Nicolao Bonini

On the reality of the conjunction fallacy.

Attributing higher “probability” to a sentence of formp-and-q, relative top, is a reasoning fallacy only if (1) the wordprobability carries its modern, technical meaning and (2) the sentencep is interpreted as a conjunct of the conjunctionp-and-q. Legitimate doubts arise about both conditions in classic demonstrations of the conjunction fallacy. We used betting paradigms and unambiguously conjunctive statements to reduce these sources of ambiguity about conjunctive reasoning. Despite the precautions, conjunction fallacies were as frequent under betting instructions as under standard probability instructions.

Comparison of confirmation measures.

Alternative measures of confirmation or evidential support have been proposed to express the impact of ascertaining one event on the credibility of another. We report an experiment that compares the adequacy of several such measures as descriptions of confirmation judgment in a probabilistic context.

Escalation of Commitment with Transparent Future Outcomes

A frequent case of irrational decision making is the tendency to escalate commitment to a chosen course of action after unsuccessful prior investments of money, effort, or time (sunk costs). In previous research it is argued that escalation does not occur when future outcomes and alternative investments are transparent. Inconsistent with this argument, in an experiment in which undergraduates were presented fictitious investment problems with sunk costs, escalation was demonstrated when full information was given about investment alternatives and estimates of future returns. Thus, it is indicated that people may escalate despite knowing that it will not make them economically better off. A more comprehensive understanding of escalation requires disentangling peoples noneconomic reasons for escalation.

Mental accounting and acceptance of a price discount

Abstract The paper reports five experiments related to a price reduction choice task. In Experiment 1 and in the control condition of Experiment 4, the finding reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) with the calculator problem is replicated. People show a difference in the rate of acceptance of a price reduction across the two versions of this problem. This finding has been explained as due to the use of a topical mental account of the offered price reduction. This paper studies the effect on the previous finding of four experimental manipulations of the calculator problem. In these situations, a relationship between the two purchases is provided in order to make their mental segregation difficult and favour the use of a comprehensive mental account of the price discount. Results show that when the two target purchases are embedded in a shopping list, an expense budget is provided, and subjects are reminded that they can also buy the jacket at the other store, the effect reported in the control condition disappears. These results are interpreted by the notion of the focusing mechanism.

Anxious ultimatums: How anxiety disorders affect socioeconomic behaviour

Although the role of emotion in socioeconomic decision making is increasingly recognised, the impact of specific emotional disorders, such as anxiety disorders, on these decisions has been surprisingly neglected. Twenty anxious patients and twenty matched controls completed a commonly used socioeconomic task (the Ultimatum Game), in which they had to accept or reject monetary offers from other players. Anxious patients accepted significantly more unfair offers than controls. We discuss the implications of these findings in light of recent models of anxiety, in particular the importance of interpersonal factors and assertiveness in an integrated model of decision making. Finally, we were able to show that pharmacological serotonin used to treat anxious symptomatology tended to normalise decision making, further confirming and extending the role of serotonin in co-operation, prosocial behaviour, and social decision making. These results show, for the first time, a different pattern of socioeconomic behaviour in anxiety disordered patients, in addition to the known memory, attentional and emotional biases that are part of this pathological condition.

Pecunia olet: the role of incidental disgust in the ultimatum game.

We address the role of the incidental emotion of disgust in the Ultimatum Game. Participants had to choose whether or not to accept a €2 offer from a €10 pot made by another participant; 120 were in a room where a disgusting smell was released and 120 were in a room with no particular smell. Acceptance rates were higher in the room with the disgusting smell. The effect was mainly carried by the male participants who also reported more disgust with the disgusting smell and judged the offer as less unfair than females. We propose a spontaneous discounting explanation. Acceptance rates were higher in the room with the disgusting smell because participants misattributed the disgust induced by the offer to the ambient disgusting smell.

Influencing what the money is perceived to be worth: Framing and priming in contingent valuation studies.

