Nicholas C. Soderstrom

Learning versus performance: an integrative review.

The primary goal of instruction should be to facilitate long-term learning—that is, to create relatively permanent changes in comprehension, understanding, and skills of the types that will support long-term retention and transfer. During the instruction or training process, however, what we can observe and measure is performance, which is often an unreliable index of whether the relatively long-term changes that constitute learning have taken place. The time-honored distinction between learning and performance dates back decades, spurred by early animal and motor-skills research that revealed that learning can occur even when no discernible changes in performance are observed. More recently, the converse has also been shown—specifically, that improvements in performance can fail to yield significant learning—and, in fact, that certain manipulations can have opposite effects on learning and performance. We review the extant literature in the motor- and verbal-learning domains that necessitates the distinction between learning and performance. In addition, we examine research in metacognition that suggests that people often mistakenly interpret their performance during acquisition as a reliable guide to long-term learning. These and other considerations suggest that the learning–performance distinction is critical and has vast practical and theoretical implications.

Are survival processing memory advantages based on ancestral priorities

Recent research has suggested that our memory systems are especially tuned to process information according to its survival relevance, and that inducing problems of “ancestral priorities” faced by our ancestors should lead to optimal recall performance (Nairne & Pandeirada, Cognitive Psychology,2010). The present study investigated the specificity of this idea by comparing an ancestor-consistent scenario and a modern survival scenario that involved threats that were encountered by human ancestors (e.g., predators) or threats from fictitious creatures (i.e., zombies). Participants read one of four survival scenarios in which the environment and the explicit threat were either consistent or inconsistent with ancestrally based problems (i.e., grasslands–predators, grasslands–zombies, city–attackers, city–zombies), or they rated words for pleasantness. After rating words based on their survival relevance (or pleasantness), the participants performed a free recall task. All survival scenarios led to better recall than did pleasantness ratings, but recall was greater when zombies were the threat, as compared to predators or attackers. Recall did not differ for the modern (i.e., city) and ancestral (i.e., grasslands) scenarios. These recall differences persisted when valence and arousal ratings for the scenarios were statistically controlled as well. These data challenge the specificity of ancestral priorities in survival-processing advantages in memory.

Judgments of Learning as Memory Modifiers.

A frequent procedure used to study how individuals monitor their own learning is to collect judgments of learning (JOLs) during acquisition, considered to be important, in part, because such judgments are assumed to guide how individuals allocate their future learning resources. In such research, however, a tacit assumption is frequently made: Namely, that asking for such metacognitive judgments does not affect the learning process per se. In 3 experiments, the present research addressed the accuracy of this assumption and tested a possible account--based on aspects of Koriats cue-utilization approach to JOLs (Koriat, 1997) and de Winstanley, Bjork, and Bjorks (1996) transfer-appropriate multifactor account of generation effects--for why the mere act of making JOLs might enhance later memory for the information so judged. Potential implications of the present findings for the future conduction of research using metacognitive measures as well as for students studying for exams is discussed.

Recollection-Based Prospective Metamemory Judgments Are More Accurate than Those Based on Confidence: Judgments of Remembering and Knowing (JORKS).

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember-know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes-no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal.

The Critical Importance of Retrieval—and Spacing—for Learning

We examined the impact of repeated testing and repeated studying on long-term learning. In Experiment 1, we replicated Karpicke and Roediger’s (2008) influential results showing that once information can be recalled, repeated testing on that information enhances learning, whereas restudying that information does not. We then examined whether the apparent ineffectiveness of restudying might be attributable to the spacing differences between items that were inherent in the between-subjects design employed by Karpicke and Roediger. When we controlled for these spacing differences by manipulating the various learning conditions within subjects in Experiment 2, we found that both repeated testing and restudying improved learning, and that learners’ awareness of the relative mnemonic benefits of these strategies was enhanced. These findings contribute to understanding how two important factors in learning—test-induced retrieval processes and spacing—can interact, and they illustrate that such interactions can play out differently in between-subjects and within-subjects experimental designs.

