Nicholas Magnan

Predicting Success in a Productive Asset Transfer Program: A Goat Program in Haiti

Livestock transfer programs have become an essential component of many non‐governmental organizations’ (NGOs) strategies for reducing poverty among smallholders and subsistence farmers in less developed countries. Despite their prevalence, the literature surrounding the effectiveness of this class of productive asset intervention is only starting to emerge. In this paper, we examine an NGO‐sponsored goat transfer‐and‐training program in rural Haiti. Before realizing the ultimate program goals of improved health, greater levels of education, better housing, and more productive farms, beneficiaries must build sustainable herds of healthy goats. Our intent is to identify household characteristics correlated with success in the program. Therefore, we measure a set of outcomes related to herd health and growth, and explain their variation across beneficiaries by regressing them on a set of household variables. We use the results of the regressions to evaluate hypotheses informed by current literature in asset‐based poverty. Specifically, we find compelling evidence that the wealthiest beneficiaries build smaller, less valuable herds compared to poorer beneficiaries. We find equally compelling evidence that geography affects herd growth. In addition, we find that access to land significantly reduces kid mortality, a key to sustainable, profitable goat herding. Finally, we find some evidence that female beneficiaries experience lower kid mortality. To the extent that these findings hold in other contexts, NGOs can improve the targeting of livestock programs by screening beneficiaries on these criteria.

Ex ante and ex post effects of hybrid index insurance in Bangladesh

This study assesses both the demand for and effectiveness of an index insurance product designed to help smallholder farmers in Bangladesh manage crop production risk during the monsoon season. Villages were randomized into either an insurance treatment or a comparison group, and discounts and rebates were randomly allocated across treatment villages to encourage insurance take-up and to allow for the estimation of the price-elasticity of insurance demand. Among those offered insurance, we find demand to be fairly price elastic, with discounts significantly more successful in stimulating demand than rebates. Purchasing insurance yields both ex ante risk management effects as well as ex post income effects on agricultural production practices. The risk management effects lead to an expansion of cultivated area with concomitant increases in agricultural input expenditures during the monsoon season. The income effects lead to more intensive rice production during the subsequent dry season, with more intensive use of both irrigation and fertilizers, resulting in higher yields and higher total rice production.