Narushige Michishita

Playing the Same Game: North Korea's Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation

The nuclear and missile capabilities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are certainly improving, but that does not mean its strategy has changed. Those who argue that Pyongyang has abandoned diplomacy and chosen a military path risk missing the point: nuclear weapons and missiles are the means, not the ends. North Korea is actually taking necessary steps to prepare for future talks with the United States. In other words, North Korea is playing the same game again. Three major diplomatic cards are on the negotiating table between North Korea and the United States: the nuclear issue, the missile issue, and the issue of signing a peace treaty or agreement. During the Bush years, the missile and peace issues were missing from the scene largely because the United States was not interested in seriously engaging North Korea and declined Pyongyang’s suggestion to negotiate a deal on missiles. Although North Korean nuclear and missile tests must be strongly condemned, its recent actions suggest that the country has taken a note of the Obama administration’s willingness to engage and has started to prepare for future negotiations by strengthening its bargaining position.

The future of North Korean strategy

Abstract By the early 1990s, North Koreas policy objectives had become defensive, focused on regime and economic survival. North Korea attempted to achieve this goal by trying to normalize relations with the United States and Japan. North Koreas security and foreign policy strategy has largely remained constant. On the military front, North Korea maintained strong deterrents and simultaneously resorted to nuclear brinkmanship to achieve the above mentioned goal. On the diplomatic front, it continued to use equidistance policy to maximize its security and economic gains. In order to cope with some fundamental policy dilemmas, North Korean leaders have used cybernetic decision-making, exemplified by the cyclical application of adventurism and caution, coercion and dialogue, and socialist central planning and reformist economic management. There are at least three policy opportunities or options that could result in a major transformation of North Koreas policy orientation: (1) normalization of relations ...

North Korea's ‘first’ nuclear diplomacy, 1993–94

North Koreas nuclear diplomacy in 1993–94 was its first long, complex, and sophisticated military–diplomatic compaign, in which it sought to obtain both displomatic and economic benefits. Although North Korea could not achieve all of its goals, its endeavour was quite successful overall. North Koreas nuclear development, deterrent capabilities, the limits of the international nuclear regime, and the lack of transparency in the North Korean system played important roles in this.

Changing Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes

Japan has long played the role as the main operating base for Korean contingencies. It has also provided rear-area logistic support to the US forces fighting in Korea and helped South Korea build up its defense industrial base. However, the Japan-South Korea relationship has deteriorated in recent years due to short-term political and long-term economic and strategic reasons. At this point, South Korea is bandwagoning with China and deemphasizing its relationship with Japan. China-South Korea relations are not without problems, however, and Japan regards South Korea as one of the most important potential strategic partners in maintaining stability in Asia. In the future, the most decisive factor in determining the direction of the security relationship between Japan and South Korea will be China.

Coercing to reconcile: North Korea's response to US ‘hegemony’

Abstract Since 1993 North Koreas response to US ‘hegemony’ has been a seemingly paradoxical attempt to bandwagon with the United States by means of military coercion. However, after more than a decade of effort, North Korea has failed to normalize its relations with the United States. In the years ahead, it can either pursue more proactively the strategy of bandwagoning with the United States, shift its strategic focus to China, or embark upon a policy of equidistance between the United States and Japan on the one hand and China on the other.Abstract Since 1993 North Koreas response to US ‘hegemony’ has been a seemingly paradoxical attempt to bandwagon with the United States by means of military coercion. However, after more than a decade of effort, North Korea has failed to normalize its relations with the United States. In the years ahead, it can either pursue more proactively the strategy of bandwagoning with the United States, shift its strategic focus to China, or embark upon a policy of equidistance between the United States and Japan on the one hand and China on the other.

Calculated Adventurism: North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns

Abstract On January 10, 2003, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), returning to the situation of 10 years ago. Based on a historical study of North Koreas military-diplomatic campaigns, this paper will shed light on their patterns and characteristics, and discuss their implications on the ongoing nuclear question. It will show that North Korea has used force to achieve its political objectives (in the Clausewitzian sense), however idiosyncratic they may seem, that its behavior has been shaped and constrained primarily by military balance, and that those factors have largely determined modes and outcome of North Korean actions. Although important events and issues related to North Koreas military-diplomatic campaigns have been studied, the contents have been either an overview of these events;1 accounts of particular cases;2 analysis of military operations;3 military leadership;4 crisis...

Changing faces of Japanese defense policy: Past and future

During the Cold War, Japan played a strategic role by contributing to the global containment against the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, Japan became more active operationally and better prepared legally. However, it did not play significant strategic roles in shaping the post‐Cold War international order. The question now is whether Japan will play strategic roles in the future. Given the changes in the domestic political outlook, political capital necessary for redefining Japanese defense policy seems to be forthcoming. Japan could play strategic roles particularly in ballistic missile defense and U.S.‐Japan defense cooperation.