Nathan Levialdi Ghiron

Real option's model to evaluate infrastructure flexibility: an application to photovoltaic technology

The high level of uncertainty characterising the future market demand in many industrial sectors makes it necessary to use strategic investment evaluation models that foresee the possibility of determining and managing uncertainty in order to be able to fully take the potentials for creating the value associated with it. By using the approach of real options in this work, a mathematical model is provided for choosing a strategic investment in the photovoltaic industry; this model allows management to handle the uncertainty of the demand that cannot otherwise be dealt with by using the Net Present Value (NPV) as a tool to support decisions. Moreover, it will be shown how this evaluation model is able to reduce the risk of a strategic investment, if compared to the NPV, and point out the hidden value drivers of a managerial decision.

Combining modelling and simulation approaches: How to measure performance of business processes

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide a method for analysing and improving the operational performance of business processes (BPs). Design/methodology/approach – The method employs two standards, Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN 2.0) and Business Processes Simulation (BPSim 1.0), to measure key performance indicators (KPIs) of BPs and test for potential improvements. The BP is first modelled in BPMN 2.0. Operational performance can then be measured using BPSim 1.0. The process simulation also enables execution of reliable “what-if” analysis, allowing improvements of the actual processes under study. To confirm the validity of the method the authors provide an application to the healthcare domain, in which the authors conduct several simulation experiments. The case study examines a standardised patient arrival and treatment process in an orthopaedic-emergency room of a public hospital. Findings – The method permits detection of process criticalities, as well as identifying the best co...

Modelling the competition of an HNO versus an MVNO in the mobile telecommunications industry

This paper analyses the relationship between a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) and its Hosting Network Operator (HNO) in the mobile telecommunications industry. A model is defined to analyse the competition and strategic interactions between the two players and their economic consequences. Two different scenarios are envisaged to observe the effects when varying the interconnection charges and structural characteristics of the operators. The analysis of the results obtained from the model focuses on retail price strategies and on market shares and profits in an attempt to provide recommendations which may be utilised in the decision-making process.

Innovation and competition in two-sided markets: the case of payment systems

This paper proposes a model which analyses the role of technological innovation in the competitiveness and efficiency of the payment system industry. The performance of this industry is described through the use of a mathematical model and the strategies of platforms are analysed considering the role of technological innovation. The paper shows how technological development is the most common competitive strategy in an oligopolistic market of payment platforms. Moreover, the paper shows that these platforms can develop product/service innovations or price differentiations in order to deal with market competition effectively.

Regulation of competition and access of mobile virtual network operators

Mobile termination rate, degree of asymmetry, and degree of substitutability are the elements which mostly characterise the mobile telecommunication market complexity. However, if mobile termination rate is considered as a primary item to be examined and regulated, the degrees of asymmetry and substitutability which characterise and define the structural aspects of the market are often not considered as strategic variable for the market competition. In this paper, a model has been defined to analyse the strategic consequences of the regulatory interventions on modalities about the adoption of mobile termination rates. The analysis of the results obtained by the model, based on numerical simulations, has been focused on retail price strategies, market shares erosion, and profit allotment of real and virtual mobile operators under variations of economic and structural characteristics, in the attempt of providing suggestions for decision, strategic and regulatory process.

Mobile Networks Competition and Asymmetric Regulation of Termination Charges

This paper is aimed to verify the effectiveness of the asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges, under the assumption of discriminatory retail pricing. In the mobile competition, the networks revenue depends on two factors: the retail price and the termination charge. If the retail prices are different between calls that terminate on the same network (on net) and calls that terminate on the rival network (off net), the competition is more complex, involving positive networks externalities for the incumbent operator.

Mobile Network Prospects: A Multi-sided Platform Analysis of Competition

This chapter analyzes telecommunication markets before and after the introduction of an open mobile terminal platform (OMTP) standard. OMTP is an organization comprised of mobile operators attempting to reach an OMTP standard. Calabrese et al. (2004) show strategic choices for two market players, operators and hardware producers under alternative competition scenarios. This study integrates network economics and a multi-sided platform industry in the modeling. Producer and operator firms are considered. Operators supply the same telephone as producers but sell the good combined with a SIM card. The analysis assumes that firms act as a cartel to maximize joint profit. Moreover, producer and operator coalitions are assumed distinct only when their telephones have different technical standards. A sequential game similar to Economides and Flyer (1997) is introduced to study this behavior. The game analyses three scenarios. In Scenario 1 the market is characterized by separate coalitions—producers supply telephones only and operators sell their telephones with SIM cards. Scenario 2 considers a market whereby an operator coalition with an OMTP standard competes with producers that only sell standard telephones. In Scenario 3 producers adopt the OMTP standard and mobile phones are not differentiated. A goal of the analysis is to identify conditions for the transition from Scenario 2 to Scenario 3. Assuming that the standard is not subject to ownership rights the decision by a coalition to adopt depends on potential profit. This case describes a non-cooperative equilibrium (Economides and Flyer). When a standard is subject to ownership rights, for a coalition to adopt the standard requires consent from the right’s owner. This case results in a consensual equilibrium (Economides and Flyer). The next section defines the market. A description of an incompatible (differentiated) goods market in Cournot competition is then described. The compatible (undifferentiated) goods case is described next. Scenario 1 is then proposed. Then a multi-sided platform industry and the OMTP standard are described. Analyses of Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 follow. Finally, study arguments are summarized and conclusions made.