Noriko O. Tsuya

Social networks and family change in Japan

Japan, unlike most Western countries, has not experienced several components of the second demographic transition, including cohabitation, widespread use of childcare centers, unmarried childbearing, and nonmarriage. Yet there is evidence that Japan is ripe for change in such family behaviors. This article examines a set of innovative questions related to knowing individuals who have engaged in these behaviors by type of relationship (sibling, other relative, friend, and coworker) respondent has to such individuals. We find that a large proportion of the Japanese population knows someone who has cohabited, used childcare, had a nonmarital birth, or plans to remain unmarried. This knowledge is patterned by both relationship domain and social structural variables. There is a strong positive association between knowing someone who has engaged in one of these behaviors and attitudes toward nontraditional family behavior, suggesting pathways by which micro-level interpersonal interactions may be linked to macro-level social change.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF LOW FERTILITY

Japans very low fertility is set in the context of the ‘marriage package’ faced by never-married young people. The competition between the unmarried lifestyle and the traditional package of marital roles has led to delays in marriage and childbearing. The marriage package is discussed in terms of levels of and preferences for wifes education and employment, the division of household labor, the changing nature of marriage, and the rising risk of divorce. The extended portion of adult life spent unmarried and childless is also creating feedback loops at both the individual and societal level by providing new opportunities for innovative behaviors such as cohabitation.

IS THE GENDER DIVISION OF LABOUR CHANGING IN JAPAN

The paper examines potential changes in housework and employment among married couples in Japan. The data are from national surveys in 1994 and 2000 of persons aged 20–49. Wives’ housework hours decreased and the proportion of husbands doing any housework increased. A majority of wives are employed, many work full-time and husbands work long hours and many return home late in the evening. While wives do less housework if they are employed, husbands’ housework does not respond to their wives’ employment. Large gender differences persist, with wives’ employment associated with family constraints. In general, changes were the same across categories of the population, though three of five significant interactions with time involved wives’ education. A positive relationship between wives’ education and any housework by husbands becomes stronger over time. The results suggest gender inequality in housework may decrease in the future, with potential relevance to future marriage and fertility.

Below-Replacement Fertility in Japan: Patterns, Factors, and Policy Implications

Japan has experienced two fertility transitions, the first a decline from high to the replacement level of about 2.1 children per woman shortly after World War II and the second a decline since the mid-1970s from replacement to very low total fertility rates (TFR) of 1.3–1.4 children per woman. While the first transition stemmed primarily from declining rates of childbearing among married couples, the second transition has been related almost entirely to the postponement of marriage and childbearing. And it now looks like substantial numbers of Japanese women and men will never marry and will remain childless. Improved education and labor-market opportunities for young women, combined with decreasing regular employment for young men, is likely leading to the postponement or avoidance of marriage. In addition, the combination of rising economic opportunities in the workplace and unequal gender relations at home make the traditional marriage package particularly unattractive for young Japanese women. Concerned about very low fertility and rapid population aging, the Japanese government has introduced various family policies and programs since the early 1990s. These consist of three major components: (1) childcare services; (2) parental leave schemes; and (3) monetary assistance in the form of child allowances. Despite these efforts, Japan’s family policy appears to have been largely ineffective in the sense that strains, especially on working mothers, have not been alleviated and fertility has remained very low.

Social class and migration in two northeastern Japanese villages, 1716–1870

This paper examines the effects of household social class called ‘mibun’ on the likelihood of migration among peasant men and women from their residing communities, focusing on two farming villages in preindustrial northeastern Japan. Using the local population registers called ‘ninbetsu-aratame-cho’ from 1716–1870, we analyze the relationship between social class of peasant household and different types of out-migration for individual men and women in agricultural communities. We found large differences in landholding between households of titled peasants (honbyakusho) who owned land and those of mizunomi peasants who were in principle landless, suggesting that social class indexed the amount of wealth that a household possessed although considerable economic differences existed among households of titled peasants. These differences in household social class influenced the likelihoods of different types of out-migration of residents in the two farming villages. Regardless of reasons, mizunomi peasants were more likely to migrate out of their village of residence than titled peasants for both sexes. Further, the higher likelihood of out-migration among the mizunomi class was especially notable for male labor migration at the time of local economic hardships.

Fertility Transition: East Asia

Japan, Korea, and Taiwan experienced rapid transitions from high to the replacement level of fertility in the earlier postwar decades, followed by further declines to well below-replacement levels of childbearing in the recent decades. While the earlier fertility transitions were due mainly to reduction of marital fertility through contraception and induced abortion, the more recent transitions to very low levels were due largely to decreasing marriage among young women. The declining marriage and fertility were associated with increases in educational attainment and paid employment among women at peak reproductive ages in the context of rapid economic transformations.