Narayanan Subramanian

Termination Risk and Managerial Risk Taking

We study the empirical evidence on the relationship between the conditional probability of being fired in the event of poor performance (termination risk) and managerial risk-taking. Previous research has focused on compensation risk only and shown that it has a negative effect on risk-taking. We find that termination risk reduces managerial risk taking similarly. Firms that are more likely to fire their managers for poor performance have significantly lower volatility of stock returns. Further, the positive effect of the convexity of the managers compensation contract on risk taking is also lower at firms where termination risk is high. A 10% increase in the conditional termination propensity results in 5%-22% reduction in stock return volatility for the median firm in our sample.

Performance Incentives, Performance Pressure and Executive Turnover

We examine the relationship between the optimal incentive contract and the firm’s decision to fire a manager for poor performance. We first derive some theoretical results using a simple principal-agent model, and then examine the empirical evidence on the incidence of forced turnover among CEOs with different compensation contracts. We find that CEOs with steeper compensation contracts (i.e., with greater incentives) are more likely to be fired following poor firm performance. Logit estimations indicate that among firms that make a net loss in a given year, a CEO receiving incentives at the 60th percentile level is 26.55% more likely to be fired than a CEO with incentives at the 40th percentile. The corresponding figure for firms whose ROA is below the industry average level is 15.07%, and for firms whose stock return is below the market return is 15.86%. The results are robust to various performance and incentive measures. Overall, our re-sults indicate that CEOs with greater incentives also face greater performance pressures.

A Closer Look at Dividend Omissions: Payout Policy, Investment and Financial Flexibility

We adopt a comprehensive approach to studying dividend omissions to better understand the motivation behind this important policy decision. We find that poor operating performance, poor financial flexibility, high investment and increased risk are factors that affect the likelihood of a dividend omission. Not all dividend omissions, however, are the same. For 25% of dividend omitting firms, the omission signals a quick turnaround in their operating performance and results in a resumption of dividends within three years from the omission. Our analysis suggests these firms use the dividend omission strategically to improve their financial flexibility, allowing them to pursue valuable investment opportunities. The remaining firms continue to be financially constrained and under-perform their peers after the omission. One possible explanation for this divergence in performance is the quality of their management.

Learning Versus Diversification in Project Choice

We study the issue of project choice when a risk-averse agent must choose whether to invest in two projects of the same type (focus) or of different types (diversification). Projects of the same type are subject to common type-specific shocks. Hence focusing is more risky within each period, but enables faster learning across periods. Optimal project choice involves balancing these two considerations. We demonstrate how an agents choice of whether to focus or diversify is related to (i) the speed of learning (ii) the type-specific risk and (iii) his risk- aversion and investment horizon. We show that, contrary to intuition, an increase in type-specific risk may lead to a decrease in diversification. Our theory is applicable to occupational choice within households, project choice under group lending, and corporate diversification.