Nancy L. Rosenblum

Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of Liberal Democratic Thought

Elements of the relation between religion and politics are standard themes in political theory: toleration and free exercise rights; the parameters of separation of church and state; arguments for and against constraints imposed on religious discourse by philosophic norms of “public reason”. But religious parties and partisanship are no part of political theory, despite contemporary interest in “value pluralism” and in liberal democratic theorys capacity to address multicultural, religious, and ethnic group claims. This essay argues that religious parties are missing elements in discussions of “identity politics”. They play an important role not just in expressing but also in constructing and mobilizing religious political identity. Political activity linked to parties is a principal way of bringing diffuse, politically unorganized groups, whose leaders are self-appointed and not regularly accountable for the way they represent co-religionists in political life, into the democratic mainstream. With political organization and especially partisanship, the “fact of pluralism” is made concrete for democratic purposes.

Susan Moller Okin

The entry in W. H. Audens Commonplace Book for “Justice” cautions: “Whoever suffers from the malady of being unable to endure any injustice, must never look out of the window, but stay in his room with the door shut. He would also do well, perhaps, to throw away his mirror.” Susan Moller Okin suffered this malady but rejected the poets advice. She opened the window and looked in the mirror; her writings reflect sensitivity to injustice and acute awareness that her position of privilege and her good fortune made the work she did a moral imperative. The temper of her work was set by her political sensibility to the consequences of strength and weakness and by unflagging attention to the events of our world.

Partisanship and independence: the peculiar moralism of American politics

Against the background of historical antipartyism in practice and in democratic theory, and with a focus on American political thought, this paper takes issue with contemporary arguments that value the political identity ‘Independent’ and disparage partisanship. A typology of ‘Independent’ is offered and both empirical and moral claims about the superiority of Independent voters are rebutted, with particular focus on the ‘weightlessness’ of Independents. The reasons to appreciate the moral distinctiveness of partisanship for democracy are set out: commitment to political pluralism, to regulated political rivalry, and to shifting responsibility for governing. Inclusiveness, comprehensiveness, and compromisingness set the contours for an ethic of partisanship.

The Partisan Connection

We are sympathetic to the institutional innovations Leib and Elmendorf propose, and to the concept of democracy at the heart of their recommendations. They resist the opposition of “popular democracy” and “party democracy,” and their models of reform ingeniously blend the two. Popular democracy attempts to realize the imperative that “the people should rule” by engaging “the people” directly in the legislative activity of government. This activity includes initiatives, referenda, recalls, and party primaries—familiar Progressive institutions that aim to popularize democracy. Party democracy, by contrast, relies on the opposition of rival parties to render government accountable to a citizenry that in turn steps into its authority only at election time. Legitimate opposition, campaigns, elections, and the peaceful transfer of power are the familiar practices of party government. In conventional terms, party democracy and popular democracy are rivals. As Leib and Elmendorf tell it, the institutions of popular democracy were intended to curtail and ultimately eclipse party democracy. Popular primaries were intended to curb the entrenched power of party bosses, for instance. Similarly, other popular reforms like the Australian ballot were meant to cleanse politics

Speaking Truth to Conspiracy: Partisanship and Trust

ABSTRACT What we call the “partisan connection”—the bridge parties build between the people and the formal polity—entails sympathizing with citizens’ suspicions and fears (though not recklessly stoking them). However, loosening the partisan connection and “speaking truth to conspiracy” is sometimes a moral and political imperative when conspiracy charges come from party leaders’ constituents and fellow partisans. We consider epistemological challenges that make it difficult to assess whether conspiracy claims are warranted, and we consider political challenges to assessing the validity of conspiracy claims that are posed by the secrecy, misleading partial truths, obscurantism, and lying that are endemic to politics. Finally, we propose three standards for responsible party officials to use when judging whether to oppose conspiratorial claims: when they are fueled by hatred of certain groups; when they represent the opposition as treasonous and illegitimate; and when conspiracism extends to authority generally, especially expert authority, thereby undermining the basic work of government decision making.

Book Review: In the Interest of the Governed: A Study in Bentham's Philosophy of Utility and LawLyonsDavid. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. xiv, 150,

I n the Iiiterest of the Goverrted is an interpretive essay in two parts. David Lyons explains Bentham’s use of the principle of utility in An Iiitrodiictioiz to the Priiiciples of illorals arid Legislation, and he argues on the basis of the recently published Of Zmvs in Ceiieraf that Bentham’s theory of law is not, as it is commonly taken to be, a simple command theory or law. Lyons sensibly restricts his interpretation to these works, Bcntham’s fullest and most authoritative discussions of utility and legal theory, although he indicates where the views he attributes to Bentham changed over the course of his long career. The book is clearly written, scrupulously documented; it confronts possible objections and acknowledges its own weak points in a way that makes it excellent reading even for those unfamiliar with the philosophical literature on Bentham. This book is also of use to those engaged in Bentham scholarship. Lyons does well to phrase his arguments with modesty and care, for this book is a startling corrective of many of the common assumptions about Bentham’s thought. It is recommended in particular t o those readers who, desperate to make some sort of peace with Bentham’s often formidable writings, have been too eager to write him off as simple-nunded or incoherent. The principle of utility was in the air when Bentham wrote. Although it is agreed that he was the first to apply it systematically, i t has remained unclear whether Bentham’s utility recommends self-interest, the interest of the community, or the interests of all men as the standard for evaluating actions or whether, indeed, he has any consistent notion of utility at all. Lyons demonstrates that throughout his writings Bentham rejects a universalistic principla of utility. He then argues that in the Iutrodt(cfion Bentham proposes a dual standard of utility, one which requires that

8.00.

other theorist has done-develop a &dquo;logic of the will&dquo;-and he asserts that this new logic is grounded on a view of the dominion of pleasure and pam that is also unique (Bentham, 1962: vol. 1, iv). This protestation of uniqueness was no more uncommon in the eighteenth century than today. and Bentham’s contemporaries quite rightly claimed to have developed the doctrine of sensationalism whose first and best expounder was Locke (1965). It is in light of this record of psychological theorizing by Condillac, Helvetius, and Hartley, among others-a record acclaimed in its