Nathalie Behnke

Measuring Success of Constitutional Reforms: Evidence from Territorial Reforms in Eight Western Democracies

Studies of constitutional reforms so far have equated formal ratification with a successful reform. The paper goes beyond this narrow focus by adding substantive success as a second dimension based on two indicators: degree of agenda fulfilment and degree to which the reform contributes to solve the constitutional problem. Analysing territorial reforms in unitary or federal states, we distinguish two types of problems—group and efficiency problems. The comparative analysis of formal and substantive success demonstrates that first, reforms can be at least partly successful in terms of substance, although they may have failed formally; second, fulfilling the reform agenda seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for solving the constitutional problem at stake; third, cases with group problems score higher on both indicators, thus being more successful than cases with efficiency problems. Furthermore, the characteristics of the two most successful cases suggest that opportunities for participation, open dialogue and consensus building play an important role in explaining the results.

Föderalismusreform in Deutschland, der Schweiz und Österreich

Alle drei deutschsprachigen Staaten – Deutschland, Osterreich und die Schweiz1 – hatten in den vergangenen Jahren verstarkt mit der Ineffektivitat ihrer foderalen Strukturen zu kampfen. Hierbei standen die Ineffizienz und Intransparenz der Finanzausgleichssysteme im Vordergrund, aber auch die Diskussion um einen Rucktransfer weitergehender Kompetenzen an die Lander und Kantone.2 Drittens drehte sich die Diskussion um effektivere Modi der horizontalen und vertikalen Kooperation und Koordination in der Politikgestaltung.

Public Trust, Path Dependence, and Powerful Interests: A Model for the Emergence of Ethics Measures

How can the seemingly contradictory trends of international convergence of ethical standards and persistent differences in the shape and quantity of ethics measures be explained? This article presents a framework that combines explanatory factors for both trends and shows that they can very plausibly coexist. The framework is based on the logic of a principal-agent relationship as applied to the democratic system of representation and accountability and on institutionalist considerations of path dependency. Empirical evidence is gained from a structured-focused comparison of two case studies—Germany and the United States—which are described systematically according to the elements of an ethics infrastructure. As a result, it can be shown that the international convergence of ethical standards is mediated by institutional path dependency and specific administrative and legal traditions.

The purpose of intergovernmental councils : a framework for analysis and comparison

ABSTRACT Intergovernmental councils (IGCs) are specific, institutionalized forums of intergovernmental relations. They provide essential horizontal and/or vertical executive channels for preparing, deciding, and implementing multilevel policies. We assume there to be variation, both across federal systems and policy domains, in the purpose they serve – from mutual influence and protection of autonomy through joint decision-making to mere exchange of information – the use that central or sub-state actors make of IGCs, as well as their effectivity. In order to map and explain such variation, this introductory article provides a framework for analysis that includes both conceptual building blocks and conjectural relationships, laying the comparative groundwork for the case studies included in this Special Issue. Findings from the case studies indicate that it is primarily the institutional architecture, but also the structure of the multilevel party system, that account for variation in the purpose and effectiveness of IGCs.

A Nolan Committee for the German ethics infrastructure

Abstract. An international trend towards establishing and conforming standards of ethical behaviour in the public sector has repeatedly been stated. Germany, however, remains surprisingly reluctant to adopt such recommendations. This article argues that the likelihood of German decision makers implementing new, and especially soft, ethics measures depends on the demand for such measures, on the one hand, and their supply, on the other. The analysis shows that contradictory forces have an impact on Germany. The demand for new ethics measures is relatively low as a high level of hard ethics measures incorporated in the longstanding formal legal system of rules and regulations make the implementation of new measures seem unnecessary. Also, the demand for soft ethics measures is less marked in Germany than in the United Kingdom. This comparatively weak pressure meets the natural inertia caused by cognitive and institutional path–dependency in institutional choices of political decision makers. On the other hand, external bodies (such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD) provide blueprints for soft ethics measures and encourage the implementation of uniform standards across countries. Which of these forces will prevail in the long run, however, cannot be deduced from the present situation.

