Nick Sitter

If you can't Beat them, Join them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe

Over the last three decades many Western European social democratic parties have been challenged by populist radical right parties. The growth and success of parties on the right flank of the party system represents a triple challenge to the social democrats: they increase the salience of issues traditionally ‘owned’ by the right; they appeal to working-class voters who traditionally support the centre left; and they may facilitate the formation of centre-right governments. This article explores social democratic parties’ strategic options in the face of this challenge, and tests the widespread assumption that the centre-left parties respond by taking a tougher stance on issues related to immigration and integration. Comparative analysis of developments in Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway reveals significant variation in the substance, scope and pace of the strategic responses of their social democratic parties. And it suggests that those responses are influenced not only by the far right but also by the reactions of mainstream centre-right parties and by parties on their left (and liberal) flank. Internal disunity, potential or actual, is also an important factor.

The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro‐scepticism a government‐opposition dynamic?

Scandinavian party competition has incorporated divisions over European integration to a greater degree than most West European party systems, but with considerable variation in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. From a comparative politics perspective this raises questions about the relatively high salience of Euro‐scepticism in Scandinavian politics, the differences between the three cases and changes over time. The central argument in this article is that Europeanisation of party politics ‐ the translation of issues related to European integration into domestic party politics ‐ is driven by the dynamics of long‐ and short‐term government‐opposition competition, and the key driver of change is party strategy. Whether at the centre or extremes of the party system, Euro‐scepticism is a product of party competition — and is, both in its origins and development, ‘the politics of opposition ‘.

Patterns of Stability Party Competition and Strategy in Central Europe since 1989

During the decade and a half since the collapse of communism in 1989, the four Central European states have achieved a remarkable degree of party system stability, confounding pessimistic predictions about unstable competition, weak parties and limited institutionalization. This stability, and variations within the region, raises important questions about party system stability and change. The present article explores the patterns of party competition in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and finds that party system stability is largely a function of party strategy. The broadly successful strategies of former communist and new social democratic parties have stabilized the left wing of the systems in the first three cases, whereas the Slovak left has struggled. However, while efforts to define and dominate the centre–right have yielded some stabilization in Hungary and the Czech Republic, similar efforts in Poland have been less decisive. In Slovakia, the struggle against Mec .iar has eclipsed other bloc-building strategies, and accounts for much of the instability. In both Poland and Slovakia, relatively open electoral systems in the early years worked against unitary strategies, at least for some parties. However, apart from this, constraints on party strategy were weak in the first decade, and many strategies were attempted. In such a context, party strategy therefore becomes a particularly powerful explanation of differences in patterns of party system stability.

Differentiated Integration: What is it and How Much Can the EU Accommodate?

Abstract How much differentiated integration can the European Union accommodate? Not all member states are equally eager or able to participate in all aspects of integration, and the impact of EU policy on the member states varies across states and policy sectors. Whereas much of the literature on differentiated integration has focused primarily on formal opt–outs, this article widens the term to capture both the formal and informal arrangements for policy opt–outs as well as the differences, or discretionary aspects, associated with putting EU policy into practice. The article draws on organisational theory to elaborate a broad and flexible understanding of European integration that links the literature on integration and Europeanisation, and proceeds to explore different types of European integration. The core question is therefore: what is differentiated integration, and how much can the EU accommodate? Is differentiated integration a robust path for the EU project?

Cleavages, party strategy and party system change in Europe, east and west

Abstract This article analyses the development of competitive party politics in post‐communist East Central Europe from a comparative perspective. The central concerns are party system stabilisation and change in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and implications for comparative theory. Starting from Lipset and Rokkans ‘cleavage model’, the article assesses the relevance of their key variables for party politics in the 1990s. Although there are considerable similarities (particularly in termsof choice of electoral systems), the cleavages, relationships between voters and parties, and the very nature of parties all differ considerably from the early Twentieth Century West European cases. Party strategy emerges as the key variable in explaining patterns of party system stability and change. Variations result from: (i) the prevalence of catch‐all type strategies; (ii) interest representation strategies; and (iii) the presence of parties that have staked out positions on the flanks of the system. The conclusions concerning the central role of party strategy are not confined to East Central Europe, but are also pertinent to the study of party system change in Western Europe.

A liberal actor in a realist world? The Commission and the external dimension of the single market for energy

ABSTRACT This article investigates the European Commissions external energy policy through the lens of the regulatory state. It argues that because of the nature of its institutions, policy tools and resources, the Commission remains a liberal actor even as the world leaves the benign pro-market environment of the 1990s and becomes more mercantilist – or ‘realist’. The article tests seven hypotheses related to two key challenges as perceived by the Commission: building energy markets, and making them work. It finds that the Commission seeks to project the single market beyond its jurisdiction to deal with transit infrastructure problems; extend international regimes to cover energy trade; deal with monopolists such as Gazprom through classical competition policy; and fix global energy market failures with clear regulatory state tools. Importantly, however, some actions by the Commission can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance external actors, or as second-best efforts to address energy market failures.