Metacognition and depressive realism: Evidence for the level-of-depression account

Introduction. The present study examined the relationship between metacognition (i.e., “thinking about thinking”) and depression. More specifically, the depressive realism hypothesis (Alloy & Abramson, 1979), which posits that depressed people have a more accurate view of reality than nondepressed people, was tested. Methods. Nondepressed, mildly depressed, and moderately depressed individuals predicted their memory performance by making judgements of learning after each studied item. These predictions were then compared with actual performance on a free recall task to assess calibration, an index of metacognitive accuracy. Results and conclusions. Consistent with the depressive realism hypothesis, mild depression was associated with better calibration than nondepression. However, this “sadder but wiser” phenomenon appears to only exist to point, as moderate depression and nondepression showed no calibration differences. Thus, the level-of-depression account of depressive realism is supported.

The fate of being forgotten: Information that is initially forgotten is judged as less important

Is forgotten information deemed less important than remembered information? The present study examined potential biases regarding the importance of information that was initially forgotten. In Experiment 1 participants studied words paired with varying point values that denoted their importance and were encouraged to recall higher value words. Participants recalled more high-value words on an initial test. However, on a later cued recall test for the values, initially forgotten words were rated as less valuable than remembered words. Experiment 2 used a similar procedure with the exception that participants rated the importance of traits when evaluating a significant other (e.g., honest, intelligent). Participants were more likely to recall highly valued traits but regarded forgotten traits as less valuable than remembered traits. These results suggest that a forgetting bias exists: If information is initially forgotten, it is later deemed as less important.

How should exemplars be sequenced in inductive learning? Empirical evidence versus learners’ opinions

The sequencing of exemplars during study can have a large effect on category or concept induction. Counter to learners’ intuitions, interleaving exemplars from different categories is often more effective for learning the different underlying categories than is blocking all the exemplars by category (e.g., Kornell & Bjork, 2008). Prior research suggests that blocking and interleaving each support different aspects of induction: Interleaving appears to enhance between-category discrimination, whereas blocking appears to promote the learning of within-category commonalities. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants studied paintings by 12 artists and were asked to induce the different artists’ painting styles. We explored whether hybrid schedules can leverage the benefits of both types of schedules, comparing blocked, interleaved, and 3 hybrid schedules—blocked-to-interleaved, interleaved-to-blocked, and miniblocks. The miniblocks and blocked-to-interleaved schedules were as effective, statistically, but not better than pure interleaving. The blocked schedule led to the worst performance. In Experiments 3 and 4, we explored participants’ a priori beliefs by having them self-schedule hypothetical future category-learning tasks. Although participants demonstrated some metacognitive sophistication with respect to the relative benefits of blocked and interleaved study, pure interleaving was the least popular schedule, despite its being one of the most, effective schedules for learning.

Metacognitive illusions can be reduced by monitoring recollection during study

Prior work has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs) are prone to an auditory metacognitive illusion such that loud words are given higher predictions than quiet words despite no differences in recall as a function of auditory intensity. The current study investigated whether judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs)—judgments that focus participants on whether or not recollective details will be remembered—are less susceptible to such an illusion. In Experiment 1, participants studied single words, making item-by-item JOLs or JORKs immediately after study. Indeed, although increased volume elevated judgement magnitude for both JOLs and JORKs, the effect was significantly attenuated when JORKs were elicited. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and additionally demonstrated that participants making JORKs were less likely than participants making JOLs to choose to restudy quiet words relative to loud words. Taken together, these results suggest that JORKs are impacted less—in terms of both metacognitive monitoring and control—by irrelevant perceptual information than JOLs. More generally, these data support the contention that metacognitive illusions can be attenuated by simply changing the way metacognitive judgments are solicited, an important finding given that subjective experiences guide self-regulated learning.