Nigel J. Ashton

Eisenhower, Macmillan and the problem of Nasser : Anglo-American relations and Arab nationalism, 1955-59

The years 1955-59 were a vital transitional period for the Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East. British and American leaders sought to protect cold war and oil interests in the region against the background of a renaissance of Arab nationalism personified by the Egyptian leader Nasser. With the aid of extensive declassified official documentation, this study traces the British and American responses to the Turco-Iraqi Pact of 1955, the Suez crisis, the Syrian crisis of 1957, the outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958. It shows how the differing priorities of the two powers in the region promoted a patchwork of confrontation and cooperation over Middle Eastern questions. For Britain, this study reveals that it was the Iraqi Revolution rather than Suez which led to a redefinition of strategy in the region, and a concentration on the defence of her oil interests in the Gulf.

Britain and the Kuwaiti crisis, 1961

The Kuwaiti crisis of 1961 has conventionally been accorded little attention in histories of Britains role in the Middle East. In fact, the crisis was an important defining moment, focusing the minds of policymakers on British interests in the Gulf, and the question of the best means of preserving them. It was also the largest scale mobilization of British forces in the Middle East in the post‐Suez era. This article sets the crisis in the context of longer term British relations with Kuwait, internal developments in the Emirate, the evolution of British strategy in the region since Suez and Kuwaiti‐Iraqi relations in order to understand the significance of the episode.

‘A “Special Relationship” sometimes in spite of ourselves’: Britain and Jordan, 1957–73

In view of Britains role in the creation and development of Jordan, bilateral relations in the wake of the Suez crisis are an important test case of its continuing engagement, not only in the Levant, but in the Middle East as a whole. This article shows that despite the far-reaching changes which took place in British foreign policy between 1957 and 1973, Britain retained a significant bilateral relationship with the Hashemite Kingdom. Through a comparison of the role of the Western powers in the 1958 and 1970 crises, and through an analysis of the key events of the intervening years, including the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, this article explores the dynamics of this persisting relationship. It shows that the initiative often came from the Jordanian side, with King Hussein particularly keen to involve both Britain and the United States in the September 1970 crisis as witnesses to his dealings with Israel.

A MICROCOSM OF DECLINE: BRITISH LOSS OF NERVE AND MILITARY INTERVENTION IN JORDAN AND KUWAIT, 1958 AND 1961

This article reinterprets the post-Suez British role in the Middle East through a comparison of the military interventions in Jordan in 1958 and Kuwait in 1961. Moreover, it places these operations in the broader context of the debate about British decline. It is argued that in addition to the familiar constraints on British action imposed by limited resources and the changing international climate, the projection of power in the region proved to be a great test of nerve for British ministers and officials. Paradoxically, this proved to be true as much of the successful interventions in Jordan and Kuwait as of the earlier failure over Suez. Utilizing very recently released documents from British and American archives, the article aims to shed light on the dynamics of decline at the microcosmic level, in the belief that insights gleaned here may well be of value in revising macrocosmic theories of the process.

Love's Labours Lost: Margaret Thatcher, King Hussein and Anglo–Jordanian Relations, 1979–1990

Relations between Britain and Jordan underwent a revival during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher between 1979 and 1990. Although no longer the dominant power in the Middle East, Britains membership of the European Economic Community and the close relations between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan meant that Britain was seen by King Hussein as an influential power to be courted. Thatcher shared Husseins views about the Arab-Israeli peace process and lent him strong support as the voice of Arab moderation. She also sought to use her personal relationship with Hussein as a vehicle to further British interests, particularly through her promotion of British arms sales, both directly to Jordan, and indirectly, through Jordan, to Iraq. This article makes use of a large body of British official documents secured under the Freedom of Information Act and Jordanian documents from the Royal Hashemite Archive in Amman to illuminate the development of bilateral relations over the course of the decade. It concludes by showing how the differing responses of Thatcher and Hussein to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 ruptured their relations. Drawing on sources which have previously been unavailable the article offers a fresh perspective on important aspects of the international history of the Middle East during the 1980s.

