Nick Zangwill

Direction of Fit and Normative Functionalism

Etude du probleme local de la difference entre la croyance et le desir qui souleve des questions fondamentales concernant la metaphysique de lesprit. Examinant la metaphore de la direction du trait (fit), et soulevant la difficulte de distinguer la verite de la satisfaction, lA. montre que la solution est dordre normatif, mais que linterpretation normative proposee par E. Anscombe doit etre modifee dans le sens des dispositions definies par M. Smith, dune part, et dans le sens des intentions de second-ordre reperees par L. Humberstone, dautre part. Rejetant le fonctionnalisme dispositionnel standard, lA. defend le fonctionnalisme normatif de la philosophie de lesprit

THE NORMATIVITY OF THE MENTAL

I describe and defend the view in a philosophy of mind that I call ‘Normative Essentialism’, according to which propositional attitudes have normative essences. Those normative essences are ‘horizontal’ rational requirements, by which I mean the requirement to have certain propositional attitudes given other propositional attitudes. Different propositional attitudes impose different horizontal rational requirements. I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this doctrine and argue for the weaker version. I explore the consequences for knowledge of mind, and I then consider objections to the view from mental causation, from empirical psychology, and from animals and small children.

Philosophical aesthetics : an introduction

Acknowledgements. Introduction. Part I: What is Art?:. 1. The Concept of Art: Oswald Hanfling (Open University). 2. Aesthetic Qualities: Oswald Hanfling (Open University). 3. The Ontology of Art: Oswald Hanfling (Open University). Part II: Art and Feeling:. 4. Aesthetic Experience: Diane Collinson (Open University). 5. Expression and Creativity (Robert Wilkinson, Staff Tutor, Open University). Part III: Art, World and Society:. 6. Truth and Representation: Rosalind Hursthouse (Open University). 7. Art, Society and Morality: Tom Sorell. Part IV: The Evaluation of Art:. 8. Evaluation, Objectivity and Subjectivity: Colin Lyas (Lancaster University). 9. Criticism and Interpretation: Colin Lyas (Lancaster University). 10. Continental Aesthetics: Stuart Sim (Open University). 11. Marxist Aesthetics: Stuart Sim (Open University). Index.

Art and audience

Contrairement aux theories de lart qui impliquent une relation de loeuvre avec son public, lA. defend lidee selon laquelle lessence de lart ne depend pas dune pretendue relation dispositionnelle ou fonctionnelle avec le public, mais necessite la prise en compte de lintention de lartiste. Examinant les theories de M. Beardsley, N. Goodman, A. Danto, G. Dickie et J. Levinson, ainsi que les contre-exemples que representent les nouvelles de Kafka, destinees a la destruction, et les scupltures mortuaires destinees a linhumation, lA. definit les principes de lactivite artistique rationnelle, fondee sur la transparence de lintention et lexplication minimale des motivations de lartiste, dune part, et defend lautonomie artistique dun art egoiste fonde sur lintegrite et lexperience de lartiste, dautre part. Des lors, la relation entre lart et le public devient purement normative, relevant les effets epiphenomenaux de loeuvre et non pas de son essence

Normativity and the Metaphysics of Mind

I consider the metaphysical consequences of the view that propositional attitudes have essential normative properties. I argue that realism should take a weak rather than a strong form. I argue that expressivism cannot get off the ground. And I argue that eliminativism is self-refuting.

The Concept of the Aesthetic

Can the contemporary concept of the ‘aesthetic’ be defended? Is it in good shape or is it sick? Should we retain it or dispense with it? The concept of the aesthetic is used to characterize a range of judgements and experiences. Let us begin with some examples of judgements which aestheticians classify as aesthetic, so that we have some idea of what we are talking about. These paradigm cases will anchor the ensuing discussion. Once we have some idea of which judgements are classified as aesthetic judgements, we can go on to ponder what, if anything, they have in common. We judge that things are beautiful or ugly, or that they have or lack aesthetic value or aesthetic merit. Let us call these judgements verdictive aesthetic judgements. (I group judgements of beauty and aesthetic value together.) We also judge that things are dainty, dumpy, graceful, garish, delicate, balanced, warm, passionate, brooding, awkward and sad. Let us call these judgements substantive aesthetic judgements. The objects and events about which we make verdictive and substantive judgements include both natural objects and works of art. Aestheticians have traditionally been concerned to understand the nature of verdictive judgements. Interest in substantive judgements, by contrast, is a novelty – something that has surfaced only since the Second World War. Interest in judgements of beauty and ugliness has a history of millennia, whereas interest in substantive judgements has a history of decades. The contemporary category of aesthetic judgements, as it is usually conceived, includes both verdictive judgements and substantive judgements. But ‘aesthetic’ is a term of art, and there is no right answer concerning how the word should be used. For example, the modern usage is quite unlike Kant’s. What is in question is the point of a classification which groups the beautiful together with the dainty and the dumpy. Is there anything to be said for such a classification? Or is it arbitrary? Are there relevant similarities which would make such an inclusive classification illuminating and worthwhile? The other face of the problem is over representational judgements. Examples of representational judgements are judgements to the effect that a work of art is of Napoleon or of a tree. Representational judgements are usually, but not always, excluded from the category of aesthetic judgements. Are there relevant dissimilarities which would make such exclusion illuminating and worthwhile? The issue is not one about aesthetic terms, since, as Roger Scruton has emphasized, there are many aesthetic descriptions which do not deploy aesthetic terms. (Scruton 1974; see also Sibley 1959, pp. 422–23, 446–48.) These are the metaphorical aesthetic descriptions. For example, we say that works of art are ‘delicate’ or

