Neil Robinson

The global economy, reform and crisis in Russia

Russian economic reformers of the early 1990s believed that integration with the global economy would facilitate the construction of a market economy and the reconstruction of the Russian state by helping to break down economic interests inherited from the USSR. However, the global economy did not act as an agent of transformation in Russia. Russias reintegration with the global economy became narrowly focused on the sale of treasury bills to finance the budget deficit as attempts to stabilize state finances in 1996-7 made Russian financial markets attractive to foreign investors. There was, however, no underlying change in the governments economic fortunes and attempts at stabilizing state finances engendered political conflict. As a result, Russia was exposed to changes in world markets and the rouble collapsed in August 1998. The devastation of the Russian economy as a consequence of these developments means that the Russian state is the only force that can lead reform. However, it is in such a weak ...

Russian Patrimonial Capitalism and the International Financial Crisis

The international financial crisis brought Russias run of economic growth to a halt and has given a greater sense of urgency to President Medvedevs calls for modernization. This, however, does not mean that crisis has changed Russia or its political economy. Russias economic system is a form of patrimonial capitalism, a particular form of patrimonialism created when patrimonial systems reform under the influence of global economic forces. Russian patrimonial capitalism developed in the 1990s and stabilized under Putin. This type of capitalism is hard to change and does not tend to promote economic modernization or diversification. The crisis has so far not fatally wounded this system, and this will make future reform harder to secure.

Institutional factors and Russian political parties: the changing needs of regime consolidation in a neo-patrimonial system

Presidentialism and other institutional factors have been major influences on the development of Russias party system. Why and how they have influenced party development has changed over time. This article looks at these changes and explains them as a response to the evolving neo-patrimonial system in Russia. Rules establishing electoral institutions have been particularly important and have been changed according to the needs of regime stability. Russian party development has flowed and ebbed as a result, particularly as electoral rules have changed. One function of parties under Yeltsin was as vehicles that signalled which interests had to be negotiated with by Yeltsin or incorporated into the regime. Under Putin, and as rules have changed, this function ended, and United Russia as the paramount party became a vehicle for controlling interests instead. The article ends with some speculation about the sustainability of this pattern of political development.

Ideology and the Collapse of the Soviet System: A Critical History of Soviet Ideological Discourse

Bringing ideology back in - the party and the Soviet model of politics the origins of Soviet ideology and the power of the party ideology after Stalin - Khruschev, Brezhnev, the revival of communist construction and the resurection of party power breaking the ice - from uskorenie to perestroika, Gorbachevism 1985-1987 the second phase of perestroika - socialist pluralism of opinions, the law-based state, socialist choice and the party the end of the Soviet model of politics - the failure of the party and the collapse of party hegemon conclusion - idiology and the shape of the Soviet system.

The myth of equilibrium: winner power, fiscal crisis and Russian economic reform

Abstract It has become common to describe Russia as a state that has only achieved partial reform due to the influence of powerful economic forces, the ‘winners’ of economic reform, and to assume that the Russian state lacks autonomy. This paper questions how far reform in Russia has been compromised by the power of winners. The failure of economic reform between 1992 and 1998 is explained as a policy response by state officials unable to manage tendencies towards fiscal crisis because of the states general helplessness in managing the Russian economy, rather than as a surrender of sovereignty to economic interests.

Russia's Response to Crisis: The Paradox of Success

Russias recovery from the deep economic crisis it experienced in 2008–2009 did not deliver clear political dividends for the Russian leadership. This is because of the context in which the crisis occurred and the way that the leadership, particularly President Medvedev, and many of its critics described the crisis. The oil-fuelled boom that preceded the crisis had the effect of deepening it. Economic recovery based on rising energy prices looks like a failure, rather than a success, and highlights the underlying structural problems of the Russian economy. Arguments about the need for modernisation from within government exacerbated this perception. This seems to have weakened the connection between approval for the leadership and economic growth, a staple of pre-crisis politics.

August 1998 and the development of Russia's post-communist political economy

ABSTRACT Russias experience of financial crisis has been novel: crisis was followed by growth rather than depression, and did not lead to any increased role for foreign economic agencies or actors in Russias economy. This novel experience resulted from the structure of Russias economy in the 1990s, the limited role of financial intermediation in the Russian economy and rising oil prices. Consequently, the chief outcome of crisis has been political, the renewal of central political authority and a reining in of major economic interests. This has helped to solve the problem of state finances, which was the source of the 1998 crisis, but neither economic growth nor increased central political authority have managed to deal with the problem of capital deficiency in Russia so that it remains dependent on energy exports to continue growing. Potentially, this leaves Russia exposed to ‘resource curse’ problems. While these have been avoided so far, the absence of constraints on political leaders might lead to such problems in the future.

The Presidency: the Politics of Institutional Chaos

Presidentialism has become a major topic in comparative political analysis over the last few years. Juan Linz (1990) and others1 have suggested that presidencies have a negative effect on democratic consolidation because it is in their nature as institutions to concentrate executive power in an individual and turn political competition into a zero-sum game. The failings attributed to presidentialism are manifold: it excludes significant groups from decision-making processes to the detriment of democratic representation; presidents often contest power with legislatures in a politically destructive fashion; coalitions that emerge to support a president are likely to be unstable since they are set up on a president’s terms and not negotiated; ministers under presidents are less accountable than those answerable to parliaments; finally, presidents may suffer delusions of grandeur as they ‘conflate … supporters with “the people” as a whole …[and] define [their] policies as reflections of the popular will’ (Linz, 1990: 61). As a result, it is argued that presidentialism is politically anti-irenic; it promotes crisis and democratic breakdown more than parliamentarism. Limited accountability, polarization and frustration at being excluded from power make for less agreement among elites about the rules of politics.

Economic and political hybridity: Patrimonial capitalism in the post-Soviet sphere

Hybridity in non-democratic states can be economic as well as political. Economic hybridity is produced by the same kind of pressures that create political hybridity, but the relationship between economic and political hybridity has not been as much studied by political scientists. This article uses the concept of patrimonial capitalism to look at economic hybridity, its stability and relationship to political hybridity. Using examples from Russia and other former Soviet states it argues that economic hybridity is unstable and that it has a potentially negative affect on political stability generally.

Classifying Russia's party system: The problem of ‘relevance’ in a time of uncertainty

Party development in Russia has been chaotic, but can be explained in part by looking at the interactions between Russian political parties. The application of Sartoris scheme for classifying party systems suggests that party competition in Russia shows signs of both centrifugal and centripetal pulls. This has several contradictory effects. Anti‐systemic parties have their principled opposition to Russias post‐communist development reaffirmed at one level, but are sometimes forced into co‐operation with the more powerful executive. Pro‐systemic parties have little incentive to co‐operate because they and members of the political elite do not face serious competition from anti‐systemic parties. In consequence, there is unlikely to be a rapid streamlining of the Russian party system.