Nahoko Hayashi

Selective Play: Choosing Partners in an Uncertain World

The theoretical implications of introducing the “selective play” paradigm to experimental gaming research are discussed. In the traditional “forced play” environment, players are locked in a particular relationship and do not have options of leaving the current relationship and joining another. In the selective play environment players are given the options of leaving the current relationship andforming a new relationship. A previous computer tournament of prisoners dilemma network (Hayashi, 1993) showed that out-for-tat (OFT) strategy performed very well in the selective play environment. OFT keeps cooperating with a partner until the partner defects; it deserts the partner and turns to someone else as soon as the partner defects. Results of a new computer tournament that introduced opportunity costs, however, point to the limits of the OFTs strength. OFT prematurely forms a commitment relationship with a cooperative partner and fails to utilize better opportunities. The best performer in the second tournament was the only one who was “trustful” and had a positive bias in calculating the expected payoff of interactions with a “stranger.”

Selective Play: Social Embeddedness of Social Dilemmas

Research on social dilemmas and related problems are currently witnessing new, encompassing developments in theory and methods. In this paper, we will focus on one specific aspect of those developments—i.e., development of the “selective play ”paradigm. The attention of social dilemma researchers has traditionally been focused on isolated dyads or groups, and the wider context in which dyads or groups are embedded has traditionally been ignored. In this traditional research paradigm, players are implicitly assumed to be locked in a particular dyad or a group, having no chance of moving out and joining another dyad or group. This traditional research paradigm may be called the “forced play ”paradigm (Hayashi, 1995a) in the sense that players are “forced ”to interact with particular partners. Some of the interdependent relations we observe in the real world may be of this kind. A good example is the US-USSR relation before the collapsing of the Soviet Union. The two partners (the US and the USSR) are “forced ”to interact with each other no matter how strongly either party wanted to avoid interaction. However, many of the interdependent relations in the real world are not of this kind. Actually, only very few types of relationship (such as one between a parent and a child or between two siblings) are forced ones in this sense. Most personal as well as formal relationships we deal with in everyday life come with the possibility of exit. In our life, we typically choose to interact with our partners, and each has at least a partial freedom to leave the relation. Even the most long-lasting relationships such as marriage and friendship in the most contemporary societies entail possibilities of termination by voluntary moves of the people involved. People often form relations and leave them looking for better alternatives. Although the exit option was included in some of earlier studies of social dilemmas (e.g., Marwell & Schumitt, 1975; Orbell, Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1984) it was in the late 80’s that social dilemma researchers, though small in number yet, started systematic research efforts to explore theoretical implications of the option for leaving the current relationship and choosing a new partner. Resulting research paradigm may be called the “selective play ”paradigm (Orbell & Dawes,1991; Hayashi, 1995a). The purpose of this chapter is to explore theoretical implications of this emerging new paradigm. An additional purpose of this chapter is to provide a chance for the English speaking reader to be exposed to a literature on selective play published or reported in Japanese.