Anglo-American relations from World War to Cold War

John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2001; pp. vii + 258; ISBN 0 333 62250 2 Jonathan Hollowell (ed.), Twentieth Century Anglo-American Relations, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001; pp. x + 206; ISBN 0 333 80404 X Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002; pp. xxi + 325; ISBN 0 521 80111 7 John T. McNay, Acheson and Empire: The British Accent in American Foreign Policy, Columbia, MO, University of Missouri Press, 2001, pp. x + 219; ISBN 0 8262 1344 8

Macmillan and the Middle East

One of the great ironies of the Suez Crisis is that it resulted in the replacement of one Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, deemed to have taken too radical an approach in defence of British interests in the Middle East, by another, Harold Macmillan, whose views on the region were, if anything, even more radical. Macmillan was not only the foremost of the Cabinet hawks over Suez, and the first to propose the involvement of the Israelis in military action against Egypt, he was also responsible for the effective misrepresentation to Eden of the views of the US administration on the use of military force in cables sent during his visit to America in September 1956. Finally, and confusingly, it was the breaking of Macmillan’s nerve during the Suez landings which more than any other single factor seems to have dictated the decision to halt operations on the morning of 6 November 1956.

‘A Local Terrorist Made Good’: the Callaghan government and the Arab–Israeli peace process, 1977–79

Abstract The British government had played an important role during the 1950s and 1960s as a mediator in the Arab–Israeli conflict, most notably through the development of Project Alpha between 1954 and 1956, and through the negotiation of United Nations Security Council resolution 242 in 1967. Between 1977 and 1979, British Prime Minister James Callaghan played a supporting role to US President Jimmy Carter as he negotiated the Camp David Accords of 1978. Callaghan adopted a pro-Israeli stance, cultivating close relations with the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and defending Begin’s position over key issues, particularly his reluctance to remove settlements from the occupied territories. In this respect Callaghan’s government departed from established British policy, even abstaining over United Nations Security Council resolution 446 in March 1979 which condemned continuing Israeli settlement activity. This resulted in damage to Britain’s relations with moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan.

Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace? Anglo-American Relations and the Road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 continues to rank as a key point of reference for the Arab-Israeli peace process. The resolution laid down a ‘land for peace’ formula for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under which Israel would withdraw from territories occupied during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War in exchange for full peace agreements with its Arab neighbours. This article analyses the Anglo-American diplomacy at the United Nations which led to the passing of the resolution. It argues that the policy-making of the Johnson administration was rendered incoherent by internal rivalries and disorganisation. US Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, was perceived as excessively sympathetic to Israel by the Arab delegations. The British approach, by contrast, was perceived by all parties as more even-handed. The clear position adopted by Foreign Secretary George Brown on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, together with the skilful diplomacy of the Ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon, explains the British success in sponsoring Resolution 242. The episode holds broader lessons for the conduct of Anglo-American relations showing that Britain was better placed to achieve diplomatic success when it retained its freedom of manoeuvre in relations with the United States.

King Hussein of Jordan

King Hussein of Jordan has been described as a prisoner of history and geography.1 In fact, he saw both as presenting him with opportunities as well as constraints. In terms of geography, Jordan is a classic buffer state, sandwiched between more powerful neighbours: to the north is Syria; to the south Egypt and Saudi Arabia; to the east Iraq and, most importantly, to the west Israel. But throughout his long reign (1953–99) Hussein made playing off enemies and rivals into an art form to ensure both the survival of Jordan as an independent state and the survival of the Hashemite dynasty. In terms of history, Hussein inherited both the incorporation into Jordan of the West Bank acquired in the war of 1948–49 and hence of the Palestinian national question, and a sense of a broader dynastic mission from his grandfather, Abdullah. While his West Bank inheritance made political strife endemic to the Hashemite Kingdom, his sense of dynastic mission led Hussein to dream of a Hashemite purpose which was always larger than the boundaries imposed on Jordan. As Hussein described matters in private, Jordan had to have ‘a larger future than a few thousand square miles of sand’.2