Nikolay Milkov

The Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle: Affinities and Divergences

The Vienna Circle and the Berlin Group were schools of scientific philosophy that fought a common enemy—philosophical idealism and philosophical traditionalism in general. Their historically decisive influence makes it all the more disappointing that their intertwined story has not come down to us with due regard to its complexity. For the received account—that the Vienna Circle directed the scientific philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s—perpetuates an oversimplified picture of a seminal development of twentieth-century Western intellectual history. The fact is that the Berlin Group was an equal partner with the Vienna Circle, albeit one that pursued an itinerary of its own. But while the latter presented its defining projects in readily discernible terms and became immediately popular, the Berlin Group, whose project was at least as significant as that of its Austrian counterpart, remained largely unrecognized. The task of this chapter is to distinguish the Berliners’ work from that of the Vienna Circle and to bring to light its impact in the history of scientific philosophy.

G. E. Moore and the Greifswald Objectivists on the given and the Beginning of Analytic Philosophy

Shortly before G. E. Moore wrote down the formative for the early analytic philosophy lectures on Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1910–1911), he had become acquainted with two books which influenced his thought: (1) a book by Husserls pupil August Messer and (2) a book by the Greifswald objectivist Dimitri Michaltschew. Central to Michaltschews book was the concept of the “given”. In Part I, I argue that Moore elaborated his concept of sense-data in the wake of the Greifswald concept. Carnap did the same when he wrote his Aufbau, the only difference being that he spoke not of sense-data but of Erlebnisse. This means, I argue, that both Moores sense-data and CarnapsErlebnisse have little to do with either British empiricists or the neo-Kantians. In Part II, I try to ascertain what made early analytic philosophy different from all those philosophical groups and movements that either exercised influence on it, or were closely related to it: phenomenologists, Greifswald objectivists, Brentanists. For this purpose, I identify the sine qua non practices of the early analytic philosophers: exactness; acceptance of the propositional turn; descriptivism; objectivism. If one of these practices was not explored by a given philosophical school or group, in all probability, it was not truly analytic.

The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism

Preface Milkov, Peckhaus.- Part I. Introductory Chapters.- Part II. Historical-Theoretical Context.- Part III. Hans Reichenbach.- Part IV. Walter Dubislav.- Part V. Kurt Grelling and Alexander Herzberg.- Part VI. Carl Hempel und Paul Oppenheim.

Walter Dubislav’s Philosophy of Science and Mathematics

Walter Dubislav (1895–1937) was a leading member of the Berlin Group for scientific philosophy. This “sister group” of the more famous Vienna Circle emerged around Hans Reichenbach’s seminars at the University of Berlin in 1927 and 1928. Dubislav was to collaborate with Reichenbach, an association that eventuated in their conjointly conducting university colloquia. Dubislav produced original work in philosophy of mathematics, logic, and science, consequently following David Hilbert’s axiomatic method. This brought him to defend formalism in these disciplines as well as to explore the problems of substantiating (Begründung) human knowledge. Dubislav also developed elements of general philosophy of science. Sadly, the political changes in Germany in 1933 proved ruinous to Dubislav. He published scarcely anything after Hitler came to power and in 1937 committed suicide under tragic circumstances. The intent here is to pass in review Dubislav’s philosophy of logic, mathematics, and science and so to shed light on some seminal yet hitherto largely neglected currents in the history of philosophy of science.

On Walter Dubislav

This paper outlines the intellectual biography of Walter Dubislav. Besides being a leading member of the Berlin Group headed by Hans Reichenbach, Dubislav played a defining role as well in the Society for Empirical/Scientific Philosophy in Berlin. A student of David Hilbert, Dubislav applied the method of axiomatic to produce original work in logic and formalist philosophy of mathematics. He also introduced the elements of a formalist philosophy of science and addressed more general problems concerning the substantiation of human knowledge. What set Dubislav apart from the other logical empiricists was his expertise in the history of logic and exact philosophy which enabled him to elucidate and advance the thinking in both disciplines. In the realm of logic proper, Dubislav is best known for his pioneering work in theory of definitions. What is more, he did original work on the so called ‘quasi truth-tables’ which aided Reichenbach in developing his logic of probability. Dubislav also elaborated an influential logic of moral statements.

