Nathalie Sigot

Individual utility in a context of asymmetric sensitivity to pleasure and pain: an interpretation of Bentham's felicific calculus

This paper aims at exploring, in a formal way, Benthams statement that ‘the pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing’, which belongs to those aspects of the principle of utility left aside by Jevons‘ reconstruction. Consequently, the agent’s preference order will be viewed as depending on his initial situation, and on asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses, relative to this situation. This leads 1) to discuss the coexistence of multiple preference orders, illustrated by Benthams analysis of the optimal labour contract; and 2) to introduce true deliberation as a consequence of the gap between positive choice and rival assessments of utility.

Utility and justice: French liberal economists in the nineteenth century

Abstract French liberal economists share a very surprising reading of Benthams theory. In this paper, we underline the method according to which these economists understand Benthams utilitarianism: they consider that utilitarianism deals with ‘utility’ but disregards justice. Such an interpretation appears when they tried to oppose the ‘French school’ and ‘English school’ of economics as well as when they discussed the foundation of property rights.

Ricardo's critique of Bentham's French manuscript: Secure currency versus secure banks

Abstract After David Ricardo had argued against it, Jeremy Benthams manuscript Sur les prix was never published. Our paper deals with the reasons of that disagreement. After having told the story of the manuscript, we compare its content and the critiques on both the positive analysis of the observed monetary situation and the normative analysis of an ideal monetary system. We show the theoretical divergence between two conceptions of money, Ricardo advocating a secure currency while Bentham favored secure banks. We conclude that Benthams manuscript and Ricardos comments may add to the present knowledge about these authors and classical monetary theory.

Bentham's way to democracy

This work, based on a thesis defended in 2004, is an evidence of a growing interest in the study of Benthamite utilitarianism in France. The author is also a member of the Centre Bentham, formed in 2003 for ‘‘the translation, commentary on and diffusion’’ of Bentham’s thought, and which has organised several events dedicated to utilitarianism. de Champs’ object is to ‘‘ascertain the extent to which the constitutional writings of Bentham are fed by contemporary events and debates’’ (p. 32); more specifically, both to study the ‘‘external factors’’ (p. 31) that contributed to the modification of Bentham’s political conceptions and present those elements ‘‘interior to [his] philosophical system’’ (p. 31) which can explain such modification. This dual strategy places de Champs directly in line of descent from Elie Halévy – whose work is subject to extensive critical discussion – as well as in relation to the more recent work of J.-P. Cléro. She does not share Halévy’s perspective: she rather demonstrates that the democratic dimension is ‘‘at the heart of the Benthamite project’’ (p. 30), whereas Halévy wrote of Bentham’s conversion to the democratic principle ‘‘brought about by the milieu’’ in which he lived. By contrast, and following the approach set out in the work of Cléro, de Champs lays emphasis throughout her work on the importance of the theory of fictions in understanding Bentham’s political theory. The book has seven chapters arranged chronologically, an approach that allows the reader to gradually identify the elements that will lead Bentham to defend a democratic régime. Following the first chapter devoted to methodological issues detailing the ‘‘principles of the science of legislation’’ (pp. 35–7), Bentham’s political writings are placed in historical perspective, from the first of such writing in 1776 (Ch. II) to the Constitutional Code which is presented as the ‘‘culmination of Bentham’s political reflection’’ (p. 309). Ch. III (pp. 137–72) outlines the early writings (from the 1780s) devoted to constitutional law as a way of introducing a number of concepts that Bentham will eventually organise into a coherent structure; these writings in particular quite explicitly support the necessity of ‘‘limits to the power of the sovereign legislator’’ (pp. 170, 172). de Champs then turns to a discussion of two important moments in Bentham’s life. The first of these concerns his position with respect to the French Revolution (Ch. IV): while Bentham’s initial enthusiasm turns to criticism when faced with the terror, this period is nonetheless presented as having been at the origin of ‘‘the development of his thought built on strong principles’’ (p. 218). de Champs consequently adopts a more nuanced position than Halévy, who presented Bentham’s option for democracy during this period as a ‘‘pause’’ in his thought, and demonstrates instead that the positions adopted by Bentham at this time ‘‘were inscribed in a constitutional thought whose principles had already been posed’’ (p. 218). The second important moment concerns Bentham’s radical engagement (Ch. V). Here de Champs argues that there is a dual failure, showing firstly that the 1832 Reform Act is not a response to radical agitation (p. 252), and secondly that ‘‘philosophical radicalism’’ is to a great extent an entity that postdates Bentham’s death’’ (p. 262). The following chapter (Ch. VI) also deals with failure: having clarified what making a constitution means in Bentham’s sense, de Champs presents his varied efforts to gain acceptance for the drafts which he had written in response to requests from Spain, Portugal, Greece and various countries in South America. Unfortunately, de Champs notes, ‘‘Bentham’s correspondents [who had written to him asking for advice and assistance] are never in a position to influence constitutional developments’’ (p. 270). If these aborted efforts did not entirely discourage Bentham, as is shown by the editorial work on the Constitutional Code from 1822 to 1830, they do lead him to leave blank the name of the country which will adopt the code to which he was devoting all his effort (pp. 275, 306). But as de Champs emphasises, it was that ‘‘universalist character’’ of the Code which condemned it to its fate of non-adoption: ‘‘Even the prospect of a universal code seemed to contradict the nationalist aspirations of the revolutions of History of European Ideas 35 (2009) 112–115