Against the sociology of art

Aesthetic theories of art refuse to go away. In spite of decades of criticism and derision, a minority of thinkers stubbornly persist in maintaining that we need a general theory of art that makes essential appeal to beauty, elegance, daintiness, and other aesthetic properties. However, those who approach the theory of art from a sociological point of view tend to be skeptical about any account of art that appeals to aesthetic properties in a fundamental way. This skepticism takes two overlapping forms, only one of which I will pursue here. The form of skepticism I am interested in is concerned to deny that we need to appeal to aesthetic considerations in explaining the production of art. Let us call this production skepticism. This form of skepticism does not coincide with skepticism about the appeal to aesthetic considerations in explaining our experiences and judgments about art. Let us call that consumption skepticism. Examples of consumption skeptics are Pierre Bourdieu and Terry Eagleton, who think that aesthetic value judgments about art really reflect social status rather than being a response to qualities of the works. In my view, the reasons, such as they are, that Bourdieu and Eagleton put forward in favor of

Feasible Aesthetic Formalism

LA. se propose de defendre la validite de la these du formalisme esthetique tant denigree ces dernieres annees. LA. presente un formalisme modere qui sappuie sur la distinction esthetique/non-esthetique, dune part, et sur la distinction entre la beaute libre et la beaute dependante chez Kant, dautre part. LA. montre que seul un formalisme modere permet de rendre compte des formes dart essentielles que sont la peinture, la sculpture, la litterature et la musique

Are There Counterexamples to Aesthetic Theories of Art

Do all works of art have an aesthetic purpose? It is not particularly controversial that many works of art have an aesthetic purpose. What will be disputed is whether they all do. According to aesthetic theories of art, having an aesthetic purpose makes a thing art. It will be said that the trouble with aesthetic theories of art is that there seem to be works of art with no aesthetic purpose. Most aestheticians in the last few decades have thought it is obvious that there are clear counterexamples to aesthetic theories, and so they think that such views are easily shown to be false. I shall begin by arguing that this rests on a hasty view of one kind of counterexample, and a methodologically naive approach to another. I then consider different notions of art, and I end with some reflections on methodology in the philosophy of art. Aesthetic theories emerge looking fit and healthy. Let me say a little about aesthetic theories of art, so that we have something substantial to work with. For the purposes of this discussion, we can take such theories to span a family of different theories. But all such theories have two

Against Analytic Moral Functionalism

I argue against the analytic moral functionalist view propounded by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I focus on the ‘input’ clauses of our alleged ‘folk moral theory’. I argue that the examples they give of such input clauses cannot plausibly be interpreted as analytic truths. They are in fact substantive moral claims about the moral ‘domain’. It is a substantive claim that all human beings have equal moral standing. There are those who have rejected this, such as Herman Goring. He was loyal to a sub-class of humankind, but he suffered no conceptual confusion. Claims about what is morally relevant are substantive claims that cannot be known on purely conceptual grounds. 1. Semantic and metaphysical naturalism How do we know moral truths? A semantic naturalist in moral philosophy claims, firstly, that moral properties are determined by natural properties, and, secondly, that the obtaining of such determination relations can be known on purely semantic or conceptual grounds. Since natural facts are empirically knowable, this has the consequence that moral facts are easily knowable given empirical knowledge of the natural facts. We know the natural facts in ordinary empirical ways, add the semantic knowledge of the determination relation, and then deduce the moral facts. By contrast, a metaphysical naturalist agrees that moral properties are determined by natural properties, but shrinks from the idea that we know these determination relations on semantic or conceptual grounds. The metaphysical naturalist says that we cannot know moral facts just by knowing the natural facts that determine them plus semantic knowledge (Sturgeon 1984, Railton 1986, Lycan 1988, Brink 1989). For a metaphysical naturalist, knowledge of the links between moral and natural properties is problematic. But if there are semantic connections between moral and natural properties, then we can know one on the basis of the other. Semantic naturalism implies that insofar as people are not ignorant of natural facts, those making false moral judgements are misusing language or abusing concepts. ≈ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2000, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Ratio (new series) XIII 3 September 2000 0034‐0006