N. Piers Ludlow

Dealing with Britain: the Six and the first UK application to the EEC

Britain’s 1961 application was the first time that the European Community was obliged to consider a membership application from one of its neighbours. This book, based on newly-released material from the archives, challenges traditional views of the British application and casts new light on the way in which the EEC responded to the challenge of enlargement. The author explains the initial inability of de Gaulle to oppose British membership, and draws attention to the hesitant and conditional nature of Britain’s application. In combination these two factors ensured that the sixteen months of negotiations, and the balance the Six struck between their conflicting desires to widen and to deepen the Community, became crucial to the outcome of the UK’s membership bid. This book provides a detailed analysis of a vital chapter in postwar European history, and offers important insights into differing conceptions of the European Community which persist in contemporary debates.

The Making of the CAP: Towards a Historical Analysis of the EU’s First Major Policy

This article seeks to explain the emergence of the CAP between 1958 and 1968. It draws attention to four particular political factors that made the policy’s birth possible, despite the vagueness of the Treaty of Rome commitment to an agricultural policy and the unpromising precedents of earlier attempts to integrate Europe’s agriculture. These were the strength of the coalition pushing for the CAP’s emergence (primarily composed of France, the Netherlands and the European Commission), the weakness and inconsistencies of their opponents (Germany and Italy), the favourable international context, and the incremental nature of the policy’s development. The article further argues that the complexity of the bargaining over the farm support policy, and the manner in which CAP discussions often became entwined with other seemingly unrelated aspects of EEC decision-making, illustrate how even the early Community of the 1960s was sufficiently complex to require a radical change of approach from those who wish to study its historical development.

Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965–1966

The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965–66 has traditionally been seen as a constitutional crisis, caused by the different European visions of General de Gaulle and the Commission president, Hallstein. This article will argue, however, that the root cause of the crisis was a clash over the programme of the EEC and, at a deeper level, about the leadership of the Community. Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, it will suggest, used the 1965 common agricultural policy negotiations to challenge the traditionally prominent position of the French. In response, de Gaulle had little choice other than to escalate the crisis and launch a six-month boycott of Community institutions.

Too Far Away, Too High and Too Stable: The EEC and Trade with Australia During the 1960s

The EEC of the 1960s had little reason to prioritize trade with Australia: trade flows were too small and political ties between Australia and continental Europe too weak. That trade with Australia did become an issue of concern is thus largely due to Britain’s 1961 EEC application. The shape of the deal that looked like emerging in 1961–3 was, however, highly ungenerous – a fact which reflected both the nature of Australian exports and a strong European belief that Australia was less ‘deserving’ than other Commonwealth countries. Australian relief at de Gaulle’s veto may, however, have been premature, since early British membership of the Community might well have been in Australia’s medium-term commercial interest.

European integration and the Cold War

European integration and the Cold War were separate but intertwined. Chronologically, the two share the same formative decades – although the basic idea of uniting the separate states of Europe into a single political and economic entity long predates the East–West conflict. Both European unity and the course of the Cold War became, moreover, central preoccupations of Western leaders on both sides of the Atlantic throughout the 1947–89 period. Yet more often than not, European integration and the Cold War have been studied in near total isolation from one another, the subject of separate journals, academic conferences and books, and the primary interest of two distinct groups of specialist scholars who have rarely exchanged ideas. This chapter will hence begin with a brief explanation of why this separation has occurred, before going on to argue that the interaction between the evolution of the Cold War and the gradual development of today’s European Union (EU) was so intimate as to make it vital for historians to break down the barriers between the two fields. One of the reasons why the two historiographies have diverged is that the most consistently successful forms of European integration have been primarily concerned with economic matters rather than military or political cooperation. Of the two economic and military plans launched within months of each other in 1950, the Schuman Plan – intended to pool the coal and steel industries of France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries – succeeded in bringing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) into being in 1952.

The Real Years of Europe? U.S.-West European Relations during the Ford Administration

Little has been written about transatlantic relations during the presidency of Gerald R. Ford. This article shows that, contrary to what most of the recent historiography suggests, the brief period under Ford did make an important difference in U.S.-West European relations. During the Ford administration, the whole architecture of transatlantic relations was rearranged, creating structures and features that endured well after Ford and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, had left office. In particular, the Ford years witnessed the emergence of a pattern of quadripartite consultation between the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany on foreign policy issues; and the advent of multilateral economic summitry. Each of these innovations transformed the pattern of U.S.-West European dialogue.

A Waning Force: The Treasury and British European Policy, 1955–63

This article explores the role of the Treasury in the formulation and implementation of Britains European policy in the period between the Messina conference and the failure of the first membership bid. It points to a strong contrast between the 1955–59 period, during which the Treasury, aided and abetted by the Board of Trade, was the dominant force in British European policy, and the early 1960s when the Cabinet and Foreign Offices successfully challenged for the position as lead department in this policy area. The final section of the article seeks to explain the disappearance of Treasury pre-eminence, suggesting that factors ranging from the personality of the Chancellor to the subject and context of negotiations with Western European interlocutors help explain why the Treasury appeared a waning force in the making of Britains policy towards the EEC.

Roy Jenkins and the European Commission Presidency, 1976 –1980

Roy Jenkins brought great talent to Europe’s top job. He played a key role in re-launching European monetary integration, winning the right to attend the new global summits, and smoothing Greece’s path to EC membership. But he fell short of other targets. Commission reform remained elusive, as did an improvement of the UK’s troubled relationship with the EC. Indeed the row over Britain’s contribution to the EC budget, meant that Britain’s position in Europe was as difficult when he left Brussels as it had been when he arrived. This study will look at how Jenkins approached his role, identifying his priorities, examining his working methods, and exploring his rapport with the European and international statesmen with whom he had to work. In the process, the book will shed light on the nature of the job, on Jenkins’ own talents and limitations, and on the European Community as it struggled with the global economic crisis of the 1970s.

Transatlantic relations in the Johnson and Nixon eras: The crisis that didn't happen – and what it suggests about the one that did

Many believed that the latter half of the 1960s would be a difficult time for NATO. Europe’s recovery, détente, and Washington’s preoccupation with other regions of the world, could all have endangered the alliance. Recent archival releases confirm that several of the trends that were to cause transatlantic tension during the Nixon era were already apparent during the previous administration. Yet recent historiography has emphasised the lack of a transatlantic crisis during the Johnson years. This article will seek to explain why a breakdown was averted —and in the process suggest a number of factors which help explain the difficulties of the 1969–74 period.

History aplenty: but still too isolated

Like most political anniversaries, the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome, marked by multiple events in the spring of 2007, has rapidly faded from memory. In its brief moment of prominence, however, the occasion did serve to underline quite how long the European integration process has lasted. The EC/EU itself is more than 50 years old; some form of institutionalized level of cooperation at a European level has been in existence now for over six decades; and the idea of European unity and cooperation has a much longer history even than that. There is hence plenty for historians of European integration to get their teeth into, even making allowances for the normal reluctance of historians to study subjects which are too close to the present and for which access to archival documents is limited. A varied and wide ranging historiography has been the result. The first part of this chapter will briefly review what has been written by historians about the integration process; the second part will then assess the strengths and weaknesses of this work; and a third part will suggest a number of fields to which historians appear to be (or, in some cases, ought to be) turning their attention.