Natasha Kuhrt

The Russian Far East in Russia's Asia Policy: Dual Integration or Double Periphery?

Abstract The Russian Far East has, since Gorbachev, been used in foreign-policy discourse as a tool to access the integrative processes of the Asia-Pacific. However, vulnerability, symbolised by the border with China and the asymmetry of the Sino–Russian economic relationship, highlights the geopolitical andgeoeconomic implications of engagement with the Asia-Pacific. The ‘modernisation’ agenda, which became a leitmotiv of the Medvedev administration, focused attention on the challenges ofdevelopment in this region, but development within this agenda tends to be based on the most optimistic scenarios, and development plans for the border areas are heavily geared towards China. Integration with the Asia-Pacific is often advocated as a means of escaping economic dependence on China, but approaches and strategies remain overly politicised.

Russia and Asia-Pacific: From ‘Competing’ to ‘Complementary’ Regionalisms?:

This article addresses Russias role in the Asia-Pacific region and asks whether and how its conception of its role has changed. It is suggested that within Russia there is a re-evaluation of regionalism, underway in both academic and public spheres, which seeks to engage with ‘Eurocentric’ approaches to regionalism and, to some extent, challenge it – much of this remains at a discursive or rhetorical level. However, there is also evidence to show that Russia is attempting to diversify relations in the region away from China due to the overdependence of Russias Far Eastern region on China in economic terms.

The Russian Far East and Russian Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region

This chapter examines the place of the Russian Far East in Moscow’s security-policy deliberations. Analysing influences ranging from the deployment of Russian armed forces in the Far East to bilateral and multilateral engagements in the Asia-Pacific, and Russian–Chinese attempts at coordination in global politics, the authors find that factors local to the Russian Far East are particularly salient for understanding Russian security policy in the Asia-Pacific. The asymmetry between Russia’s underdeveloped Far Eastern region and the populous and economically thriving countries of the Asia-Pacific region represents a significant vulnerability for Russia. Security concerns related to the social and economic underdevelopment of the Russian Far East have thus prevented the ‘pivot’ from being grounded in broad regional engagement.

Russia and the CIS in 2017: Russia in Asia: Succumbing to China’s Embrace?

Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia’s “eastward pivot” has intensified, mainly observable as strengthened relations with China, which appear to be evolving into a quasi-alliance. This places in question Russian attempts at diversification in the Asia-Pacific, and its position in Central Asia, where China’s Belt and Road Initiative challenges Russian influence.

Russia, the Responsibility to Protect and Intervention

It is important to note at the outset that Russia fails to distinguish between the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and humanitarian intervention. Therefore, despite the fact that the RtoP doctrine itself stipulates that the principle should not be viewed as identical to humanitarian intervention, even in the Western scholarly literature there appears to be some disagreement on whether this is in fact the case. Russia persists in conflating the two principles. This chapter will examine the possible reasons for this conflation by providing the historical and analytical context of Russian thinking on intervention since the fall of the Soviet Union. It will be demonstrated that the roots of this thinking need to be traced back to the interventions in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the resistance to US hegemony, at both regional and global levels, and what Russia sees as attempts to overturn existing norms, rather than simply focusing on more recent events such as the “Arab Spring” in isolation. Furthermore, the issue of intervention has become increasingly intertwined with domestic developments. This chapter will examine Russia’s views on sovereignty and intervention in the post-Cold War era in general, before looking at Russia’s stance on the interventions of the 1990s and the watershed case of Kosovo. Then, with the advent of the RtoP Doctrine in 2001, other relevant cases of intervention as well as nonintervention will be examined in order to give some idea of when Russia supports intervention and when it does not. This chapter also focuses on Russian understandings of the RtoP doctrine.

Russia and Asia-Pacific: Diversification or Sinocentrism?

In analysing Russia’s policies towards Asia, we need to distinguish several Asias: Central Asia, South Asia and Asia-Pacific. The focus in this chapter is mainly on the last, the Asia-Pacific region (APR), a region undergoing structural changes of global magnitude while Russian policies towards the APR are evolving and remain largely understudied. Several government-sponsored expert reports — including those of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP 2010), the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC 2012), the Valdai Club (Valdai Club 2012) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013) — call for a more proactive and more diversified approach to the region in light of the growing importance of China, of the economic dynamism of the wider Asia-Pacific (Kuhrt 2014b, 138–139) and of the US ‘pivot’ (or ‘rebalancing’) announced by the Obama administration. In addition, the development of Russia’s Far Eastern region has remained a major concern of both domestic and foreign policy under Vladimir Putin as well as Dmitry Medvedev.

Russian Views of India in the Context of Afghanistan

In Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term (2000–2004), two trends were already in evidence: growing Russian interests in the Group of Eight (G8) and the strengthening of ties with China and India, two ‘rising powers’ in Asia. The latter built on an idea that had already been put forward by Foreign Minister Evgeniy Primakov in the 1990s, who had spoken of a Russia-China-India strategic triangle. The Indian vector was formalised by the ‘Declaration on Strategic Partnership between India and the Russian Federation’ in 2000 and the strategic partnership with China in 2001.

United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to Responsibility to Protect by Ramesh Thakur

Questions surrounding power are hardy perennials in international relations discourse. Although power is seldom well-defined by IR specialists (one has to look to sociologists and philosophers for really systematic attempts to get to grips with the concept), debates around the perceived consequences of its possession and use have generated a vast literature. The record of the Bush administration and its alleged hostility to institutions, processes and approaches which limit American power has only added to this. That said, and given the titles of the two books under review here, coupled with their United Nations patrimony, the prospective reader could assume that he or she knows their likely content already. First, power, or at least power inadequately constrained by international norms, rules and structures, is likely to be considered a bad thing. US hegemony is especially likely to be deplored. Multilateralism – however defined – is most likely to be evaluated in positive terms as the best – if not only – hope for a more stable and humane international environment. These underlying strands of opinion are detectable in both these books. However the first manages to substantially avoid the pitfalls of becoming too overt and predictable. The second, it must be said, is less successful in this regard. As a coherent product developing and exploring clear and important arguments, Power in Transition is also the better of the two. Charles Kupchan begins by outlining and developing the analytical framework for the volume. He argues that there are three elements necessary to increase the chances of power transitions taking place in a stable, peaceful and orderly way (there is no guarantee). These are, first, perceptions of the essentially benign nature of both established and rising powers. Second, there should be agreement on what constitutes an acceptable order. Peaceful transition depends on the existence of satisfied powers. Finally, the new order should be seen as legitimate, not only by the major powers but also more widely. This is a useful and interesting analytical framework and Kupchan and his co-authors use it to explore three main case studies: the Concert of Europe in