Nancy Budwig

The Linguistic Marking of Agentivity and Control in Child Language.

The present study examines the relationship between linguistic forms and the functions they serve in childrens early talk about agentivity and control. The spontaneous linguistic productions of six children ranging between 1;8 and 2;8 served as the data base. Preliminary analyses of who the children referred to and what forms were used in subject position suggest that the children could be divided into two groups. Three children primarily referred to Self and relied on multiple Self reference forms in subject position, while the other children referred to both Self and Other and primarily used the Self reference form, I. A functional analysis was carried out to examine whether the seemingly interchangeable use of Self reference forms could be related to semantic and pragmatic patterns. The findings indicate that at a time before they regularly refer to others, the children systematically employed different Self reference forms to mark distinct perspectives on agency.

A developmental approach to language acquisition: two case studies

The aim of this article is to revitalize and extend functionalist approaches to language use and language acquisition by utilizing a theory which focuses on general issues of human development. The emphasis here is to show how such developmental considerations enable one to reconstruct a growing childs own efforts to acquire and use a language in increasing accord with cultural demands as to a telos of language development. Two case studies are presented. The first one deals with early phases of language use, in which we analyse subtle ontogenetic changes in the organization and reorganization of personal pronouns referring to the Self. In the second case study, we focus on language modifications during later ontogenesis, analysing the changing functions involving the nominal-pronominal contrast and the contrast between particular tense-aspect markings. It is argued that the ontogenetic changes in both sub-domains are illuminated by exploiting in their analyses Werner & Kaplans Orthogenetic Principle, in which development is defined in terms of increasing differentiation and hierarchic integration in human functioning. In a final section, we distinguish our Developmental Approach to language acquisition and language use from other functionalist approaches.

How far does a construction grammar approach to argument structure take us in understanding children's language development?

Tomasellos stimulating review of Goldbergs (1995) book, Constructions: a construction grammar approach to argument structure , raises several themes worthy of discussion. Tomasello suggests numerous reasons why functional and cognitive linguistic approaches in general, and Goldbergs approach in particular, are central to current work in child language. In my commentary I will summarize Tomasellos central claims about what he sees as significant about Goldbergs book, and I will raise the question of whether construction grammar – rather than any other cognitive or functional approach – is worth pursuing. While generally sympathetic to Goldbergs approach, I will discuss two issues that I think are worthy of further consideration in future research. Tomasello highlights three very important reasons why he believes Goldbergs approach makes a significant contribution to child language research. First, he states that construction grammar provides a way of understanding language development as a whole, and not just particular aspects of language development, such as core grammar. Second, Tomasello characterizes Goldbergs approach as noteworthy because it provides a way of relating language development to other domains of human cognition. A third advantage, Tomasello claims, is that construction grammar allows for the view of language development as protracted (e.g. not instantaneous), something Tomasello suggests fits well with his own research findings (see Tomasello, 1992).

‘Why Sally Never Calls Bobby “I” ’ Revisited: an Alternative Perspective on Language and Early Self Development:

In this article, I consider the question posed by Boesch (2003) in his commentary that appeared in response to issues raised in Coehlo and Figueiredo’s (2003) discussion of intersubjectivity. I begin with an overview of an alternative view of language to the one adopted in Boesch’s question, one that starts from a usage-based approach. Next I move on to consider empirical findings from recent research that examines language and the construction of self. Agreeing with Boesch’s central claim, this article nevertheless offers a distinct view of the connection between language and human development suggesting that language not only provides a tool for the researcher, but also provides a powerful means for the child to come to interpret culturally sanctioned ways of being in the world.

Social Intelligence in a Multicultural World: What Is It? Who Needs It? How Does It Develop?

“George Washington liked good roast beef. Haym Solomon liked fish. When Uncle Sam served liberty they both enjoyed the dish.” When I was a child growing up in New York City in the early days of television that jingle was part of a public service advertisement linking American patriotism to tolerance for differences in the beliefs and customary practices of ethnic and religious minority groups in the United States.

The Development of Predication: Examining the Link between Knowledge and Practice

Bogdan’s [2009] book Predicative minds: The social ontogeny of propositional thinking may at first glance seem to hold import for a select group of scholars interested in the development of predicative thinking – though I will argue this book is an important read for scholars interested in other areas of cognitive, social, and linguistic development. Pulling together a wealth of literature on predication in a clear and sophisticated fashion by the end of the first section of the book, Bogdan comes to the conclusion that ‘a convincing theoretical and empirical case for animal and infant predication has not yet been made’ (p. 41). Bogdan continues to consider five implications of his read of this literature (p. 41) – implications which hold value for discussions of other areas of human development as well: (1) Predication is likely to be exclusively human. (2) Predication emerges in childhood – that is, predication is not available in the infant mind. (3) The ability to predicate might not be innate ‘in the strong sense of being blueprinted in the genome’ (p. 41). (4) The ability to predicate is a human universal, but one which is neither learned nor blueprinted in our genetic make-up. The argument is made for a complex piggy backing on other universal and possibly innate traits as well as abilities. (5) The abilities and traits that feed the ability to predicate are ‘likely to reside in non-categorical, non-perceptual, non-linguistic, and non-formal areas of human mental development’ (p. 41). The rest of Bogdan’s [2009] book works towards an explanation, first by considering a hypothesis, then exploring the roots of predicative thinking. In doing so, Bogdan considers the assembly of the abilities and dispositions he suggests come together to create a context for this new development. The argument developed is clear yet complex, and holds important insights first and foremost about predicative thinking, but also more generally about ways of conceptualizing complex developmental processes. The heart of Bogdan’s [2009] hypothesis is succinctly stated when he suggests that the cognitive ability to predicate is ‘assembled in contexts of social interaction

