Nils-Frederic Wagner

Increase in glutamate/glutamine concentration in the medial prefrontal cortex during mental imagery: A combined functional mrs and fMRI study

Recent functional magnetic resonance spectroscopy (fMRS) studies have shown changes in glutamate/glutamine (Glx) concentrations between resting‐state and active‐task conditions. However, the types of task used have been limited to sensory paradigms, and the regions from which Glx concentrations have been measured limited to sensory ones. This leaves open the question as to whether the same effect can be seen in higher‐order brain regions during cognitive tasks. Cortical midline structures, especially the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), have been suggested to be involved in various such cognitive tasks. We, therefore set out to use fMRS to investigate the dynamics of Glx concentrations in the MPFC between resting‐state and mental imagery task conditions. The auditory cortex was used as a control region. In addition, functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to explore task‐related neural activity changes. The mental imagery task consisted of imagining swimming and was applied to a large sample of healthy participants (n = 46). The participants were all competitive swimmers, ensuring proficiency in mental‐swimming. Glx concentrations in the MPFC increased during the imagery task, as compared to resting‐state periods preceding and following the task. These increases mirror BOLD activity changes in the same region during the task. No changes in either Glx concentrations or BOLD activity were seen in the auditory cortex. These findings contribute to our understanding of the biochemical basis of generating or manipulating mental representations and the MPFCs role in this. Hum Brain Mapp 36:3204–3212, 2015.

Is the Sense of Agency in Schizophrenia Influenced by Resting-State Variation in Self-Referential Regions of the Brain?

Schizophrenia is a disturbance of the self, of which the attribution of agency is a major component. In this article, we review current theories of the Sense of Agency, their relevance to schizophrenia, and propose a novel framework for future research. We explore some of the models of agency, in which both bottom-up and top-down processes are implicated in the genesis of agency. We further this line of inquiry by suggesting that ongoing neurological activity (the brains resting state) in self-referential regions of the brain can provide a deeper level of influence beyond what the current models capture. Based on neuroimaging studies, we suggest that aberrant activity in regions such as the default mode network of individuals with schizophrenia can lead to a misattribution of internally/externally generated stimuli. This can result in symptoms such as thought insertion and delusions of control. Consequently, neuroimaging can contribute to a more comprehensive conceptualization and measurement of agency and potential treatment implications.

Habits: bridging the gap between personhood and personal identity

In philosophy, the criteria for personhood (PH) at a specific point in time (synchronic), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of personal identity (PI) over time (diachronic) are traditionally separated. Hence, the transition between both timescales of a persons life remains largely unclear. Personal habits reflect a decision-making (DM) process that binds together synchronic and diachronic timescales. Despite the fact that the actualization of habits takes place synchronically, they presuppose, for the possibility of their generation, time in a diachronic sense. The acquisition of habits therefore rests upon PI over time; that is, the temporal extension of personal decisions is the necessary condition for the possible development of habits. Conceptually, habits can thus be seen as a bridge between synchronic and diachronic timescales of a persons life. In order to investigate the empirical mediation of this temporal linkage, we draw upon the neuronal mechanisms underlying DM; in particular on the distinction between internally and externally guided DM. Externally guided DM relies on external criteria at a specific point in time (synchronic); on a neural level, this has been associated with lateral frontal and parietal brain regions. In contrast, internally guided DM is based on the persons own preferences that involve a more longitudinal and thus diachronic timescale, which has been associated with the brains intrinsic activity. Habits can be considered to reflect a balance between internally and externally guided DM, which implicates a particular temporal balance between diachronic and synchronic elements, thus linking two different timescales. Based on such evidence, we suggest a habit-based neurophilosophical approach of PH and PI by focusing on the empirically-based linkage between the synchronic and diachronic elements of habits. By doing so, we propose to link together what philosophically has been described and analyzed separately as PH and PI.

A fallacious jar? The peculiar relation between descriptive premises and normative conclusions in neuroethics

Ethical questions have traditionally been approached through conceptual analysis. Inspired by the rapid advance of modern brain imaging techniques, however, some ethical questions appear in a new light. For example, hotly debated trolley dilemmas have recently been studied by psychologists and neuroscientists alike, arguing that their findings can support or debunk moral intuitions that underlie those dilemmas. Resulting from the wedding of philosophy and neuroscience, neuroethics has emerged as a novel interdisciplinary field that aims at drawing conclusive relationships between neuroscientific observations and normative ethics. A major goal of neuroethics is to derive normative ethical conclusions from the investigation of neural and psychological mechanisms underlying ethical theories, as well as moral judgments and intuitions. The focus of this article is to shed light on the structure and functioning of neuroethical arguments of this sort, and to reveal particular methodological challenges that lie concealed therein. We discuss the methodological problem of how one can—or, as the case may be, cannot—validly infer normative conclusions from neuroscientific observations. Moreover, we raise the issue of how preexisting normative ethical convictions threaten to invalidate the interpretation of neuroscientific data, and thus arrive at question-begging conclusions. Nonetheless, this is not to deny that current neuroethics rightly presumes that moral considerations about actual human lives demand empirically substantiated answers. Therefore, in conclusion, we offer some preliminary reflections on how the discussed methodological challenges can be met.

