Myron Rothbart

Associative storage and retrieval processes in person memory.

In this article, a general associative storage and retrieval theory of person memory is proposed, and seven experiments that test various aspects of the theory are reported. Experiment 1 investigated memory for behavioral information that is congruent with, incongruent with, or irrelevant to a prior impression. The results indicated that incongruent events are best recalled and irrelevant events are most poorly recalled. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and demonstrated that there are systematic individual differences that are consistent with the general nomothetic model proposed. The results of Experiment 3 indicated that, relative to a baseline condition, adding incongruent items to the list increases the probability of recalling congruent items but has no effect on the recall of irrelevant items. Both effects are predicted by the model. Experiment 4 provided support for the retrieval assumptions of the theory by demonstrating that there is a systematic order in which various types of items are recalled, as well as consistent differences in interresponse times. Experiments 5 and 6 demonstrated that the model is relevant to situations in which data driven, as well as conceptually driven, processes are involved. Finally, Experiment 7 examined a special case in which the theory predicts greater recall of congruent than incongruent behavioral events. The results of all seven experiments provide converging evidence for a general theory of person memory, and they have implications for a number of issues related to the study of person memory and social judgment.

Use of categorical and individuating information in making inferences about personality

In three experiments, we explored the effects of categorical information (stereotypes) and case information (traits or behaviors) on judgments about an individuals characteristics. Subjects judged a target persons aggressiveness on the basis of a description containing both a broad social category and specific case information. In Experiment 1, the description included (a) a category that was either weakly or strongly related to aggressiveness and (b) a behavior that was unrelated, moderately diagnostic, or highly diagnostic of aggressiveness. Trait inferences were a function of both the stereotypic and the behavioral information. A single behavior was not sufficient to override the category effect. In Experiment 2, temporally consistent behaviors were presented as case information; under these conditions, category information had no effect on trait judgements. This finding was extended in Experiment 3 in which subjects predicted behaviors on the basis of the target persons sex and a moderately diagnostic trait.

Are Ethnic Groups Biological “Species” to the Human Brain?: Essentialism in Our Cognition of Some Social Categories

If ethnic actors represent ethnic groups as essentialized natural groups despite the fact that ethnic essences do not exist, one must understand why. The A. presents a hypothesis and evidence that humans process ethnic groups (and a few other related social categories) as if they were species because their surface similarities to species make them inputs to the living-kinds mental module that initially evolved to process species-level categories. The main similarities responsible are (i) category-based endogamy and (2) descent-based membership. Evolution encouraged this because processing ethnic groups as species - at least in the ancestral environment - solved adaptive problems having to do with interactional discriminations and behavioral prediction. Coethnics (like conspecifics) share many strongly intercorrelated properties that are not obvious on first inspection. Since interaction with out-group members is costly because of coordination failure due to different norms between ethnic groups, thinking of ethnic groups as species adaptively promotes interactional discriminations towards the in-group (including endogamy). It also promotes inductive generalizations, which allow acquisition of reliable knowledge for behavioral prediction without too much costly interaction with out-group members. The relevant cognitive-science literature is reviewed, and cognitive field-experiment and ethnographic evidence from Mongolia is advanced to support the hypothesis.

Inferring category attributes from exemplar attributes: geometric shapes and social categories.

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that judgments about the attributes of categories are disproportionately based on the characteristics of exemplars that best fit the category. In the first 2 experiments, subjects were presented with good and bad exemplars of categories with defining attributes (rectangles, triangles, pentagons, and ellipses) in which different colors were arbitrarily paired with the good and poor examples. In both experiments, subjects erroneously judged the colors paired with the good exemplars as more frequent than colors paired with the poor exemplars. A third experiment, using social categories, examined whether attributes associated with a single category member were more likely to generalize to the category as a whole for prototypical than for nonprototypical category members. Subjects were presented with information about individual fraternity members who varied in prototypicality, and the tendency to infer a target behavior (liberal vs. conservative voting behavior) from the individual fraternity member to the fraternity as a whole increased with the prototypicality of the category member. Implications for the contact hypothesis, category-exemplar relations, and belief stability are discussed.

Subtyping versus subgrouping processes in stereotype representation.

Participants were instructed to organize information about group members either by distinguishing stereotype-consistent from stereotype-inconsistent individuals (subtyping instructions), by dividing the individuals into multiple groups on the basis of similarities and differences (subgrouping instructions), or with no explicit organizing instructions. Participants given the subtyping instructions showed greater perceived stereotypicality and homogeneity and perceived a greater difference in how typical the confirming versus disconfirming group members were, relative to subgroup participants. Study 2 demonstrated natural variation among participants in the perceived atypicality of the disconfirming relative to confirming individuals when learning about a gay activist group. Atypicality predicted perceptions of this group, even when prejudice and strength of stereotyping toward gays as a whole were statistically controlled.