Building Bridges between Developmental Psychology and Linguistic Theorizing

Chomsky’s theory of language not only revolutionized linguistics, it also changed the way developmental psychologists approached the study of language. A central claim put forward by Chomsky [1965] was that children learn language largely independent of how they come to solve other mental problems. According to such an approach to language and its development, the human mind is best viewed as a domain-specific collection of abilities rather than as a general problem solving system. If this were the case, then a book about language development, while potentially relevant in the broadest sense to scholars of human development, might not be considered central to developmental processes. Tomasello’s book, Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition, challenges such an assumption. His argument concerning language development draws upon modern-day cognitive and functional linguistics rather than generative grammar, and consequently adopts a view of language that makes language learning central to developmental processes. In this essay I will outline Tomasello’s usage-based approach that not only provides a new psychology of language, but also has direct consequences for the relevance of language learning to other aspects of human development. The first section of this essay is divided into three parts. First I review aspects of the book providing an overview for how usage-based approaches to linguistics offer developmental psychologists a new way to examine language that has important implications for how one approaches the development of language. Next, I examine Tomasello’s proposal concerning new views of learning mechanisms that allow us to rethink the role of learning in children’s acquisition of a mother tongue. After reviewing the two main ways Tomasello alters the way we think about language development, I offer a brief outline of the book. This is followed, in the second

Language and its role in understanding intentional relations: Research tool or mechanism of development?

In our commentary we elaborate on Barresi & Moores use of language as a tool. In particular, we highlight the importance of cognitive linguistic research with its emphasis on the relation between morpnosyntax and intentional schemes. We also speculate about how language itself might play a role in childrens integration of first and third person knowledge.

The contribution of caregivers' input to children's talk about agency and pragmatic control

The present study examined the hypothesis that lexical acquisition is in part a matter of learning which perspectives a speaker can take, where the perspective chosen is signalled by lexical choices. If learning that category instances can be labelled in more than one way is a matter of perspective, then even 2-year-olds should accept and use multiple labels in contexts where they can shift perspective. And they do. Children aged 2, 3 and 4 years were asked a series of questions about anthropomorphic pictures of animals (based on the Richard Scarry books) in two conditions. In one, we focused on which (kinds of) animals had certain attributes (hats, fruit, toys) and we used terms from a single semantic domain basic level terms together with a superordinate (cat, dog, etc., vs. animal); in the other, we focused on the kinds of professions represented and used terms from two different semantic domains (pilot, sailor, etc.; cat, dog, etc.). We predicted that children would find it easier to shift perspective where we used terms from two domains than where we used

Intuitive Psychology as Mind Designer: Scaffolding Cognitive Novelties in Early Childhood

Intuitive psychology, also known as theory of mind or mindreading, has been a dynamic and expansive academic industry for almost forty years. Perhaps the most important insight of the multidisciplinary work undertaken in this area is how central and indispensable intuitive psychology is to social interactions, communication, cultural and language learning and transmission, and education. Less explored and less well understood is the crucial contribution of intuitive psychology to mental development and the very construction of the human mind. It is a contribution that takes the form of new (mostly) cognitive abilities that emerge at different stages of ontogeny and reshape the developing mind. I call this the mind-design work of intuitive psychology. In several past works I have explored this mind-design role of intuitive psychology in a few areas of cognitive development construed in evolutionary terms – reflexive thinking or thinking about one’s own thoughts, learning word meaning and reference, predicative thinking, self-consciousness, and imagination (Bogdan, 2000, 2001, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2013). In sampling and expanding on key themes of this prior work, this chapter discerns several mind-design patterns through which intuitive psychology, in discharging its basic functions, scaffolds new cognitive abilities as ontogenetic adaptations to pressures arising at distinct stages of childhood. The basic idea is this. The business of intuitive psychology is to register, represent, and interpret mental states of oneself and of others (cognitive component) and, as a result, guide appropriate reactions by way of thought, speech, and action, as part of one’s goal-pursuing strategies (practical component). It is on the latter practical side, when in new domains children face new pressures on their actively initiated and pursued goal strategies, that the expertise of intuitive psychology is recruited to provide adaptive solutions that gradually end up scaffolding new cognitive abilities. The scaffolding follows several patterns that I call templates, matrices, assemblies, escalators and infrastructures. The earliest such scaffoldings, discussed below, occur in domains that generate some of the strongest pressures on young minds, such as meaning-based communication, learning word reference and mastering predicative communication and thinking. The first part of the chapter provides a theoretical background for this basic idea. It introduces a certain conception of intuitive psychology and explains its mind-