Nils Ringe

The Second-order Election Model in an Enlarged Europe

On 1 May 2004, the European Union (EU) welcomed its new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. This paper considers to what extent one of the most widely tested and supported theories of voting behavior in Western Europe, the second-order election model, applies in the enlarged EU. We test the model using election data from the new member states and find that voters do not cast protest votes against their incumbent national governments in second-order elec tions, that is, elections where voters believe little to be at stake. This finding contradicts one of the models basic propositions and runs counter to the empirical reality in the old member states, with potentially significant implications for inter and intra-institutional politics in the EU.

The Social Utility of Informal Institutions Caucuses as Networks in the 110th U.S. House of Representatives

This article challenges the existing state-of-knowledge about legislative caucuses by arguing that the caucus system reflects and reinforces formal organizing institutions, such as parties and committees, rather than counterbalancing them. We argue that legislators engage in the caucus system to maximize the social utility of their relationships. Using a social network framework, we develop and test hypotheses that seek to ascertain the types of legislators that assume elevated positions in the caucus network. We collect data on the complete population of caucuses and their members from the first session of the 110th U.S. House of Representatives and conduct social network analyses to find evidence that the caucus system supports the hierarchical structure of existing formal institutions.

Policy leadership and re-election in the European Parliament

ABSTRACT What determines the re-election of incumbent members of the European Parliament (MEPs)? Using Heckman probit models with sample selection to predict re-election in 2014, this contribution considers the impact of policy leadership, formal leadership, professional dedication, and seniority, and investigates the conditional effect of ballot structures. It finds that formal leadership only has a positive effect for party leaders elected from open lists, while dedication and seniority do not impact incumbents’ electoral performance. Instead, policy leadership is most clearly associated with incumbents’ electoral fortunes, including an innovative new measure of MEPs’ ability to influence the votes of others. The results also suggest that party leaders, when creating electoral lists that are not subject to change by voters, seek to ensure that policy leaders are reelected, but that voters, when given the opportunity to change the rankings of candidates on electoral lists, favor MEPs with greater electoral visibility instead.

Explaining Reelection in the European elections 2014

What determines the likelihood that incumbent Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are reelected? This chapter investigates the attributes and activities that national parties and voters may value when assessing incumbent MEPs’ term in office: leadership, experience, loyalty, expertise, dedication, or signaling. In a hierarchical logistic regression model, it examines the impact of a variety of legislative activities; leadership positions in European Parliament, party, and committee; seniority; and party loyalty. It also considers the extent to which the effects of these variables are conditional on ballot structure (preferential voting vs. closed party lists). The results show five factors to be positively associated with reelection: serving as party group leader, rapporteur, and intergroup chair, as well as, for those MEPs elected using preferential voting, the number of intergroups joined. Moreover, preferential voting is associated with a greater likelihood of reelection. These findings highlight, in particular, the importance of policy expertise for the electoral prospects of incumbent MEPs (as captured by rapporteurship and intergroup leadership). The results for leadership, signaling, and dedication are mixed, while party loyalty and experience have no apparent effect.

Democratic Politics in the European Parliament

participation in the war in Iraq, he no longer retained any advantage over his Conservative counterpart. While it would be difficult to say that the theoretical model offered here is parsimonious, Schofield and Sened apply it skilfully to the five cases they have selected. I have been particularly impressed by the elegant explanation provided for several US presidential elections and the processes of party realignment. As the authors themselves realise, ‘the analysis of Italy [few inaccuracies notwithstanding] and the Netherlands made it obvious that party activists should be brought into the electoral equation’ (p. 207), otherwise the explanation will remain somewhat unsatisfactory. It is difficult to predict whether the model here formulated and tested will lead, as the authors claim, to the all too ambitious goal represented by ‘an empirically relevant theory of democracy’ (p. 208). At this point, this research certainly seems a significant contribution to the analysis of party (not only ‘multiparty’) competition.

Rapporteur‐shadow rapporteur networks in the European Parliament: the strength of small numbers

Specialisation and delegation of policy leadership within committees is the norm rather than the exception in legislatures around the world. Yet, little research has studied the sub‐groups of lawmakers who serve as policy leaders on particular bills. This article uses conceptual and methodological tools from social network analysis to investigate the groups’ composition and relational structure. It tests the proposition that limited human resources lead lawmakers from small parties to more frequently engage with a greater number of colleagues from other parties across a wider range of policy areas. This may have important relational benefits that have the potential to outweigh the structural disadvantages of small party size. The article examines whether small party lawmakers participate more, are more central and have greater potential for brokerage in policy‐making networks, or if the constraints associated with small party size and/or particular ideological leanings prevent their realisation. Empirically, the analyses focus on working relationships between rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs in the adoption of reports by standing committees of the 7th European Parliament, 2009–2014. Methodologically, a mixed methods approach is employed. The quantitative analyses show that small party size does not affect legislators’ participation in policy‐making networks, but that it increases legislators’ centrality and brokerage potential. Regarding ideology, being committed to democratic participation as a good in itself has a positive association with all three outcomes, while attitudes to European integration show no effect. The qualitative data suggest that the relational benefits of belonging to a small party partially mitigate the structural disadvantages associated with it. They also indicate that policy making in the European Parliament is quite inclusive, as any systematic exclusion tends to be the result of self‐marginalisation.