Soft power with a hard edge: EU policy tools and energy security

ABSTRACT International security debates surrounding the European Union (EU) energy supply challenge commonly invoke the need for more EU hard power – e.g. getting tough on Russia or engaging directly with other exporters. This article investigates whether what might be labelled ‘soft power with a hard edge’ instead amounts to a consistent policy strategy for the EU. The central argument is that the EU has turned a weakness into strength, and developed a set of tools that sharpen the way soft power is exercised in the energy sector. The article explores how soft power affects companies that ‘come and play’ on the EU market: the rules of the Single European Market (SEM) and how they affect external firms. It also assesses the long reach of the SEM: both the gravitational ‘pull’ the SEM exerts in the ‘near aboard’, and the EUs ‘push’ to facilitate the development of midstream infrastructure and upstream investment. The conclusion is that the EU regulatory state is emerging as an international energy actor in its own right. It limits the ways states like Russia can use state firms in the geopolitical game; and it exports its model into the near abroad, thus stabilizing energy supply and transit routes.

Ever Closer Cooperation? The Limits of the ‘Norwegian Method’ of European Integration

The ‘No’ majorities in two referendums on European Community/Union (EC/EU) membership have set clear formal limits to Norways participation in European integration. However, pro-EU parliamentary majorities have tended to produce governments that seek as close cooperation with the EU as possible. This involves a kind of quasi-membership of the EU, particularly in the light of cooperation beyond the limits of the European Economic Area (EEA). The result has been a ‘Norwegian method’ of European integration that combines access to the Single Market with efforts to ‘purchase’ participation in other policy areas and adapt to changing EU policies, legislation and treaties. Given the supranational character of the EUs Single Market rules, this kind of quasi-membership goes considerably further than non-members’ participation in most other international organisations. Although the EEA system has worked to the parties’ satisfaction, Norways efforts to keep up with a changing Single Market, maintain the institutions in the face of treaty change and enlargement, and accommodate new developments pertaining to the EUs second and third pillars represent considerable challenges to the Norwegian method of integration.

Norway's Storting election of September 2005: Back to the Left?

In September 2005, after four years in opposition, Jens Stoltenberg led the Norwegian Labour Party to electoral victory at the head of a ‘red–green’ alliance that included the Socialist Left and the rural Centre Party. This brought about the first (peace-time) Labour-led coalition, the first majority government for 20 years, and the first coalition to include the far left. The centre-right coalition of the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party and the Liberals lost badly, and the populist right-wing Progress Party became the second largest party. Four years earlier (Norway uses a fixed-term electoral cycle) Stoltenberg had fought the 2001 election as a modernising prime minister cast in the Tony Blair mould, defending a record of public sector modernisation and privatisation, and lost badly (Madeley 2002). Labour’s 2005 campaign was a stark contrast. The Blairite ‘third way’ rhetoric was replaced by criticism of the centre-right’s public sector reforms; underscored by the new alliance. Was this, then, the triumph of the return to ‘second way’ social democracy? The answer is, at most, a qualified ‘yes’. The result also reflected three factors that have been central to electoral contests in Norway for at least ten years. First, as John Madeley noted in an earlier election report in this journal, Norway’s oil wealth wreaks havoc with electoral politics (Madeley 1998). Governing parties are vulnerable to charges that the ‘richest country in the world’ can surely afford better public services, and such arguments find resonance in a country with a high proportion of floating voters. Second, the last two decades have seen minority governments come and go. Building and maintaining coalitions has been a persistent challenge. Third, Norway’s ambiguous relationship with the European Union continues to divide both centre-left and centre-right coalitions. The question must be solved, or at least shelved, before any coalition can be agreed. All three themes played their part in 2005: yet another government that had presided over a solid economy was defeated; the Progress Party withdrew its support from Prime

The EU Regulatory State, Commission Leadership and External Energy Governance

In the 1990s the European Union extended its regulatory state model (Majone 1994; Lodge 2002; Moran 2002; Lodge 2008; Levi-Faur 2011) to the utilities sectors, and began to liberalize its gas market. As this process got underway, the EU began to pursue a parallel process: extending the reach of the single market beyond its borders. In fact, the EU sought to guarantee security of energy supplies primarily by extending its regulatory governance beyond its jurisdiction. These efforts included enlarging the EU (thereby expanding the direct reach of its regulatory apparatus), establishing the European Economic Area (EEA) (making key energy-supplier Norway comply with EU rules), and setting up policy agreements such as the Energy Charter Treaty with former Communist states — notably Russia (which currently supplies the EU with 30 per cent of its gas and 35 per cent of its oil) (Eurostat 2012).