In contingent valuation studies willingness to pay (WTP) for a non-use value may be affected by how much the respondents perceive that a money contribution they plan or are asked to make is worth. In Study 1, 66 psychology undergraduates stated how much they were willing to pay for cleaning the lakes in the country. Different groups were told that the suggested contribution was equivalent to the cost of a more or a less valuable service. As expected, the WTP was less in the former than in the latter group. Similar results were obtained in Study 2 for 280 randomly selected residents of a metropolitan area answering a mail-back questionnaire. Half of them who first recalled buying something too expensive indicated a higher WTP than those who first recalled buying something well worth the money.

Waves of regret: A MEG study of emotion and decision-making

Recent fMRI studies have investigated brain activity involved in the feeling of regret and disappointment by manipulating the feedback participants saw after making a decision to play certain gambles: full-feedback (regret: participant sees the outcomes from both the chosen and unchosen gamble) vs. partial-feedback (disappointment: participant only sees the outcome from chosen gamble). However, regret and disappointment are also characterized by differential agency attribution: personal agency for regret, external agency for disappointment. In this study, we investigate the neural correlates of these two characterizations of regret and disappointment using magnetoencephalography (MEG). To do this, we experimentally induced each emotion by manipulating feedback (chosen gamble vs. unchosen gamble), agency (human vs. computer choice) and outcomes (win vs. loss) in a fully randomized design. At the behavioral level the emotional experience of regret and disappointment were indeed affected by both feedback and agency manipulations. These emotions also differentially affect subsequent choices, with regret leading to riskier behavior. At the neural level both feedback and agency affected the brain responses associated with regret and disappointment, demonstrating differential localization in the brain for each. Notably, feedback regret showed greater brain activity in the right anterior and posterior regions, with agency regret producing greater activity in the left anterior region. These findings extend the evidence for neural activity in processing both regret and disappointment by highlighting for the first time the respective importance of feedback and agency, as well as outlining the temporal dynamics of these emotions.

Time Devours Things: How Impulsivity and Time Affect Temporal Decisions in Pathological Gamblers

Impulsivity is associated with several psychiatric disorders in which the loss of control of a specific behavior determines the syndrome itself. One particularly interesting population characterized by reported high impulsivity and problematic decision-making are those diagnosed with pathological gambling. However the association between impulsivity and decision making in pathological gambling has been only partially confirmed until now. We tested 23 normal controls and 23 diagnosed pathological gamblers in an intertemporal choice task, as well as other personality trait measurements. Results showed that gamblers scored higher on impulsivity questionnaires, and selected a higher percentage of impatient choices (higher percentage of smaller, sooner rewards), when compared to normal controls. Moreover, gamblers were faster in terms of reaction times at selecting the smaller, sooner options and discounted rewards more rapidly over time. Importantly, regression analyses clarified that self-reported measures of impulsivity played a significant role in biasing decisions towards small but more rapidly available rewards. In the present study we found evidence for impulsivity in personality traits and decisions in pathological gamblers relative to controls. We conclude by speculating on the need to incorporate impulsivity and decision biases in the conceptualization of pathological gambling for a better understanding and treatment of this pathology.

Living emotions, avoiding emotions: Behavioral investigation of the regulation of socially driven emotions

Emotion regulation is important for psychological well-being. Although it is known that alternative regulation strategies may have different emotional consequences, the effectiveness of such strategies for socially driven emotions remains unclear. In this study we investigated the efficacy of different forms of reappraisal on responses to the selfish and altruistic behavior of others in the Dictator Game. In Experiment 1, subjects mentalized the intentions of the other player in one condition, and took distance from the situation in the other. Emotion ratings were recorded after each offer. Compared with a baseline condition, mentalizing led subjects to experience their emotions more positively when receiving both selfish and altruistic proposals, whereas distancing decreased the valence when receiving altruistic offers, but did not affect the perception of selfish behavior. In Experiment 2, subjects played with both computer and human partners while reappraising the meaning of the player’s intentions (with a human partner) or the meaning of the situation (with a computer partner). Results showed that both contexts were effectively modulated by reappraisal, however a stronger effect was observed when the donor was a human partner, as compared to a computer partner. Taken together, these results demonstrate that socially driven emotions can be successfully modulated by reappraisal strategies that focus on the reinterpretation of others’ intentions.