Noël Carroll

Horror, Helplessness, and Vulnerability: A Reply to Robert Solomon

In a recent issue of Philosophy and Literature,1 Robert Solomon published a very provocative review-article of my book The Philosophy of Horror.2 In part, Solomons review is so very interesting because he approaches horror from a different methodological angle than I do, and he develops what is, in effect, an alternative theory of horror. Thus, before turning to some ofSolomons detailed criticisms ofmy philosophy of horror, it will be instructive to attempt to mark some of the fundamental differences between Solomon and me. A recurring theme in Solomons review is the notion of what I will call a reflexive component in our response to horror. That is, in Solomons account, our response to horror fictions is somehow involved with a thought about ourselves and our vulnerabilities (perhaps our vulnerabilities as human beings). The prototype here is Aristodes Poetics. Aristotle conjectured that when we witness the reversal of fortune of the tragic figure—a figure like us—we are put into a state of fear because we realize that such reversals could befall us. And in this we become