Nathan Leites

Politburo Images of Stalin

Hypotheses regarding differences (or lack of differences) in policy-orientation or in degrees of influence between the various members of the Soviet Politburo have always been of great interest to students of politics. Thus there have been frequent speculations regarding alleged differences in foreign policy lines and on the problem of succession. The absence of confirming or disconfirming data for any of these hypotheses is striking, and obvious in view of the secrecy that enshrouds the internal operations of the Politburo. Published statements of any kind by members of the Politburo have become infrequent in recent years. Such statements as are available for analysis have usually dealt with different subjects and have been made at different dates, so that they were difficult to compare from the point of view of testing hypotheses regarding differences in policy of influence. Through Stalins seventieth birthday, December 21,1949, however, a rare opportunity for comparative analysis did occur.

Paris from EDC to WEU

Abstract : This study attempts to throw light on the attitudes of French parliamentarians (the Communists excepted) toward the rearmament of Germany -- attitudes that came particularly to the fore during the year that preceded the French ratification of WEU in March, 1955. That year included the rejection of EDC in the summer of 1954, the acceptance of the London Agreements in the fall, and the difficult passage of the Paris Agreements through the National Assembly during the winter. The study does not discuss the frequently hidden and always important influence that was exerted by considerations of economic interest and of domestic policy. It only tries to clarify some of the major attitudes on the manifest problems of French foreign policy that were aroused by the various schemes for German rearmament. It would seem that these attitudes have not always been sufficiently understood. (Author)

Stalin as an Intellectual

D uring Stalins lifetime Soviet writing, with his encouragement, presented him as a master theoretician, without a living peer. The more recent tendency on the part of his successors to reduce reference to this and others of his roles has not amounted to a denial of the earlier theme of intellectual greatness. It may therefore be of some importance, even after his death, to investigate Stalins theoretical writings, not only to clarify his function and accomplishments as an intellectual, but also to gain further insight into Bolshevik and Soviet patterns of thought. A particularly interesting subject for such an investigation is Stalins last and most widely heralded theoretical writing, the article, “Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.”

Soviet Style in War

Abstract : The report addresses itself to the question: What are the distinctive propensities in Soviet warfighting (particularly on the ground)? An answer is arrived at by examining both Soviet memoirs of the war with Germany and Soviet military publications since then. It is suggested that, in substantial measure, Soviet peculiarities in warfighting are attempts to ward off undesirable tendencies which Soviet leaders perceive in their subordinates as well as in themselves.

Weakening the Belief in General War: Schelling on Strikes

We may argue about the wisdom of announcing ‘unconditional surrender’ as an aim in the last major war,” observes Schelling in his recent book, Arms and Influence —as one might expect, a brilliant and important study—“but seem to expect ‘unconditional destruction’ as a matter of course in another one” (p. 23). Secretary McNamara does in fact require “adequacy of our forces from the standpoint of convincing others that the initiation of general nuclear war would inevitably bring about” not their facing the choice between capitulation and devastation, but exclusively “their own destruction.” Suppose the enemy underestimates our force and its defenses or exaggerates the obstacles he can put in our path—suppose, that is, we have failed to be “clear and convincing” about our capabilities. Assume that the enemy then attempts to disarm us, disarming himself in the act.

The Politburo Through Western Eyes

One of the factors in world politics which social scientists are beginning to subject to systematic analysis is that of elite behavior in international relations. While hypotheses about elite behavior appear to be not only essential to, but also implicit in, any formulation of foreign policy, it still requires to be demonstrated whether research of this order has any operational utility. Clearly, many students in this field have not articulated their assumptions about the conduct of elite groups in foreign affairs; it is often doubted that hypotheses based upon intensive investigation of the doctrine of elites and their cultural matrices have any bearing on the analyses usually pursued in the study of international relations.