Sex bias, diagnosis, and DSM-III

Sixty-five licensed clinical psychologists independently diagnosed 18 written case histories on the basis of 10 DSM-III categories. The results showed that females were rated significantly more histrionic than males exhibiting identical histrionic symptoms. There was no comparable sex bias to diagnose males showing antisocial pathology as more antisocial than females. The explanation proposed is that the antisocial category is behaviorally anchored whereas the histrionic category is trait dominated. Thus, the findings suggest that vague diagnostic descriptions promoted sex stereotyping and sex bias in diagnosis.

In-group-out-group differences in the perceived efficacy of coercion and conciliation in resolving social conflict.

In-group and out-group members were predicted to differ in the judged efficacy of coercion and conciliation as social influence strategies, with coercion perceived as relatively more effective than conciliation by outgroup rather than ingroup members. In Experiment 1, all subjects read a description of a conflict between two hypothetical nations, with half of the subjects taking the perspective of the defense minister of one nation and half the perspective of the other. Each nation was developing weapons that increased rather than decreased the likelihood of war. Each subject was asked to consider the effectiveness of an array of social influence strategies, varying in degree of coercive or conciliatory tone, that could modify the actions of either their own or the other country. The prediction was confirmed, both by indexes of rated effectiveness and by a ranking of effectiveness. In Experiment 2, the perspective-taking manipulation was weakened by merely asking subjects to imagine that they were citizens of one country or the other. Experiment 2 replicated the basic findings of Experiment 1. The implications of these results for international conflict, with particular reference to the arms race, are discussed.

Category learning and change: Differences in sensitivity to information that enhances or reduces intercategory distinctions.

We examined the amenability of abstractions of categories to new and relevant information. In Experiment 1, Ss formed impressions of 2 sets of numbers by periodically estimating the cumulative means of each set. During the 1st half of the procedure, the 2 means were mathematically stable. During the 2nd half of the procedure, the mean of 1 set was modified and the mean of the other set remained unchanged. We predicted and found that the resultant estimates for the modified category changed more when the mean difference between the 2 categories was enhanced than when it was reduced. Experiment 2 suggested that the accentuation effect results from a 2-stage process of category learning (Stage 1) and category change (Stage 2). Experiment 3 replicated the effect with person categories. The relevance of category accentuation is discussed with respect to the modifiability of social beliefs.

Contrast and accentuation effects in category learning.

This study examines the accentuation of perceived intercategory differences. In Experiment 1, 2 sets of trait adjectives were presented--a neutral set and a set of either favorable traits or unfavorable traits. Ss estimated the mean favorability of each set. The mean favorability of the neutral set was then increased or decreased by adding new traits. As predicted, the estimated mean favorability of the neutral set changed more when the set became more distinct from a contextual set than when it became more similar. In Experiment 2, estimated category means were displaced away from each other (contrast effect), and they moved even farther apart when new information increased the variability of trait favorability (accentuation effect). This change was illusory because the actual category means remained constant. Experiment 3, in which trait adjectives described members of 2 novel groups, replicated Experiment 2. The relevance of contrast and accentuation effects to the development and maintenance of differentiated intergroup perceptions is discussed.

Category-exemplar dynamics and stereotype change☆

Abstract Research relevant to Rothbart and Johns (1985) [Journal of Social Issues, 41, 81–104] model of stereotype change is examined. Contrary to predictions from the contact hypothesis, the attributes of category members frequently fail to generalize to the category as a whole. To account for this lack of generalization, Rothbart and John proposed that judgments about the attributes of a category are based, in part, on the attributes of the members most strongly activated by the category label. Embedded in this simple assumption, however, is the idea that as a category member becomes increasingly disconfirming of the stereotype, it decreases in its likelihood of being activated by the category. Category members who are too strongly disconfirming of the category are, in effect, not thought of as category members — a view that is consistent with prototype models of category structure. Current evidence for two critical assumptions is examined: (a) at the level of judgment, greater weight will he given to the attributes of good-than poor-fitting members of the category, and (b) typical category members are retrieved from memory more easily than atypical category members. In addition, evidence relevant to two implications of the model is also examined: (a) moderately disconfirming exemplars are more likely to change the stereotype than are strongly disconfirming exemplars, and (b) stereotypes should show considerable stability over time, given the tendency to “functionally isolate” highly disconfirming exemplars. The cultural images of groups tend to be both more extreme and more homogeneous than is warranted by reality. The implications of this discrepancy for understanding resistance to change through contact with group members are discussed.