Nikolaos Zahariadis

Ambiguity and choice in European public policy

ABSTRACT Amending rational institutionalist accounts of EU policy, I use the multiple streams perspective and examples from several policy sectors to explore the impact of two elements of policy choice: policy windows and the dynamics of coupling. I argue that policy outputs are neither exclusively rational nor solely a function of institutional design; rather they depend heavily on a complex interaction between problems, solutions, and politics during fleeting open windows of opportunity. Policy windows pose limitations to rational policy-making by framing the context within which choice is made, while the notion of coupling stresses the impact of entrepreneurial politics and strategies in EU policy-making. The analysis illuminates the limitations of rationality in explaining policy choice, the role of political power in the absence of institutional hierarchies, and the impact of ideas, institutions, and entrepreneurs in the EU policy process.

Ambiguity, multiple streams, and EU policy

The multiple streams framework draws insight from interactions between agency and institutions to explore the impact of context, time and meaning on policy change and to assess the institutional and issue complexities permeating the European Union (EU) policy process. The authors specify the assumptions and structure of the framework and review studies that have adapted it to reflect more fully EU decision-making processes. The nature of policy entrepreneurship and policy windows are assessed to identify areas of improvement. Finally, the authors sketch out a research agenda that refines the logic of political manipulation which permeates the lens and the institutional complexity which frames the EU policy process.

To Sell or Not to Sell? Telecommunications Policy in Britain and France

Using Kingdons agenda setting model and broadening it to the entire policy formation process, I offer an explanation of why the British privatised their telecommunications authority but the French did not. Privatisation is brought about by coupling three streams or factors in critical moments in time: available alternatives generated in policy communities, high government borrowing needs, and party politics. The findings illuminate the usefulness of Kingdons model beyond its original application in the United States, and have implications for broader theoretical debates in comparative policy research.

Asset Specificity and State Subsidies in Industrialized Countries

Why do national governments in industrialized countries subsidize many of their industries? Borrowing insights from literature on transaction cost economics and international trade, I build a model which tests the hypothesis that under threat of international competition disbursement of state subsidies varies systematically with the degree of asset (factor) specificity employed in a national economy. Asset specificity refers to the cost of moving factors (assets) from one activity to the next. I pool annual data on state subsidies in thirteen OECD countries during the period 1990–93 and regress them on two measures of asset specificity (physical and human capital) in the face of competition from abroad. Physical capital exercises a significant u-shaped effect on total and sectoral subsidies. Human capital has a weak negative effect on horizontal subsidies. The results extend the literature on asset specificity and trade in two ways. First, they provide empirical support in favor of the argument that asset specificity and subsidy protection are related. While theoretical claims concerning asset specificity abound, the literature is generally short of empirical studies. Second, asset specificity helps determine the scope of subsidies.

Selling British Rail An Idea Whose Time Has Come

Using a multiple streams model, which is based on work by Kingdon, the study explains the quest to sell British Rail. It argues that privatization depends on the interplay of three streams or factors in opportune moments: problems, solutions, and politics. The key to understanding the process is coupling, the notion that the effects of these factors are not additive; rather, only a combination of all three at the same time can produce the desired outcome. The essential features of the answer to the privatization puzzle, therefore, are the institutional position and strategy of policy entrepreneurs who join the streams together and the effect of policy windows on impeding or enhancing the coupling chances of specific solutions. The study refines Kingdons argument by specifying the conditions under which a policy may be in search of a rationale.

Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue

Few statesmen could have foreseen the complications posed by the resurgence of nationalism and inter-ethnic tensions in the wake of the dissolution of communism in the former Eastern bloc. Although a great deal has been written about how nationalist aspirations and ethnic divisions affect a state’s external relations, little attention has been paid to nationalism as an external source of foreign policy. We are warned, for example, that the emerging nationalism in lands of former Eastern Europe is an issue of great concern, but we are not given a theoretical map as to how it may affect the Western response.

Building better theoretical frameworks of the European Union's policy process

We aim to build better frameworks of the European Unions policy process by taking stock of promising theoretical lenses, assessing their strengths and limitations, and developing robust research agendas. Frameworks may constitute competing policy explanations depending on assumptions they make about institutional and issue complexity. Points of competition and complementarity are identified, leading to a research agenda that specifies which lenses to use and when.

Why State Subsidies? Evidence from European Community Countries, 1981–1986

In this article I seek to explain why European Community members subsidized a substantial portion of their economies in the period 1981–1986. I test three competing explanations: socioeconomic, party control, and world markets. Parties have an impact on overall state subsidies and loans, but trade deficits are most influential in the disbursement of direct budget outlays and tax incentives. Unemployment has no effect on subsidies. The differential responsiveness to trade and parties is likely to frustrate efforts toward greater European integration.

Complexity, coupling and policy effectiveness: the European response to the Greek sovereign debt crisis

What is the impact of Greeces fiscal meltdown on the effectiveness of Europes response? Using Perrows normal accidents theory, I argue that efforts to reduce the likelihood of a Greek default activated conflicting centripetal and centrifugal modes of governance. Greater centralisation in decision-making at the European Union level improves policy effectiveness because it addresses problems of contagion but it simultaneously raises the risk of overall failure by increasing diagnosis, coordination and compliance costs. Three episodes are explored: the first bailout in May 2010, the mid-term fiscal strategy in June–July 2011 and the second bailout in February 2012. Implications are drawn for theories of delegation, intergovernmentalism and the future of EU crisis management.

European Markets and National Regulation: Conflict and Cooperation in British Competition Policy

The aim of this article is to examine the politics of competition policy in the United Kingdom by taking into account regulatory cooperation at the European Union level. Adopting a multiple streams approach, the article follows a bottom-up approach placing domestic politics at the heart of the puzzle. The analysis leads to four conclusions. First, pace-setters, such as the UK, may not be interested in playing one dimension of the regulatory competition game, that is, trying to influence the development of EU policy. Second, incongruence between domestic and EU regimes does not necessarily produce change at the domestic level. Convergence is not a top-down process. Third, the activating stimulus for change may be external (the EU), but the process is basially of domestic politics. Fourth, to the extent that the removal of political discretion characterizes a more transparent and strictly enforced regime, British competition policy provides empirical support for the hypothesis that the interaction of regulatory competition prior to regulatory cooperation leads to convergence to the top.