Discovering the Neural Nature of Moral Cognition? Empirical, Theoretical, and Practical Challenges in Bioethical Research with Electroencephalography (EEG)

In this article we critically review the neural mechanisms of moral cognition that have recently been studied via electroencephalography (EEG). Such studies promise to shed new light on traditional moral questions by helping us to understand how effective moral cognition is embodied in the brain. It has been argued that conflicting normative ethical theories require different cognitive features and can, accordingly, in a broadly conceived naturalistic attempt, be associated with different brain processes that are rooted in different brain networks and regions. This potentially morally relevant brain activity has been empirically investigated through EEG-based studies on moral cognition. From neuroscientific evidence gathered in these studies, a variety of normative conclusions have been drawn and bioethical applications have been suggested. We discuss methodological and theoretical merits and demerits of the attempt to use EEG techniques in a morally significant way, point to legal challenges and policy implications, indicate the potential to reveal biomarkers of psychopathological conditions, and consider issues that might inform future bioethical work.

Brain transplants and possible worlds: A response to Beck

I am very grateful to Simon Beck for his thoughtful response to my paper “Transplanting Brains?” (2016). Needless to say, he raises more issues than I can hope to answer in a brief response. While Beck seemingly feels that the deck has been stacked against him, I think that the majority of his criticisms result from misconceptions and misunderstandings that I intend to straighten out in what follows. Before proceeding, I would like to draw attention to a worry that is lurking in the shadows. Perhaps Beck and I talk at cross purposes. While Beck is concerned with a metaphysical theory of personal identity that supposedly holds across all possible worlds—and as such places heavy importance on counterfactuals and intuitions—I am concerned only with the natural world with the aim of generating empirically substantiated hypotheses about how things really are when it comes to persons persisting through time. Now, here is a disclaimer: If the natural world does not exhaust reality, then my discussion is only partial. It goes without saying that most contemporary philosophers given a choice between going with science and going with intuitions, go with science.

Promoting inequality? Self-monitoring applications and the problem of social justice

When it comes to improving the health of the general population, mHealth technologies with self-monitoring and intervention components hold a lot of promise. We argue, however, that due to various factors such as access, targeting, personal resources or incentives, self-monitoring applications run the risk of increasing health inequalities, thereby creating a problem of social justice. We review empirical evidence for “intervention-generated” inequalities, present arguments that self-monitoring applications are still morally acceptable, and develop approaches to avoid the promotion of health inequalities through self-monitoring applications.

Designing a Holistic Behavior Change Support System for Healthy Aging

Abstract In this paper, we describe the development of a behavior change support system to improve health. The system is designed for people in the age range of 50–65 with an interdisciplinary approach. The basic structure of the presented system consists of two main modules: a monitoring module to collect and analyze data and an intervention module to support behavior changes. Based on the results of a requirements analysis and findings gathered from a conducted literature review and own analyses, the behavior change system addresses the following lifestyle areas: physical activity, nutrition, mental fitness, sleep, and nature contact. We outline how the concept is developed with regards to the results of the requirements analysis and psychological foundations to explain and predict motivation and behavior change processes. We describe how single system components match phases of behavior change models and how they were implemented into an Android application. Finally, we present the results of usability studies where the comprehensibility of the concept and application was tested together with the usability of navigation structure and design. The results show that the target group is able to understand the concept and can navigate through the system easily.

Corrigendum to: Designing a Holistic Behavior Change Support System for Healthy Aging

*Corresponding author: Katja Herrmanny, University of Duisburg-Essen, Personal Analytics, Forsthausweg 2, 47057 Duisburg, Germany, e-mail: katja.herrmanny@uni-due.de Michael Schwarz, Katrin Paldán, Nils Beckmann, Jennifer Sell, Nils-Frederic Wagner, Aysegül Dogangün, University of Duisburg-Essen, Personal Analytics, Forsthausweg 2, 47057 Duisburg, Germany, e-mails: michael.schwarz@uni-due.de, katrin.paldan@uni-due.de, nils.beckmann@uni-due.de, jennifer.sell@stud.uni-due.de, nils-frederic.wagner@uni-due.de, ayseguel.doganguen@uni-due.de Unfortunately, there are citations missing of the VisAWI-s (Moshagen & Thielsch, 2013) and the System Usability Scale (Brooke, 1996).