Agenda-Setting für Verfassungsreformen

Wann, warum, in welcher Form und welchem Ausmas und mit welchem Ergebnis werden Verfassungen geandert? Diese Fragen liegen letztlich jeder Beschaftigung mit Verfassungswandel zugrunde. Dahinter steht die Vermutung, dass der Beginn, der Verlauf, das Timing und das Ergebnis eines Verfassungswandelprozesses miteinander kausal verknupft sind, oder, anders ausgedruckt, dass das Ergebnis eines Verfassungswandels zumindest teilweise durch die Umstande ihres Beginns und Verlaufs erklart werden kann. Eine Schlusselrolle kommt hierbei naturlich der Initiierung des Wandlungsprozesses zu. Wird kein Wandlungsprozess angestosen, kann er auch zu keinem Ergebnis fuhren. Traditionelle Verfassungstheorien gehen zumeist von einem funktionalistischen Verstandnis von Verfassungswandel aus, dergestalt, dass Verfassungen eben dann geandert werden, wenn sie sich in der einen oder anderen Form als defizitar, uberholt, luckenhaft oder anpassungsbedurftig erwiesen haben. Sie problematisieren aber nicht die Frage, wie und warum eine solche Einschatzung der Anderungsbedurftigkeit der Verfassung uberhaupt auf die politische Agenda kommt. Theorien des Agenda-Setting (Kingdon, 2003; True et al., 1999) betonen hingegen die Rolle interessierter Akteure, die Aufmerksamkeiten lenken und somit Themenkonjunkturen beeinflussen konnen. Die Ubertragung von Erkenntnissen aus der Policy-Forschung auf die Verfassungspolitik liegt nahe, da die Problemkonstellationen als analog gesehen werden konnen.

Federalization and Minority Accommodation

It is often assumed that federalization or decentralization reforms are the appropriate remedy for accommodating minority conflicts in multinational states. The underlying expectation is that by granting political competences and/or rights of cultural autonomy to regionally concentrated minorities, threats of secession, separation, or even civil war can be curbed, thereby securing plurality in unity. Based on this assumption, the establishment of federal institutions was (and still is) a common policy recommendation for transitional states. Even in established democracies, however, recent processes of competence devolution did not unequivocally confirm this assumption, let alone federal experiences in postcommunist states in Eastern Europe. Rather, it is still quite unclear whether those reforms did indeed contribute to conflict accommodation among regional groups or between regions and the central state. In Spain, as well as in the UK, recent developments seem to indicate that the fire of minority requests for more autonomy is ‘fueled’ further (Brancati, Int Org 60:651–685, 2006) in spite of recent reforms. In investigating selected processes of ‘federalization’ or ‘decentralization’ in Western democracies, which were initiated as reactions to minority requests for more autonomy, it is thus the purpose of the research project presented here to uncover relevant mechanisms that can help explain the success or failure of those measures. By taking an analytical perspective of reconstructing situational definitions, strategic decisions, and actions of regional as well as central-state actors in a long-term process marked by ‘waves’ of events (action and reaction), the dynamics at work can best be understood and explained. In this temporal stream of events, the individual perceptions of relevant actors are of course shaped by contextual factors. Therefore, the paper aims primarily at presenting the analytical framework combining the analysis of events, perceptions, and context. As the research project is still at the very beginning, I am not yet able to present empirical evidence.

Politische Dezentralisierung und administrative Dekonzentration in Italien

Der italienische Staat hat seit seiner Neugrundung nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg eine eigentumliche Zwitterposition inne gehabt. Einerseits zentralstaatlich organisiert, wurden bereits in der Verfassung 1948 Regionen als territoriale Organisationseinheiten vorgesehen. Daruber hinaus wurde durch die Differenzierung zwischen Regionen mit Normalstatut und Regionen mit Sonderstatut ein Element der Asymmetrie eingefugt, so dass gewissermasen ein Zwischenmodell entstand: „weder Einheits- noch Bundesstaat, sondern ein asymmetrischer Regionalstaat“ (Palermo 2007: 97). Entsprechend oszillieren die wissenschaftlichen Beschreibungen zwischen einem ausgepragten Zentralismus (Amoretti 2002) und einem starken Regionalismus, wenn nicht gar Foderalismus (Grottanelli de’Santi 2006; Bartole et al. 2003: 45 ff.) Allerdings bedurfte es einer jahrzehntelangen Entwicklung, bis die Regionen nicht mehr nur auf dem Papier existierten, sondern zu einer politischen Realitat geworden waren. Zum aktuellen Zeitpunkt (2009) hat der italienische Staat so viele Kompetenzen an subnationale Ebenen (Regionen, Kommunen, aber auch Provinzen und Metropolstadte) abgegeben, wie niemals zuvor.