión.

La evidencia empirica ha puesto de manifiesto el efecto positivo que se deriva de las reestructuraciones accionariales cuando se espera una mejor supervision y gobierno de la empresa con la nueva estructura de propiedad resultante (hipotesis de supervision). Asi, tanto en operaciones que suponen un cambio directo en ia propiedad accionaria1 (exclusion de bolsa, OPA, venta de bloque accionarial, OPVs, privatizaciones) como un cambio indirecto (splits, recompra de acciones y desregulacion), la hipotesis de supervision condiciona el precio de la operacion a priori y el rendimiento obtenido a posteriori. La revision realizada en este estudio permite extraer dos conclusiones principales: i) la estructura accionarial existente antes y despues de determinadas operaciones en el mercado de capitales afecta a la valoracion de las mismas, y u) la estructura accionarial resulta relevante no solo por sus consecuencias sobre el «gobierno» de la empresa sino tambien por los efectos informativos que supone.

Valoración económica de la eficiencia de los sistemas concursales: un análisis empírico internacional.

RESUMEN La valoración que el mercado realiza de los problemas de insolvencia empresarial se ve condicionada por las características de la legislación concursal, siendo tradicional la distinción entre normativas orientadas a la protección del deudor o de los acreedores. Sin embargo, resulta necesario atender también al propósito perseguido con cada medida concreta establecida en la legislación para tratar de solucionar las dificultades financieras. En el presente trabajo se realiza una aproximación considerando los diferentes tipos de eficiencia de la normativa concursal, el carácter antagónico que, en ocasiones, tienen entre sí, y la valoración que el mercado realiza de cada uno de ellos a través de un análisis internacional en los principales países de la Unión Europea.

Supervisory Behaviour and Private Benefits of Investors: An Empirical Analysis for the Spanish Market

The objective of our study is to look for an equilibrium among three factors: the private benefits that main shareholders can obtain from the firm, the public or social benefits derived from a certain ownership structure (such as supervision and alignment of interests) and the costs derived from ownership concentration (such as loss of liquidity and risk diversification). Our empirical analysis allow us to conclude that the supervisory role of ownership is more intense in firms where the potential conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is greater, and therefore the value of the firm can be increased through a specific composition of its shareholders.

Block Trades in the Spanish Stock Exchange: Empirical Analysis of the Information and Monitoring Hypothesis

The aim of our study is to analyse if the purchase of share blocks in the Spanish capital market is motivated by the value creation derived from monitoring, or by the informative advantage of the acquirers and insider trading. This would highlight the need of an strict application of Governance Codes and vigilance of firms with asymmetric information. Our results allow us to observe a purchase behaviour by either the control group, institutional investors or insiders when an improvement in managerial running is foreseen as a consequence of the higher monitoring the acquirers accomplish. Insiders show a higher probability of purchase in firms with more asymmetric information. asymmetric information