Noretta Koertge

Theory Change in Science

Nowadays theories about science change even more rapidly than science itself. Not too long ago nearly everyone would have agreed that the primary method of criticizing scientific theories was falsification; (the disagreements were over what positive things could be said about theories which survived testing). Then Kuhn (1962) discovered normal science and Agassi (1966) argued that Boyle’s Rule was dogmatic (why should one always keep the experimental result and drop the theory?) and so it was suggested that the method of science was the removal of inconsistencies, preferably not by ad hoc stratagems. However Feyerabend (1962) soon showed that the demand for consistency was much too stringent since most progressive new scientific theories were inconsistent with the best theories and observational evidence available at the time. Lakatos (1970) then proposed a sort of Pollyanna theory of science — scientific research programs should be evaluated by counting only their successes and ignoring their failures. But Feyerabend (1970) argued that even this standard was too restrictive and claimed that the methods of science were counter-induction, proliferation, and “anything goes.”

Popper's metaphysical research program for the human sciences 1

Popper has provided a model for the scientific explanation of human actions and a metaphysical theory of man which can guide scientific research. In this paper I discuss the problems of the empirical content and nomicity of the Rationality Principle and extend the method of situational analysis to the problem of explaining beliefs. The domain of applicability of the Rationality Principle is bounded on one side by cases in which behavior is determined by processes which can not be influenced by criticism and on the other side by the phenomenon of substantive creativity. However, a large part of human activity lies within its scope.

Simultaneous Electronic and Vibrational Transitions in the Spectra of Hydrated Nickel(II) Ion

A series of weak bands at about 19 000 cm—1 was found in the visible spectra of the hydrated nickel(II) ion in several crystals. These bands are assigned to simultaneous electronic and vibrational transitions involving the H–O stretching vibration. This assignment was confirmed by observation of an isotopic shift upon deuteration.

The methodological status of Popper's rationality principle

Poppers account of situational explanations is contrasted with the models of Dray and Hempel. Poppers Rationality Principle has the unusual feature of positing causal connections between objective ideas (world 3) and human behaviour (world 1).Poppers methodological policy concerning the Rationality Principle seems to be in direct conflict with his general theory of scientific method. However, I argue that Popper has underestimated the empirical content and criticizability of the Rationality Principle.

Inter-Theoretic Criticism and the Growth of Science

This paper is intended to be a small contribution to a future comprehensive Theory of Scientific Growth. I take it that such a theory would give an idealized description of the repeating patterns of growth found within the history of science and show how these developmental patterns are different from those found in the case of theories such as witchcraft, on the one hand, and the patterns found in the growth of the ‘practical arts’, such as pottery-making, on the other. The theory would go on to explain why such patterns might be expected to produce scientific knowledge by pointing out the critical forces which are operating and the rationality of the responses to them. In short, an adequate philosophical theory in this area should not only give the kinetics of scientific growth, but also the dynamics of that process.

Science, Values, and the Value of Science

Protagonists in the so-called Science Wars differ most markedly in their views about the role of values in science and what makes science valuable. Scientists and philosophers of science have traditionally considered the principal aims of science to be explanation and application. Only cognitive values should influence what is taken to be explanatory. Social and political values affect the priority assigned to various scientific problems and the ways in which scientific results are applied. Ethical considerations may be brought to bear on the treatment of human and animal subjects, and the manner in which scientific results are communicated. Recent critiques of science allege that the content of scientific explanations reflects the dominant ideology and interests of scientists and their patrons. Instead of calling for more value neutrality, some now urge that science take as a principal aim the emancipation of oppressed subcultures. Not only should progressive political values be allowed to set the problems attempted, they also should be used to constrain the types of answers which are pursued. Since scientific knowledge is constructed by us, we should take responsibility for its content. This paper argues that the project of Emancipationist science is impractical and self-defeating. There is good reason to believe that there would be unresolvable political disputes concerning which kinds of scientific theories are truly emancipiatory. Furthermore, just as placebos cease to work when recognized as such, so would a science known to be constrained by political considerations lose its special epistemic authority.

Towards a New Theory of Scientific Inquiry

An instructive model for the philosopher interested in scientific method is a novel entitled Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. The narrator (who is a dropout from Mortimer Adler’s program at the University of Chicago) stresses the importance of good external and internal working conditions: Loud music is distracting; you will need good light and room to lay out your tools; if you are feeling impatient, knock off for the day — or at the very least, don’t attempt a sensitive job; try to remain flexible in your diagnosis of what is wrong; investigate various alternatives in a systematic way.

Scientific values and civic virtues

There has been much debate recently about the relationship between science and politics. This volume of essays takes an affirming, positive view of the relationship between the values embodied in science (such as honesty and precision of language) and the nature of civil society. The contributors - who include philosophers, political scientists, feminist theorists, physicists and engineers - argue that science can broadly inspire the civic virtues of an educated and tolerant global enterprise dedicated to the common good.

Methodology, Ideology and Feminist Critiques of Science

This paper deals with two questions. First, if all scientists were perfect Popperians, how much influence could their background values and experiences have? It is argued that background can play a role in problem choice and in the constructing and testing of hypotheses. Second, do the ideals of feminism suggest the need for a new methodology and epistemology for science? In answering this question, Hardings paper in this volume is discussed.

Explaining Scientific Discovery

Since philosophers of science have shown that discoveries cannot be predicted, how can historians of science explain them? The concept of discovery is explicated and what is required in order to provide a covering law explanation of past scientific discoveries is analyzed. The account relies on Hempels model of genetic explanation, Poppers situational logic and Salmons theory of statistical relevance. The Verstehen approach also plays an important role.