Nicholas Marsh

Figes, Orlando, 2007. The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin's Russia. London: Penguin. xxxviii + 740 pp. ISBN 9780713997026. Montefiore, Simon Sebag, 2007. Young Stalin. London: Widenfeld & Nicolson. xxviii + 397 pp. ISBN 9780297850687

Desch’s book is a critique of what he calls the ‘democratic triumphalism’ literature and its hypothesized positive relationship between democracy and military effectiveness. He focuses on the selection argument (democracies are more prudent when involving themselves in wars) and the war-fighting argument (democracies fight more effectively because of less rent-seeking, better alliances, better strategic evaluation, higher public support and stronger battlefield performance). Desch claims that his quantitative analysis and case studies show that these arguments are flawed. Although he succeeds in highlighting the need for refinement of the causal mechanisms of ‘triumphalism’, there are several problems with his analysis. First, the way Desch deals with existing quantitative evidence is unconvincing. His interpretation of interaction terms, which much of his analysis rests upon, is flawed in that he incorrectly assumes that significance levels and marginal effects for interaction terms can be calculated just as for ordinary variables. In addition, Desch’s proposal to exclude wars whose outcome might have been determined by factors other than democracy from the analysis is quite unorthodox. Second, ‘democratic triumphalism’ seems at times to be more of a straw man made up for an easy refutation than a correct reflection of the body of literature attacked. For instance, when addressing democratic alliance behaviour, the author rejects the claim that democracies are more likely to align. This finding is probably correct, but ignores the fact that this claim has also long been rejected by quantitative alliance research and the very body of literature he attacks. Ulrich Pilster

Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency

This edited volume has been written by a veritable ‘who’s who’ of US theorists on insurgency and military strategy (most of whom work for US military colleges or consultancy firms). Together with Mark Galeotti and Andrew Garfield (based in Europe), they provide interesting and informative analysis of contemporary insurgency and terrorism. The book is divided into four parts, focusing on a theoretical and legal introduction; crime and private armies in Chechnya and Northern Ireland; Al-Qaeda; and, finally, networks. There are many highlights. Max Manwaring provides an impressive overview of the global security landscape, emphasizing the links between failed states, criminality, terrorism and insurgency. The links between terrorism, crime and private armies are also highlighted by John Sullivan. Neal Pollard suggests that legalistic antiterrorist initiatives are hamstrung by an inability to prosecute people for being part of terrorist networks (rather than just as individuals), and that it is too difficult to take action against the state sponsors of terrorism. Galeotti and Garfield have produced informative case studies of, respectively, Chechen insurgents and the Provisional IRA. Unfortunately, other contributions do not meet these high standards. Arquilla & Ronfeldt’s piece on ‘netwar revisited’ is rather perfunctory. The two biggest disappointments are the two chapters devoted to Al-Qaeda – Robert Bunker and Matt Begert’s operational analysis and Lisa Campbell’s order of battle. Despite recognizing that it is a disparate body of often loosely connected groups and individuals, they tend to present it as a unitary foe. They cite examples of the tactics and technology used by Al-Qaeda groups, but fail to highlight the extent to which the rest of the network can actually use them. Nicholas Marsh