Karl Popper's Debt to Leonard Nelson

Karl Popper has often been cast as one of the most solitary fi gures of twentiethcentury philosophy. Th e received image is of a thinker who developed his scientifi c philosophy virtually alone and in opposition to a crowd of brilliant members of the Vienna Circle. Th is paper challenges the received view and undertakes to correctly situate on the map of the history of philosophy Popper’s contribution, in particular, his renowned fallibilist theory of knowledge. Th e motive for doing so is the conviction that the mainstream perspective on Popper’s philosophy makes him more diffi cult to understand than might otherwise be the case. Th e thinker who fi gures most signifi cantly in the account of Popper developed in these pages is Leonard Nelson. Both a neo-Friesian and neo-Kantian, this philosopher deeply infl uenced Popper through his student Julius Kraft, who met with Popper on numerous occasions in the mid 1920s. It is in the light of this infl uence that we understand Popper’s recollection that when he criticized the Vienna Circle in the early 1930s, he looked upon himself “as an unorthodox Kantian”.

Political Philosophy in Bulgaria – a Fresh Start?

Bulgaria is a philosophical nation. It is one of the few countries in Europe in which the study of philosophy is mandatory in the high schools. Its philosophers often figure prominently in political life. The first philosopher of importance in this country, Dimitri Michaltschew, was an ambassador to Prague in the twenties and twice to Moscow, first in the thirties, later in the mid-forties. After September 1944 and until the Monarchy was abolished on 15 September, 1946, the Marxist philosopher, Todor Pavlov, was a member of the Regency Council. Finally, between 1990 and 1996, another philosopher, Zheliu Zhelev, was the President of Republic Bulgaria, thus joining the club of three philosopher-heads of state in twentieth-century Europe, the other members being A. J. Balfour of the United Kingdom and T. G. Masaryk of Czechoslovakia. There are several grounds for this. On the one hand, religious sentiment in the country is not pronounced; on the other, as some authors of the volume under review note, culture as a whole, education in particular, have a constitutive meaning for Bulgaria’s national identity. So theoretical philosophy came to have the function of something resembling a Weltanschauung. Historically, the introduction of philosophy in the country’s culture was a part of a program for radical modernization, passionately embraced after 1878, which was to wipe away the effects of the “dark age” of the “Turkish

The Joint Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein and Its Demise

Abstract Between April and November 1912, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein were engaged in a joint philosophical program. Wittgenstein’s meeting with Gottlob Frege in December 1912 led, however, to its dissolution - the joint program was abandoned. This paper outlines the key points of that program, identifying what Russell and Wittgenstein each contributed to it. It determines precisely those features of their collaborative work that Frege criticized. Finally, building upon the evidence developed in the first two sections, it recasts, along previously undeveloped lines, Wittgenstein’s logical- philosophical discoveries in the two years following his encounter with Frege in 1912. The paper concludes with an overview of the dramatic consequences the Frege-Wittgenstein critique had for Russell’s philosophical development.

Carl Hempel: Whose Philosopher?

This chapter outlines Carl Hempel’s philosophical development in broad perspective. One little-appreciated fact that becomes clear in our discussion is that the Vienna Circle had less influence on Hempel than did the Berlin Group. Tracing this influence involves presenting seminal doctrines of Hempel’s masters and of his academic associates. The ultimate aim here is to locate Hempel’s place in the history of twentieth-century philosophy of science.

The Meaning of Life: A Topological Approach

In his Notebooks, T ractatus and ‘‘Lecture on Ethics’’, Wittgenstein suggested a new approach to the problems of philosophical anthropology. His task was to locate man’s place in the cosmos with scientific rigour. This project was something of an answer to Russell’s explorations on this theme in his essay ‘‘The Essence of Religion’’ (Russell 1912), but accomplished on a higher level of exactness. Indeed, after Wittgenstein read Russell’s paper, he criticised his teacher and friend in that the latter discussed in public themes which are too private, in a way that was far from being exact. In June 1916–January 1917, however, in his Notebooks, Wittgenstein developed an exact method of treating the same problems of philosophical anthropology which Russell discussed in 1912. In this essay I intend to show that what was new in Wittgenstein’s treatment of the problems of philosophical anthropology was the formal method of topology.