Nabyla Daidj

Introduction to the Non-Cooperative Approach to Coalition Formation: The Case of the Blu-Ray/HD-DVD Standards' War

The concepts of the theory of endogenous coalition formation have not been utilized much to analyze issues in the field of applied economics. In this paper, we show how these concepts make a relevant and innovative contribution to these issues. We first illustrate the fundamentals of this theory and we present the concept of internal and external cartel stability. We provide an illustration of this concept through a basic example of an oligopoly in a cartelization situation. Then, we show the relevance of these concepts by analyzing the battle between the high-definition DVD-player standards: Sonys Blu-Ray and NEC/Toshibas HD-DVD.

Nouveau riche, old guard, established elite: Agency and the leadership of Vivendi Universal

We respond to the call for a more balanced view of agency (Tourish, 2014: 88) by presenting an account of the forced resignation of Jean-Marie Messier as CEO of the major French company, Vivendi Universal, in 2002. Messier’s ousting arose from a struggle for board control involving an exercise of power that was influenced strongly by kinship relationships, interlocking directorships, and business alliances; and by the interplay between a nouveau riche (Messier), an influential old guard shareholder family (the Bronfmans), and an established elite (of prominent representatives of French business). Collusion between the French business establishment and the Bronfman family created a coalition of interest and a locus of control that managerial and agency theories explain inadequately. We highlight the potential for a reading of class relationships in terms of structuration to foster better understanding of the complexities involved when the board of a major corporation decides to support, or withdraw support for, their CEO. We highlight several context-specific structures and mechanisms that were influential in determining corporate control and CEO agency.