Niall M. Fraser

Solving Complex Conflicts

Many complex problems may be modeled as conflicts, but until now a comprehensive technique for analyzing real world conflicts has not been available. A method is presented which permits the rapid assessment of complex conflict situations for the purpose of finding resolutions to a conflict, determining correct strategies, and enhancing ones understanding of the problem. The new technique is presented through a step by step example, and following this the mathematical basis for the analysis algorithm is developed. Finally, extensions to the procedure are presented through the analysis of the fall of France in 1940, an international water allocation conflict, and the Garrison Diversion Unit (GDU) irrigation project in North Dakota, U.S.A.

Solution concepts in hypergames

A new and comprehensive methodology, called hypergame analysis, has been developed for modeling and analyzing conflicts where one or more participants have misperceptions about the nature of the conflict. In this paper, various solution concepts for describing human behavior are formally defined in order to predict the possible resolutions to hypergames. The relationships among solution sets, which are identified under various solution concepts, are examined mathematically within the general contents of hypergame analysis. It is found that introducing misperceptions into a game does not change the games equilibrium properties. It can be proved that every hypergame has at least one overall equilibrium under Fraser and Hipels solution concept. With these developments, the effect of misperceptions in hypergames can be examined from different perspectives, the influence of information on conflict decision making can be highlighted, and the behavioral patterns of human beings in a conflict can be better understood. The work presented in this paper enhances significantly the capacity of hypergame analysis to handle a wide range of real-world conflicts.

Multicriteria approval: application of approval voting concepts to MCDM problems

Multicriteria decision making (MCDM) methods generally require information that is difficult and expensive to obtain. It is shown in this paper that given an ordering of criteria by importance, and whether each alternative is above the average evaluation of the alternatives for each criterion, considerable information can be extracted concerning the overall rankings of the alternatives. This is done by recognizing the similarity between criteria in MCDM, and voters in social choice theory. Multicriteria approval, proposed in this paper, is an MCDM adaptation of approval voting which can be used to classify decisions into one of several categories, depending on whether, and the manner in which, a superior alternative can be identified. An exhaustive examination of all possible decision situations of tractable size is made to measure the applicability of multicriteria approval, and the approach is demonstrated in an industrial procurement case. In addition to requiring minimal information from a decision maker, multicriteria approval satisfies several desirable criteria for MCDM techniques.

Ordinal preference representations

Ordinal preferences have several advantages over the traditional cardinal expressions of preference. Three different representations of ordinal preferences useful in multi-participant modelling are presented, and their features compared. One approach is thepayoff representation that is based on an ordinal normal form game. A second representation of ordinal preferences is thepreference vector, based on the option form of the game. The option form consists of a list of players, with each player followed by the options under its control. The third representation of ordinal preferences is thepreference tree. A preference tree is an implied binary tree that captures the information of preference vector in a more compact manner by making use of its lexicographic structure. The preference tree offers considerable compactness and computational efficiency over the other two approaches.

Nationalization of the Suez Canal A Hypergame Analysis

A new conflict analysis technique is employed to analyze the international crisis that was created when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. The Suez Crisis involved the use of strategic surprise by the Egyptians and it is clearly demonstrated how this type of situation can be readily modelled by utilizing contemporary methods from conflict analysis. The analysis algorithm provides a procedure for systematically studying the implications of the Suez Crisis and also for predicting what possible scenarios could have taken place.

A coalition analysis algorithm with application to the Zimbabwe conflict

An algorithm is developed for considering coalitions when formally analyzing a given conflict. The new methodology is employed for studying the 1979 Lancaster Peace Talks concerning the civil war in Zimbabwe. Following an historical description of the Zimbabwe controversy, the conflict is analyzed using an improved metagame stability analysis algorithm. A comprehensive procedure is then presented for incorporating coalition considerations into the stability analysis of the conflict. Furthermore, a metric is introduced to determine when coalitions are most likely to form. The results of the study are in agreement with the actual historical events.

Logrolling Procedure for Multi-Issue Negotiation

In order to better deal with the complexity in multi-issue negotiation, a quantitative method which produces Pareto optimal solutions through jointly improving exchange of issues is proposed. The trade-off process is modelled using logrolling, in which loss in some issues is traded for gain in others, resulting in overall gain for all parties. This mutual gain approach is designed based on the integrative negotiation strategy. The objective of the logrolling method is in negotiation support by providing a structure and systematic analysis for ill-defined multi-issue negotiation problems. This study presents a formal representation of logrolling, the sequential logrolling procedure that is based on the exchange of two issues, and the general properties of the efficient frontier produced by logrolling under a linear preference assumption. The study also includes some discussion on implementation aspects of the logrolling method.

Hypergame Analysis of the Falkland/Malvinas Conflict

A comprehensive framework is presented for modeling a hypergame, which is a game in which one or more players have misperceptions about the true nature of the dispute. To forecast the possible resolutions or equilibria of a hypergame, a new hypergame analysis algorithm is devised for executing stability analyses. In order to demonstrate the efficacy of this new approach to hypergame modeling and analysis, it is applied to the Falkland/ Malvinas conflict of 1982. The hypergame study provides some interesting insights into the manner in which misperceptions dictated coercive actions by both Argentina and Britain in this crisis.

Non-strict ordinal 2 × 2 games: A comprehensive computer-assisted analysis of the 726 possibilities

Game theory has provided many tools for the study of social conflict. The 2 × 2 game has been found to be a particularly useful model. This paper describes the enumeration and analysis of all 726 distinct 2 × 2 games. A computer is used to generate the complete set, and a wide variety of maximin, equilibrium and stability calculations is performed for each player for every outcome in every game. The resulting data set is of great value for both the modeling and analysis of social conflict.

A Conflict Analysis of the Suez Canal Invasion of 1956

At dusk on October 29 , 1956, an attack was launched on Egypt by the alliance comprised of Great Britain, France and Israel. Its objective was the occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. The attack was the culmination of three months o f talks and negotiations instigated by Egypt’s nationalization o f the canal o n July 26 , 1956. What had started as a political conflict had escalated into a military one. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a conflict analysis technique recently developed by Fraser and Hipel (1979) can be used t o thoroughly study the complex Suez crisis. It is shown that accurate predictions can be made of the possible final resolutions t o the conflict. In some conflicts or games the participants or players may not be aware of the true situation. This was the case for Egypt when the Western powers unexpectedly invaded the Suez Canal. Whenever there is a mistaken interpretation of any aspect o f the game by one or more of the players, the conflict is called a hypergame (Bennett and Dando, 1977). The method of Fraser and Hipel (1979) can readily accommodate 3 hypergame situation such as the Suez invasion of 1956. Following a historical description of the crisis, the Suez invasion is formulated as a hypergame consisting of players, their options and their preferences. The game is then analyzed t o study the outcomes that are predicted as compared to the actual resolution of this example of strategic surprise.